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ELEMENTS

OF

THEOLOGY

NATURAL AND REVEALED.

BY

JAMES H. FAIRCHILD,

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN OBERLIN COLLEGE.

OBERLIN, O.
EDWARD J. GOODRICH.

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PREFACE.

A long course of teaching in any definite line, naturally results in a book. If the teacher is not himself impressed with the idea that the thoughts which have seemed to interest and aid his pupils may be interesting and profitable to others, his pupils at least are sure to press a claim which it is difficult to withstand. This is the explanation of the present volume, as to its motive and its form.

Since the volume must present an extended range of topics, the author has been obliged to content himself with the simplest statements, intended to be luminous and comprehensible, presenting scarcely more than the bare outlines of the system, with little attempt at illustration, or extended argument in support of special views. The great body of literature which gathers about these subjects must be passed over in silence, and no attempt to give the historical connections of the different doctrines, could be indulged. It was only by such a method that the volume could be kept within the necessary limits. It is hoped that this condensation may render the treatise more available to the majority of its readers. The trained theologian can supply for himself the appropriate setting of historical and dogmatic literature, and the untrained reader who is willing to give the subject reasonable attention and thought, will find himself able to follow the statements and arguments with less embarrassment. The moderate dimensions of the book will invite, rather than repel, such readers. It is the hope of the author

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that many thinking men in the churches, who have had no specific study or training in this direction, may still be able to read the book with understanding and with profit.

The controlling thought in the mind of the author, the organic principle in the system of doctrine presented, is the recognition of the distinct and complete personality of God, and a like personality in man, as set forth in the Scriptures. It has been his purpose to develop the system of truth in harmony with these two correlated facts, and thus reach a self-consistent and reasonable theology. If the attempt shall prove to be a slight contribution toward such a result, he will be content.

OBERLIN, FEB., 1892.

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ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Theology, in its general or comprehensive sense, is the science of religion; that is, a scientific presentation of the facts and doctrines of religion.

1. Religion may be contemplated in two aspects, as objective and subjective. Objectively, religion is a system of truth pertaining to God, and to man as related to God. Thus it is something to be known. Subjectively, religion is an experience, and involves a right attitude of the will and of the affections toward God, and an experience of the divine favor in response to this attitude. Thus, religion is something to be known, to be practiced and experienced. Theology treats of religion, more distinctly, in its objective character.

2. As related to ethics, theology is scientifically subordinate, as the species to the genus. Religion is duty toward God. General duty is a broader fact than religion; duty to God is therefore a branch of general duty. God is a moral being, because his character and actions come under the principles of ethics. He is not a religious being, because he owes no duty to a superior. Scientifically considered, it is wrong to derive duty from God and religion. Duty is primary and religion derived. As a fact of science, obligation would exist if God and religion did not, provided moral beings existed. The great motives to duty, however, must be derived from God and religion.

3. Theology being, in its comprehensive form, the science of religion, is divided into two parts, because there are two parties in religion—God and man. The first part of theology is the study of God, the science of God, his existence and attributes and government. This part is theology in its specific sense. The second part of general theology is the study of man as the creature of God, and as owing him duty, as subject to his government. This is called, in a restricted sense, *Anthropology;* that is, the science of man as a religious being.

4. Theology, in its generic sense, receives, again, different designations, according to the sources from which the facts are derived. We may go directly to the works of God, guided by principles of our own reason and intelligence; and the truths we thus gather in reference to God, his attributes and government, and pertaining to man as related to God, are called *Natural Theology.*

Natural theology, therefore, embraces those facts pertaining to God, and to man as related to God, which might be gained from nature, without what is strictly called revelation. This knowledge is not limited to what men do actually learn, but includes what may be established from nature when once the truth has been suggested. To illustrate—the truths of geometry are truths of reason, can be established on rational grounds. They might have been given by revelation; but when once we had the truths, we should not depend on revelation for their validity. So the facts of natural theology might be first suggested by revelation, but they can be established and sustained apart from revelation.

5. But revelation comes in to supplement this knowledge of God, his providence and government, and of ourselves as related to God, giving us a better view of the facts of natural theology, and adding truths which lie beyond the scope of reason. Theology thus extended and sustained is called *Revealed Theology.*

Natural and revealed theology differ, primarily, in the sources from which their materials are derived, as well as in the extent and minuteness of their facts and doctrines. Revealed theology presents more minutely the facts of the divine government, the special dispensations of God's providence, the historical facts of the origin of sin in the world, the history of redemption, and the doctrine of the future life. The proper order is to begin with natural theology, that we may find the grounds for accepting revelation, and then to combine the two.

6. Other subdivisions of theology are sometimes employed, and designated by special terms. Thus, *Soteriology* is that division of theology which treats of salvation from sin. *Eschatology* treats of the facts and doctrines of the future life.

7. Still again, theology is designated as *Systematic*, didactic or dogmatic, when presented in a scientific form—its doctrines distinctly announced and sustained. Theology is called *Apologetic* when the evidences of the truth of the Christian religion are presented and maintained. It is *Polemic* when the truth is vindicated in contrast with opposing errors or heresies. *Historical theology* presents the progress of religious opinion, or the development of Christian doctrine. *Biblical theology* is the study of the facts of theology as presented in the Scriptures, the order and method of their presentation being followed out. It is based upon the fact that revelation has been progressive, that the facts of religion have been gradually unfolded. All true theology must, of course, be Biblical, in the highest sense; but technically Biblical theology presents the order and method of the revelation of Christian doctrine.

8. Theology touches almost all branches of study and of thought.

(1) It involves a study of natural science, inasmuch as nature reveals the divine methods and purposes, and illus-

trates the divine attributes. Questions of creation and providence, and of the interpretation of the Scriptures, require for their solution the study of natural science; at least to the extent of ability to appreciate results, evidences and conclusions. The theologian does not need to be a specialist in science, but must have some comprehensive view of the facts which it presents.

(2) The theologian needs to be familiar with metaphysical and ethical philosophy, because these furnish the foundation principles of his study. He cannot move a step without assuming these principles; and his superstructure can never be more reliable or trustworthy than the foundation on which he builds. We sometimes hear of a theology which is built upon the Scriptures, and is independent of all philosophy. The idea is a delusion. Every theology has its philosophy either true or false.

(3) Again, revealed theology is found in the Scriptures; and a satisfactory study of the Scriptures involves the study of their original languages and related languages, also of the countries and times in which the Scriptures were given. Thus, philology, archæology and history become aids in the study of theology.

(4) Again, opinions and doctrines can be better understood if presented in connection with the history of their origin and development. A doctrine takes its form in the symbols of the church, not only from the positive truth apprehended, but also from the opposing error against which the doctrinal expression is aimed. Thus, the history of the church and of doctrinal opinion becomes important.

9. Thus it appears that the range of theological study is very wide; not that one must traverse the entire field in order to hold intelligently and defend positive views on the leading points of doctrine, but all such study contributes to a sound and trustworthy theology. A glance at this wide field makes it obvious that theology is a progressive science.

Every advance in philosophy, in natural science, in philology, or in history, may lead to a corresponding improvement in the expression of theological doctrine. This has always been true, and must still be true. Not that there can be any change in the great facts pertaining to God and to man, or in any of the truths of revelation ; but there will be a better apprehension and expression of these facts, and this constitutes the science of theology. An illustration may be drawn from the science of astronomy. The facts of the heavenly bodies are essentially unchanging, but our knowledge of these facts is constantly extending; and thus the science of astronomy changes from year to year. The facts of the atonement must be forever the same, but the theoretical statement of the doctrine may be greatly improved. Even the familiar truth of the being of God must be better understood and expressed, as human consciousness is more thoroughly fathomed.

10. The spirit in which the study is to be pursued is a devout and truth-loving disposition, equally removed from a credulous and from a sceptical spirit—a heart in harmony with God, and in love with the truth. "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, shall in no-wise enter therein."

CHAPTER II.

THE BEING OF GOD.

1. The question of *God's existence* is fundamental in theology, the primary question. If God is not, there can be no religion and no theology. His existence must be proved from nature and reason, not from a written revelation taken as authority. We must know that God is, before we can accept a revelation as authority. Still, the proof of his existence must be found in some manifestation of himself—a revelation of himself in some form.

2. The kind of proof which we need and must look for, is such as we require for other facts—for our own existence and the existence of other men, and other things. The question of the validity of our knowledge in general, is not properly involved in the inquiry. If we find similar evidence of God's existence as for the existence of our fellow men, it should be sufficient. We need not inquire further whether our faculties are trustworthy, whether they give us any knowledge whatsoever. All philosophy, all science, rests upon the question of the reality, or validity, of our knowledge. The theologian is not, of necessity, more interested in this question than the statesman or the naturalist. He is required to build upon the common foundation—nothing more. The question of the validity of our knowledge belongs to the science of metaphysics, not to theology, natural or revealed. When we have proved that God exists, by proof similar to that on which we rest for the existence of the external world, we have done all that can be properly required. We need not settle the previous question of the reality of knowledge. Nor, again, do we need mathemati-

cal demonstration of God's being. We have no such demonstration of any existence.

3. The theistic proposition is: God exists—a personal being, with all the attributes of moral agency, supreme in the universe, its creator and ruler. This is Theism as contrasted with any view which grounds the universe in material forces or laws, instead of deriving it from a free and personal being. The proof of this propsition is essential to the establishment of theism. Let us first, in a practical way, inquire whether there is any presumption in the case, and what it is.

4. There is in the human soul a general conviction of the existence of such a being. This is shown (1) in the universal tendency to worship. Worship, even in its lowest form, contemplates a personal being—a superior, one who understands and appreciates the worship. Men in all times, and in all conditions, have been worshipers.

It is shown (2) in the sense of accountability; that is, of responsibility to an overruling power. This should be distinguished from the sense of obligation. Obligation exists toward an equal or an inferior—even toward an unintelligent creature. Accountability contemplates a superior —one who will bring us into judgment. There can be no thought of accountability, or responsibility, to a force or a law of nature—only to a superior intelligence, a person. This sense of accountability is exhibited in the expectation of punishment for wrong-doing, and of favor and prosperity for right conduct. Such an expectation is co-extensive with human experience. It is shown also in the attempt to expiate guilt; to propitiate by sacrifice and penance. Sacrifice is offered to a person in whose power the one who offers the sacrifice believes himself to be. Every such practice is an exhibition of the sense of accountability.

5. The conviction of the existence of such a being is as real in the uncultivated as in the cultivated, in the sav-

age as in the civilized. In general, those who doubt have been led to doubt by philosophical speculation, and an unsuccessful attempt to bring their conviction to the test of logical thought. But even the philosophical sceptic, in an emergency, shows a practical belief.

Again, the readiness with which the idea of an overruling being is implanted in the mind of a child, is a significant fact. It does not come to him like an ordinary fact of history or science, but with authority, and follows him through all his years. You do not need to ask a man if he believes in God ; you may always assume the fact in addressing a human creature, wherever you find him.

6. The prevalence of this conviction of God's existence is evidence of the fact. The conviction is itself a fact that needs to be explained. The most obvious and reasonable explanation of the belief, is the fact of God's existence. His existence is the cause, the belief is the effect. What other explanation have we of this all-pervading, ineradicable belief? The fact of God's existence is somehow naturally revealed to men ; hence they believe it. It may have come originally by tradition ; it is confirmed and sustained by thought and experience. This view must be regarded as a practical argument, sufficient for everyday use.

7. But the complete argument must explain the origin of this conviction, and set forth the manner in which God's existence becomes known ; must trace the connection between the fact and the belief. In general, an argument for God's existence is an attempt, more or less successful, to show how the belief arises, or what is the process of thought in the case.

8. At first view the task would seem an easy one, because the conviction is so general and so potent, one of the governing ideas of the world. It would seem easy to explain its origin ; but our primitive convictions are often most difficult to trace ; their origin escapes us. For example, the

fact of our own existence, and of the existence of our fellow men—there is nothing we know more certainly ; but how do we attain the knowledge? A failure to explain the conviction is nothing against the validity of the belief. A conviction is often more reliable than the reason we are able to give for it. The most direct and positive and irresistible conclusions are often most difficult to trace; the process is too rapid and direct, the steps are too few. Slow and tedious processes of reasoning are easily retraced and verified.

9. We will now attend to some of the explanations which have been, or can be, given, of the origin of this conviction in the soul. The proposed methods may be divided into two general classes designated as *a priori* and *a posteriori*. *A priori* methods are those which do not depend on any data, or facts of sense or experience. They are purely rational, or intuitive. An *a priori* argument for God's existence assumes that among the principles or affirmations of pure reason, we shall find grounds sufficient for the conviction. An *a posteriori* argument lies over against this, and looks for proof among the facts and data of experience, reasoning from effect to cause.

10. Let us first consider an example, or two, of proposed *a priori* arguments.

(1) The *Ontological Argument*, as it is called, is commonly attributed to Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, and may be stated as follows : We have in our intelligence, an idea of an independent, perfect being, one element of whose perfection is the necessity of his existence. When once the thought of this infinite being comes to us, we cannot think of him as not existing; hence he not only is, but must be. Our thought of God, it is said, is analogous to our ideas of space and time. When we think of space, we know that it is and must be ; we cannot think it away. Dr. Samuel Clarke, an English theologian, carrying out this analogy, maintained that space and time are attributes of

God. They must be, he says, either entities or attributes. They are not entities, therefore they are attributes of an infinite and eternal being—that is, attributes of God. The argument does not appear satisfactory. We have no idea of a being whose non-existence is impossible to our thought. Space and time are not beings nor attributes. They are simply space and time. Reason alone cannot bring us to being at all. It gives us ideas, truths, relations.

(2) What has been called the *Psychological Argument* for the existence of God, was presented by Descartes, and has been re-stated by others since his day. It may be stated as follows: We have the idea of an infinite and perfect being. There must be an archetype, a reality, corresponding to this idea. The argument seems to rest upon the assumption that all ideas which we necessarily have, and cannot be without, have a reality corresponding with them. Thus the idea is proof of the reality. This assumption is scarcely valid. The idea may be explained on other grounds. The idea of an infinite and perfect being is the natural correlative of the idea of ourselves as imperfect. The two ideas cannot be separated; each implies the other. Thus the supposed axiom that every such idea implies an existence corresponding with it, falls to the ground.

Again, if the idea comes from the reality as its source or cause, it must come through reason or sense or consciousness, which are the natural avenues of knowledge. To complete the argument, the process must be shown. The rational faculty does not give us being, and if we reach the conviction through sense or consciousness, the process is not *a priori* but *a posteriori*.

We may abandon the thought of reaching God by any direct exercise of reason, or by any *a priori* method, as we reach mathematical truths. Mathematical truths are not beings or realities.

11. We must fall back then, upon *a posteriori* meth-

ods, which are the only methods by which we come to the knowledge of ourselves, or of any existence or reality whatever.

(1) Do we know God as we know ourselves? No, we know ourselves in consciousness. We are directly aware that we think and feel and will, and thus are aware that we exist. We have no such knowledge of God. Consciousness gives us ourselves directly, but not God. If there were an inward revelation of God to each human soul, as some claim, the knowledge of God would not be direct, as the knowledge of ourselves.

(2) Do we know God as we know the external world? We know the external world through our senses; we feel and see it. Do we thus know God? No, he does not disclose himself to any of our external senses; we do not feel, or touch or see him, directly.

(3) Do we know the existence of God as we know the existence of our fellow men? And how do we know the existence of our fellow men? We do not touch or see them. We touch and see bodies like our own, but these are not our fellow men, any more than the garments they wear. Yet our fellow men reveal themselves to us through movements of these bodies, and by works which they perform, results which they bring to pass. We see evidences that these bodies are inhabited by beings like ourselves. The fact that we bring such things to pass, is the ground for our attributing similar acts to our fellow-men, or assuming the existence of other men. We do not remember such a process of reasoning, but we have instinctively, spontaneously, pursued it.

(4) Again, if our fellow-men had bodies entirely different from ours, they might give us evidence that they had essentially the same spiritual nature; their actions, realized plans or purposes, would prove it. Nay, beings without bodies, invisible, might reveal themselves to us by manifes-

tations of intelligence, of purpose, or of power, through other material objects; so that we should believe, on reasonable grounds, in the existence of other spirits like ourselves.

12. Thus God reveals himself in the world—the universe of matter and of mind; and thus the Scriptures present the argument for God's existence, so far as they present an argument. Gen. i. 1, In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. Heb. xi. 3, Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear. Psalms xix. 1, The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Isaiah xl. 26, Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number; he calleth them all by names, by the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in power; not one faileth.

13. In regard to the existence of the universe, three suppositions can be made.

(1) It has come into existence without cause; or began to be, uncaused.

(2) It has existed without beginning, from eternity.

(3) It is the work of some cause or force or being which has existed from eternity.

These three suppositions cover the ground, exhaust the possibilities of the case. The first contradicts our reason—the rational principle of causation. Nothing can ever come uncaused. If anything exists, something has existed from eternity. The world exists, therefore there has been eternal existence.

The second supposition, that the organized world has existed from eternity, is equally contradictory to the principle of causation. In the organized world we find generations of living beings succeeding each other, the present generation coming from the preceding, and that from the

one before, and so on indefinitely. There must be a cause of all, a real beginning; otherwise we have an infinite series of dependent existences, each term in the series depending upon the preceding, which is impossible. As in a suspended chain, where the lowest link is sustained by the one above, and that by the next, and so on, there must be a support of the whole; so with a series of dependent existences. If each is caused by the preceding, or depends in any way upon it for its existence, there must be a primal or original term, the cause of all. An infinite series of dependent terms is impossible. Hence there must be an uncaused, eternally existing, cause from which the succession of the universe springs.

That we cannot affirm the impossibility of an infinite series of dependent terms, has been argued from the successive moments of time, or from the successive units in a line extending through space. These, it is said, are examples of an infinite series. Not so; there is no dependence of one term upon another. A moment of time is not produced by a preceding, or dependent upon it in any sense. It is not a series of dependent terms. So of the units of a line in space. We know absolutely, when we see a series of dependent links, that the whole depends upon some sustaining cause, as truly as we know that the last depends on the preceding.

But again, without any reference to a series, every finite, dependent existence, material or spiritual, requires a creator. Its finiteness or limitation compels us to regard it as having had a beginning, and thus we always pass to an uncaused, eternal, original cause, and thus to God, who is revealed as the eternal, uncreated cause, by the very existence of the ordered universe.

Still again, the adjustments of the universe, the adaptations of parts conspiring to a result, are proof of design and a designer. The force of the argument is in the fact

that such an arrangement is instantly apprehended to be an effect—something brought about, caused, by thought and purpose and will. Paley illustrates this argument from the watch, and the necessity of assuming a maker. The same necessity arises in the contemplation of the countless adaptations of the universe. This is called the teleological argument; that is, the argument from manifested design.

14. Here the objection, or difficulty, is suggested, Why stop with God, in our pursuit of a cause? Does not the principle of causation lead us to demand the origin of God as well as of the world? This is the first thought of children in their attempts at philosophy. But clearer thought shows that the demand for a cause drives us back to a being who stands at the head of the universe, existing without beginning, and infinite in his attributes, where we find a rational resting-place for our thought. A being whom we apprehend as infinite and eternal suggests no inquiry for the cause of his existence. We find no resting-place, under the pressure of the demand for a cause, until we reach an eternal personality. To this the principle of causation at length drives us; to rest short of this is to stop with the finite and the limited—that which is seen to be an effect, and not the cause.

15. The atheistic development scheme proposes matter as the original eternal substance; or if not matter, somewhat in the shape of force, unknown and unknowable, which is the ground or cause of both matter and mind; not properly a creator, because not intelligent and personal. The first known existence, it is claimed, is homogeneous matter, and out of that is developed the ordered universe of matter and mind. It is only necessary to say that development, properly conceived, is simply a coming out, from any existence, of what was already involved in it. If the organic, the living and intelligent, universe has been evolved from homogeneous matter, it must have been in the matter be-

fore the evolution; and the demand for creation applies to this homogeneous matter, as to the cosmic universe. If we find the universe in a germ, we must still inquire who made the germ. It is a strange illusion that the problem is essentially changed by such a supposition. The adjustment to bring about a result still requires the supposition of a cause. The vague ideas of force and law involve mere bewilderment, and afford no shelter for rational thought. There is no force or law apart from being.

Evolutionary views do not necessarily exclude an intelligent creator. But the theistic evolutionist must ever hold that nothing can come from any source, or origin, by evolution, which was not essentially contained in that origin. Any evolution beyond this, is a denial of the principle of causation—an admission of an event without a cause.

16. While we cannot go to the Scriptures as authority, in proof of the existence of God, the existence of the Scriptures and of revealed religion in the world, may furnish an argument. These are facts, events, which must be explained. If God exists, the Scriptures and the historical revelations which they contain are accounted for; and there is no other reasonable explanation. The Scriptures and revealed religion are not a natural development, not a human product. The remarkable facts and communications thus presented suggest God as their source, and this is the only reasonable explanation of their existence.

In thus using the Scriptures we do not appeal to their authority as proof of God's existence; we treat them simply as a fact, a phenomenon that needs to be explained. It is not simply the book called the Scriptures which needs the explanation, but the facts and manifestations which the book contains—historical religion as it has appeared in the world.

17. Every argument and proof of God's existence is vitalized and enforced by our own moral and religious constitution. The human soul is adapted to receive the idea of

God, and the conviction of his existence; it is the natural soil for the growth of the idea. However obscure and skeleton-like the conception may be, in its first appearance in the intelligence, man's moral nature gives it life, and clothes it with power.

The establishment of the relation of parent and child illustrates the case. The child needs the parent; his nature is made for the relationship; he responds to the approach of the parent, accepts the idea, grows up with it, submits his life to be shaped and directed by it. But he is conscious of no course of reasoning through which he has passed on the subject of parental right and authority. Somehow, the conviction of the facts has taken possession of him, and he can never reasonably question the obligation; so men accept the thought of God. That thought may come originally from speculation or tradition, or from some other source. The consciousness of dependence and want, the outgoing of the religious nature, impels the soul to accept God, to "feel after him and find him." No child ever needed a parent more than man needs God. Our religious nature, which calls for God, is the chief factor in establishing in our minds the conviction of his being. But as we have seen, there is a rational and intellectual basis for the conviction. Without this, the conviction would doubtless disappear from the world, with other dreams and fancies.

CHAPTER III.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

The attributes of God naturally divide themselves into two classes: those which belong to his nature, called natural attributes, which are independent of his will, and those which depend upon his will and constitute his moral character, called moral attributes.

NATURAL ATTRIBUTES.

1. The leading attribute of God's nature is personality. God is a person, an intelligent, voluntary, sentient being. We find the proof of his personality:

(1) In the fact that he is the first or originating cause of all things; and the proper conception of cause, is the power to produce results. This is primary or original cause, as distinguished from a secondary cause which is simply a link in the chain of effects. With this conception of cause, we are led to a personal being, with intelligence and free-will. To illustrate: we loosely say that the compressed spring of the watch causes the movement; but it does not originate the motion. The compression of the spring is an effect, not an original cause. We go back to the person who brought his will to bear, and applied his force to the compression of the spring, for the true cause of the motion of the watch. The spring merely yields up the force which was imparted to it. Thus, in searching for a cause, we can never stop until we reach intelligence, will and personality.

(2) Again, the first cause of the universe must be intelligent and personal, because there are evidences of intelligence in its adjustments. The evidence of design and

purpose is proof of intelligence and will; that is, of moral agency.

(3) We know God to be a moral agent because he has created moral agents. All the principles and conditions of moral agency he must understand—obligation, right and wrong, free-will and sensibility; and therefore these facts pertain to his nature.

To this argument it is sometimes objected that it would imply that God must have a material nature; otherwise he could have no idea of matter, and could not create it. The objection can scarcely hold, because whatever powers and forces there are in matter can be known by a rational, personal, being. Force is a product of mind; matter is the outcome of mind, and the invention and product of matter is the prerogative of mind. The creation of a moral agent is the work of a moral agent, because whoever possesses the ideas involved in moral agency, must, by virtue of these ideas, be a moral agent.

2. These attributes of personality exist in God without limitation—are infinite. We predicate infinity of his natural attributes, indicating the extent of these attributes. This is, I think, a clearer statement than to make infinity a distinct attribute; it is rather the mode of all his attributes. He is infinite in duration, in power, in knowledge, in all his natural attributes; so that we say, God is infinite, in his nature.

The proof of this infinity we find in our necessary intuitions in regard to the first cause. We cannot rest in a finite person, or in anything finite, as the original cause. The finite requires a beginning, a creator. We rest, in our inquiry for a creator, when we reach the infinite, and only then. The child that asks, who made God, has not reached God in his thought; only a remote ancestor of finite persons. We cannot pass, by a mere logical process, from creation to an infinite creator. Creation is finite, but the creator must

be infinite; otherwise he is a part of creation. To specify some of God's subordinate natural attributes:

(1) We predicate Eternity of him; by which we mean that he exists without beginning. This is a necessary affirmation, involved in the very idea of first cause—a cause existing without beginning, therefore from eternity. Such a being sustains a relation to time which we cannot properly comprehend, yet we necessarily affirm it. Attempts are sometimes made to elucidate the idea, to make it comprehensible. It is sometimes said that succession of time is not predicable of God; that he fills all time, as he fills all space; that all time is present to him, that his existence is an eternal *now*. These are words to which, in the finite comprehension, there is no corresponding thought. The only now, of which we can think, is related to a past and a future. Succession of time is a rational necessity; it belongs to time as a rational conception. Time is not an eternal now. Such succession must of necessity pertain to God's being. If God has no past, no future, he has no now. When we have said that God exists from eternity on through eternity, we have said all that we are authorized to say—all that is rationally apprehensible.

(2) In the affirmation of God's infinity, we predicate of him Omnipotence—power without limitation. He can accomplish whatever is an object of power. Works which involve an absurdity or self-contradiction are, of course, excluded; they do not belong to omnipotence. For example, to determine that two and two shall be five instead of four; that there should be a shorter distance between two points than a straight line, is not predicable of omnipotence, and does not belong to God. There are, also, moral absurdities, not quite so obvious, but just as real. For example, that God should compel a wicked man to become virtuous, or should by his power turn the hearts of men from sin to holiness, are such absurdities. Holiness and virtue are the

free, voluntary choice of men, and cannot be enforced or produced by power.

We predicate omnipotence of God, not because the universe, as we see it, is a display of omnipotence; but because our rational thought ascribes infinity to the first cause. There may be, indeed, works which we instinctively refer to infinite power; for example, the creation of matter and mind and life, and the raising of the dead. We seem to see that our finite power sustains no relation to such works, and we judge that they result from infinite power; but the affirmation of infinite power in God, is a rational intuition, and not strictly a logical inference.

(3) We affirm again, that God is Omniscient—that all knowable things are known to him; that the past the present and the future are alike open to his apprehension. The method of his fore-knowledge we cannot explain. It is sometimes said that God's perfect knowledge of the present explains his knowledge of the future; that he knows perfectly, all causes and existences, including his own purposes; and must therefore know all facts which can or will spring from them. Such a statement implies that all future events lie in the chain of cause and effect linked to the will of God, and that there is no room for the operation of finite free-will.

The more simple statement that God fore-ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and therefore fore-knows what is to be, is equally opposed to the fact of human freedom. The difficulty of explaining the fore-knowledge of a free act of a finite creature, has led some to deny such fore-knowledge to God, and to find a limitation to God's omniscience in the free acts of his creatures, similar to the limitation of his omnipotence in acts which imply a contradiction. The cases are not analogous. The simple fore-knowledge of what a free agent will do, involves no perceived contradiction; but our explanation of that fore-knowledge may involve a contra-

diction; and this fact may set aside the explanation, but not the fore-knowledge. We must suppose that there is, to God, some direct beholding of the future, a power which we cannot explain or understand. The mere reasoning out of the future from the present is finite prescience, not infinite fore-knowledge.

Again, infinite knowledge must be minute and all-pervading, a knowledge not simply of great things, but of all things. God's infinity does not separate him from small things, or make these insignificant to him. That greatness is finite, not infinite, which passes over the small to attend to the great. God's appreciation of all things is absolute, not relative. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father."

(4) God is Omnipresent, in the sense in which such a fact is predicable of the Infinite Spirit. Our idea connected with the affirmation is, that there is not a point of infinite space which is beyond the reach of his power, or the manifestation of his presence. This relation to space we do not comprehend, but we rationally know it as a fact. We know little of the relation of finite spirit to space, much less of the Infinite Spirit.

Omnipresence is sometimes explained to mean that every point in space is *here* to God; but thus again, we have words without thought. Here, as we know it, implies a there. It is an attempt to explain the inexplicable.

(5) Again, God's infinity implies his Immutability, the unchangeableness of his nature. Nothing can add to, or take away from him; there can be no gain or loss of knowledge, no growth in experience; no new view can ever come to him. This is natural immutability, and is involved in his independent and uncaused existence. Moral immutability must not be confounded with natural.

(6) Still again, the Unity of God is involved in his in-

finity. He stands alone in the universe, as independent and eternal in his being. Two such beings existing together could not be infinite. The divine trinity, whatever it implies, must be consistent with the unity of God's being. This gives us, rationally, monotheism as opposed to polytheism. Polytheism presents finite divinities, not the infinite; unless the infinite Deity, as in the case of thinking polytheists is assumed as standing back of the finite. Here arises the question of the eternity of matter, a favorite speculation with some philosophers. The finiteness and dependence of matter, its adaptedness to the use of spiritual beings, prove it created.

4. Thus God is an infinite personality, the Infinite Spirit. Every act of worship involves this assumption; it involves the recognition of a personal being, ever accessible, ready to help in every time of need.

As we have seen, a consciousness of our own nature guides us in attaining a knowledge of God, and of his attributes. What we are, we know; our own voluntary and causative power, our moral nature, we understand. We spontaneously and irresistibly attribute the same nature to the Father of spirits, whose workmanship we are. Made in the image of God, we know what he must be. Acts xvii. 29, Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device.

Certain writers warn us very solemnly against anthropomorphism; that is, making God like ourselves. When we get their real thought we find they are protesting against ascribing personality to God, against giving him thought and feeling and purpose; which is the same as to discard God altogether. If God is not a personal being, he is nothing of any interest to the worshiper. Religion would be wholly subjective, without an object, and would disappear from human experience.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES.

1. A moral attribute is an attribute of moral character, a result of voluntary choice or action, as distinguished from a constitutional trait, or natural attribute. That God is a moral agent is a natural attribute. The character which he maintains in the exercise of his moral agency, constitutes his moral attributes. Our inquiry, then, is concerning the moral character of God. Is he holy, or sinful, or both?

2. Virtue or holiness in God must be essentially what it is in ourselves, or in any finite being; that is, a condition of will in harmony with righteousness, which is goodness or benevolence. The precise nature of virtue or holiness, we shall have occasion to consider hereafter. For the present we will assume it to be benevolence, the same in God as in his creatures—fidelity to all interests, a will to accomplish the highest good. Our question then, comprehensively stated, is, is God benevolent or unbenevolent? Can we affirm of God absolute goodness, or can we not?

We sometimes find a distinction made between holiness or goodness in God and in man. We are told that holiness is an attribute of God's nature—that God is essentially holy, his essence is holiness; while in man, it is an attribute of character. It is safe to say that there is no clear thought corresponding with these words. A holiness, or virtue, or goodness that does not lie in choice, or in a voluntary attitude in accordance with righteousness, is utterly incomprehensible; and when one thus speaks of the holiness of God, he uses words without meaning. To discuss the question at all, we must assume that holiness in God is what it is in man—righteousness of heart or will; and that sin would be a yielding of the heart or will to other and unworthy motives.

3. The first point we reach is God's *moral immutability*—that he is constantly either benevolent or unbenevolent, not of necessity but in fact. This is an inference from

his natural immutability. All considerations, motives, are forever the same to him. No new view can ever arise in his mind; no impulse can exist at one time, which does not at another. This is a necessary result of his infinity; hence there can be no occasion for a change of moral attitude or character. Thus, he is forever the same, not by necessity, but by his own free choice.

4. There is an *a priori* argument for God's benevolence, which furnishes a strong presumption in its favor—an argument from the nature of the case.

(1) God, being a moral being, his happiness must depend on his goodness, as with all moral beings.

(2) This fact is infinitely clear to him, and always clear; there can be no bewilderment, no contrary seeming, as to finite beings; no power of the sensibility to make a present good seem to his intelligence what it is not. Hence there is no probable motive or occasion to sin. Sin is possible to God, as possessing sensibility and free will. There is a possible motive to sin, but his infinite, and unchanging, and perfect apprehension makes sin, in his case, utterly improbable. This argument affords an extreme presumption in favor of God's benevolence, or goodness; and must be held to be conclusive in the absence of contrary evidence. The fact that finite beings sin against reason and conviction, does not set aside this presumption in the case of an infinite being. Their sensibility is varying—moving by impulse, and thus gives occasion to sin. With God there can be no such varying impulse.

5. The *a posteriori* argument for the benevolence of God must be drawn from experience, from the world as we find it. The difficulty of the argument lies in the fact of our narrow view. All human history embraces but a minute segment of the vast sweep of God's purpose and providence; the grand outcome we cannot forecast. Our discernment of facts, of causes and results, is utterly inadequate as a basis

of a judgment upon the ways of God. His plans are too vast for our comprehension. An antediluvian, standing on the last mountain peak not yet covered by the flood, would have been in a poor situation to judge of God's ways. An inhabitant of Iceland, with the glacier on one side, and the volcano on the other, can have but a poor idea of the world God has made. So we can never be sure that we have a just exhibition of the outcome of God's plans with men. Still, to our view, the aspect of the world is benignant. It seems planned for the promotion of virtue and happiness; and the more thorough our study of nature and of history, the more satisfactory is the evidence of a benevolent purpose. This is seen,

(1) In the provision for animal enjoyment.

(2) In the creation of moral beings, and in the arrangements for their virtue and happiness.

(3) In the whole course of the world as seen in history, sacred and profane; proving a benificent providence in human affairs—a providence working for human well-being, especially in the facts connected with revealed religion, the work of redemption.

6. The general tendency to a belief among men in the divine goodness, is proof that there is evidence of such goodness. The need of such a dependence, in man's finite moral nature, predisposes to a belief in God's goodness, and evidence is accepted from reason, from nature and from revelation.

7. The only appearance of evidence against God's goodness is in the evil of the world, its sin and misery. The atheistic dilemma is familiar to all: Either God is not omnipotent, and cannot prevent evil, or he is not good and will not. Either alternative is supposed to be fatal to a belief in an infinite and perfect Creator. The dilemma is not a real one; it overlooks entirely the conditions of a moral universe, and the nature of sin and of holiness. In creating

moral beings, God consents to the existence of beings who are not controlled in their moral action by omnipotence. As to their existence, they are subjects of his power; he can create or refuse to create. As to their moral character, they must be permitted to determine it for themselves; this character is not the work of omnipotence. The existence of finite moral beings makes sin possible; and the existence of sin leads to misery as a result, and as a necessary motive.

8. There is evidence in the history of the world, that God is earnestly moving to remedy both sin and misery. This evidence lies chiefly in the history of his manifestations in connection with his revelation; and to this we naturally and properly turn for further light. In revelation, if at all, we shall find the solution of the problem of sin and misery.

9. The benevolence of God being established, all his attributes can be derived from this as the essence and ground of all his moral excellence. Benevolence expresses the entirety of his moral character. His holiness, justice, mercy, faithfulness, and truth, are but different aspects of benevolence, or benevolence exercised in different relations. God's goodness involves every moral excellence.

CHAPTER IV.

ATHEISTIC AND PANTHEISTIC VIEWS.

1. All views that place, as the ground or origin of the universe, anything but an infinite Personality, must be regarded as atheistic or antitheistic; and all such views must set aside religion and worship. Atheistic views, in general, propose no positive explanation of the existence of the universe. They recognize the universe, with its laws and forces, as a fact—a fact which requires no explanation, and admits of none; it explains itself. Its forces and its laws account for its existence, its organization, its life and intelligence. Such views are a direct denial of our principle of causation—the demand of our reason for an intelligent active cause, without limitation, dependence or beginning. Forces and laws explain nothing; they need themselves to be explained and accounted for.

2. Theories which develop the universe out of some underlying substance or ground of being, reducing thus all being to a common principle or substratum or substance, are pantheistic; and since they set aside a personal Creator, they are essentially antitheistic—subversive of religion and worship.

Pantheism is a philosophy which reduces all being to one essence or substance, and teaches that different beings, as they appear to us, are but forms or modes of that essence or substance. The characteristic idea is *unity of being*. The pantheist calls that being God, but does not represent it as a personal being—an intelligent, moral Creator. Some philosophers call this substance the absolute. Her-

bert Spencer speaks of "the unknown and unknowable ground of being."

3. Pantheism has usually taken on a spiritualistic type; but some philosophers reduce all existence to matter. They regard matter as the ultimate substance, and regard life and mind as the result of matter. Such a philosophy is materialism, another name for atheism. Our modern physical science, tends, in some quarters, strongly in this direction.

But spiritualistic pantheism cannot be properly said to make the absolute substance spirit, or self-conscious intelligence. It is neither mind nor matter; it exhibits itself now as one, now as the other. Both mind and matter are but forms or modes of the absolute. The philosophy is called spiritualistic, because the absolute substance is supposed to be known through the reason rather than through the senses.

4. Historically, pantheism seems to have sprung from two distinct forces or promptings in the human soul.

(1) In one form it is the offspring of religious sentimentalism—a religious fancy or poetic dream. The great ocean of being is God; man is a drop from that ocean, to be returned and absorbed. The religious mystics of the Middle Ages, speak of themselves as lost in God. God is everything. It is a pantheistic tendency, of the religious form, which leads men to ascribe all operations in nature directly to the divine volition, making all forces in nature God's immediate force. This idea is supposed to exalt God. Some recent expressions of the doctrine of the divine immanence present a pantheistic tendency. Religious pantheism absorbs all being into God. Oriental pantheism, that of the Hindoos, presents this character. All things are finally absorbed in God; and he himself dwells in unconsciousness.

(2) The other form of pantheism is philosophic, resulting from an impulse to establish a system of ontology—to explain the true nature of things, what lies below phe-

nomena. For this form of pantheistic thought there seem to be two occasions or promptings. First, a disposition to generalize, to simplify, or reduce all things to a common principle. Generalization can go no farther than to unite all things in a common substance. There is a charm in the idea.

The second occasion or prompting, is the difficulty of conceiving of creation, of the origination of a new substance. Xenophanes, of Ionia, in the sixth century B. C., maintained the axiom: *Ex nihilo nihil fit;* in the sense that in creation there is no origination of substance, only transformation. Of course creation in the absolute sense is incomprehensible —not contradictory to reason, but above it. Those who assume the eternity of matter doubtless seem to themselves to have disposed of half the difficulty of creation, or even more. The creation of spirit, by spirit, does not seem to them to involve the same difficulty ; but it is really just as incomprehensible. Pantheism sweeps away the difficulty by denying the fact of creation, and the existence of created things; that is, their separate and distinct existence. What seem distinct existences, both spirit and matter, are to the pantheist but forms or modes of the one underlying substance.

(3) It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that there may be a perverse moral impulse tending to pantheistic thought: an impulse which lies back of all forms of unbelief—the disposition to escape from the responsibility of personal existence. If man is nothing but a mode or manifestation of God, then the consciousness of personality must be a delusion, and obligation and conscience a dream. If God is but an impersonal substance, out of which, without purpose or plan, the universe springs, as water flows from a fountain, or a tree grows from a germ, then the idea of accountability to God is an illusion.

5. Philosophical pantheism has appeared at various times in the progress of human thought. Among the Greek

philosophers the Stoics, from Zeno, were pantheists. They derived all finite forms and existences from the one substance which they called God ; not a creator, but the source from which all things spring, reproduced and reabsorbed in endless succession. The Neo-Platonists of the third century were pantheistic. In the farther East, pantheism had a strong hold among the Hindoos, and remains as the basis of their religion and their system of caste.

6. The philosophic pantheism of modern times, finds its leading representative in Spinoza, a Jew of Portugese descent, born in Amsterdam in 1632. Such a speculation we could scarcely expect from a Jew, so utterly opposed to the whole doctrine and spirit of the Jewish faith. The first verse of the Bible sweeps away the entire foundation of the system : "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

Spinoza's whole system grows out of his assumed definition of substance. Substance, he defines as that which exists in itself, and is conceived of by itself, the conception of which does not involve the conception or existence of anything else, as its cause. God is a being, a substance, absolutely infinite. That which is absolutely infinite contains, in its own essence, everything which implies essence, and which involves no impossibility. This definition, and the resulting propositions, were the foundation of his system.

The views of Spinoza attracted attention, but did not prevail in his day. Indeed, they lay almost dormant a hundred years, and then reappeared in the German philosophy of the present century.

7. Modern German pantheism began with Kant, a hundred years ago or more. Kant was a German of Scotch descent. He was not a pantheist, but his philosophy, in other hands, developed into pantheism. Philosophically he was a dualist, recognized two existences, subject and object, or perceiver and perceived, himself and somewhat out of

himself. The subject, the perceiver, the self, is known; the object, the thing perceived, cannot be known, as it is in itself; it is only known to exist. The subject, the self, furnishes the framework, the conditions of time and space under which the object is perceived. Thus we can never know how much of what we perceive belongs to the object, and how much to the subject. The object is modified by subjective forces. There must be an object, but what it is, we can never know. Kant, at times, suggested that subject and object might be the same thing; but he did not persist in this idea. He contended earnestly for personality and freedom. He was a theist, but his system furnished the germ of a new pantheism.

8. Fichte, the friend and pupil of Kant, pushed this idealism of Kant to its natural result. He denied the distinct existence of the object which we cannot know, and derived the object from the subject. What we seem to perceive as external objects, are simply conceptions, forms or modifications of the self. The only substance, the only reality, the absolute, is self, the subject. This absolute is God.

9. Schelling followed Fichte, who was his teacher, friend and co-laborer. He was inclined to the study of nature, and the external world was reality to him. Hence, he assumed the object as his absolute, and derived the subject from it; thus laying the foundation for an objective pantheism similar to Spinoza's.

10. Hegel followed, the disciple and defender of Schelling, although four or five years his senior. He denied the reality of both subject and object, and left nothing but ideas. "Being and nothing are identical."

11. The fundamental error in this philosophy of idealism, from Kant to Hegel, as shown by Sir William Hamilton in his Philosophy of Perception, was in not accepting consciousness as conclusive in reference to both subject and

object. Both are given with equal authority. In every act of touch or pressure, I become aware of myself as perceiving, and of the object perceived; and to call in question either of these facts, is subversive of all sound philosophy. Thus, the first fact of philosophy is the existence of myself and somewhat without myself. This fact sets aside pantheism, and leads on to the universe as created, and to an intelligent Creator working for an end; that is, to theism.

12. A practical answer to all inferences of pantheism as opposed to obligation and religion is, that personality and obligation exist as facts, directly known. There is nothing that we know so well. If these known facts are consistent with the assumption of a common essence or substratum of being, as pantheism claims, very well. If they are not consistent with such a view of being, we must still hold to our own personality and to obligation, because these are things we know, while the pantheistic conception is an idea, a pure speculation.

CHAPTER V.

THE NATURE OF MAN.

1. A brief study of man as a religious being comes next in order; that is, of man as capable of knowing God and of owing duty to him. To know God, man must be a rational being, and to owe duty to God he must be a moral being; but a moral being must be rational, hence our inquiry is of man as a moral being. As a moral being, he comes under the claims of duty—of the law of obligation. Hence he must be a religious being; that is, he owes duty to God, when he comes to know God. Thus he comes under the claims of religion.

2. As a moral being man possesses intellect, sensibility and free will. These are the attributes of personality, and man, possessing these, is a person.

3. By intellect we mean the power of perceiving and knowing, embracing all the various faculties of sense, judgment, memory, imagination and reason. The study of all these belongs to anthropology, but for our present purpose it will be sufficient to speak, briefly, in reference to reason alone.

As a moral being, man possesses that form of intelligence, or of understanding, which gives necessary truths; such as the axioms of mathematics, the ideas of time and space, of causation and obligation. These ideas or principles are called necessary truths, because they are seen directly to be true, or, when seen, they are seen to be true of necessity. This power or faculty we call reason, or the rational faculty; and as man possesses this faculty, we designate him, in distinction from the lower animals, a rational

being. It is by this faculty that he can say must and ought; there is no must or ought to the brute; he has a kind of intelligence, a spiritual nature in some form; but not having reason he cannot know obligation nor God, hence he cannot be a moral or religious being.

4. It is a peculiarity of the truths given by the reason that they are known to be true by their own nature, or are necessary truths. Once apprehended we must accept them as true, and we require others to accept them. It is not possible to regard them as true to myself, while they may not be true to my neighbor. Their truthfulness does not depend on the validity or reliability of our faculties. We trust our faculties because they give us such truths, and we do not receive the truths because we trust our faculties. The action of our other faculties—of our intelligence in other forms, is different. Pleasant sights and sounds and tastes are pleasant to us; we cannot say that they must be so with our neighbor. We inquire how they affect him, and we cannot assume that they are to him as to us. Even the color of an object may be to him as it is not to us.

5. Again, it is characteristic of the action of our intelligence, in every form, that its results have the character of inevitableness. With the objects before us, our perceptions and judgments must be what they are; we cannot make an object seem to us black that is white, or good that is evil. Our intelligence works under the law of necessity. We can give our attention to one object or another as we will, and thus allow ourselves to receive impressions from one object and not from another. We can determine the direction of our thought in a degree, but not the nature of the thought in the presence of the object; hence we have no direct responsibility for our thoughts. They may be right or wrong, in the sense of correct or incorrect, not virtuous or sinful.

6. Again, as a moral being, man has a sentient nature,

or a sensibility. Through the sensibility we become aware of good and evil in the natural sense; that is, of pleasure and pain, satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Indeed, good and evil, in this sense of natural facts, can have no existence except on condition of a sensibility. If there were no sentient being, there could be no good or evil in the universe—nothing of ultimate value—nothing to be chosen or regarded as a desirable end—an object to be chosen for its own sake; hence there could be no obligation, no end to be chosen, no course of conduct which ought to be pursued; hence no right or wrong as moral facts, and no ideas corresponding with the words right and wrong, ought and ought not. We never say ought or ought not except in regard to some natural good—some interest; and all good, all interest, lies in the condition or experience of a sentient nature. The sensibility is the channel for the ideas of good and evil in the natural sense, and thus it is the condition of the apprehension of obligation. Not that the sensibility gives directly the fact or idea of obligation; obligation is perceived rationally, or by the reason, in view of the good given by the sensibility. Hence a moral being must have a sentient nature.

7. The movements of man's sentient nature, or sensibility, are in the various forms of affections, appetites, desires, emotions. All these except the emotions are correlated to somewhat without us, the attainment of which affords satisfaction. These objects, as producing satisfaction, are called good in a relative sense, as distinguished from the satisfaction itself, which is absolute good—good in itself.

The movements of the sensibility, as related to objects without, have thus an impulsive power, stimulating to the attainment of the objects toward which they are directed; thus they become motives to action. Every appetite or desire naturally leads us to seek its object.

The emotions are rather passive experiences, produced

by some object of sense or of thought, and do not become, directly, motives to action. The pleasurable sensation connected with the hearing of music does not directly tend to action; but the pleasurable emotion, in contemplation, may become an object of desire. We have a desire to reproduce it, and thus may be moved to put forth effort—to bring ourselves in contact with the causes of the emotion. Thus, indirectly, an emotion becomes a motive.

8. The movements of the sensibility, in its higher forms, are conditioned upon special perceptions or apprehensions of the intellect. Emotions arise in the presence of their exciting causes; hence the causes must be present, that is, apprehended by sense, or by thought. The lower animals, having, probably, no apprehension of higher intellectual objects like beauty, grandeur, sublimity, moral excellence, can have no corresponding emotions.

9. The sensibility, like the intellect, acts under the law of necessity. We cannot avoid desiring the objects correlated to our sensibility, as a means of gratification, when these objects are before the mind. We cannot avoid having the emotions which the various objects of sense or of thought are adapted to excite. Indirectly, by guiding the thought to a chosen object, we can determine the emotions or the desires. Thus we do not strictly speak of these emotions or desires as morally right or wrong, but as pleasant or painful, as desirable or undesirable, helpful or harmful. Even an artificial appetite, craving a harmful indulgence, like the love of strong drink, is not wrong in a moral sense; nor is an emotion of reverence or gratitude or adoration toward God right in a moral sense. What are sometimes called the malevolent affections, like anger, resentment, which impel us to do harm to the objects which excite them, are not wrong morally. A yielding to them may be wrong; the action to which they tend to move us may be wrong; nursing these passions, giving them place and encourage-

ment in our hearts may be wrong, but, strictly, the wrong is not in the movement of the sensibility itself.

10. Thus we see that the sensibility is the source of temptation, as well as the channel of good. A life controlled by the sensibility is a life which befits the brute. A life ordered by reason, against impulse and feeling if need be, is a life which befits the man. By our power of choice, our free will, we can determine which of these lives we will pursue, and thus we reach the inquiry in respect to the Will.

DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

1. In addition to the faculties of thinking and feeling, as already presented, we have the power of determining, choosing or acting, called Will. Every man, in his own consciousness, recognizes this faculty in its action, and distinguishes it from the others. An object is presented to our faculty of perception; the result is inevitable. The perception is determined by the nature of the object, and the necessary movement of the faculty; the result cannot be different from that which follows; we have no direct control over it. We can control attention but not the perception.

So with our feeling; an object of desire or an occasion of emotion is presented; the feeling follows of necessity, determined by the nature of the object, and our own susceptibility. We have no direct control over the feeling. To a certain extent we can withhold attention from the object, and thus secure the abatement or modification of the feeling; but we have no power not to feel, or to feel differently in the presence of the exciting cause.

In action, our experience is different. There are always open to us at least two courses, presenting their different advantages and disadvantages, attractions and repulsions; and we consciously determine for ourselves, by a free choice between the two, upon which of these courses we will enter. This decision is not a matter of thought or feeling, though

both of these are involved, but is different from either. It is a conscious determination, in reference to the course we will pursue, by virtue of our faculty of choice or will.

2. In this decision we are conscious of the fact of freedom or liberty. We know that we can will to take either of the attitudes, or pursue either of the courses open to us; this is the beginning and the end of our freedom. We cannot determine, absolutely or directly, any result out of, or beyond, the attitude of the will itself. If all the machinery of our constitution, mental and physical, is in good working order, and no outward impediment exists, action will follow beyond the will itself, by inevitable law. Over this result we have no direct control; we can present the voluntary attitude, and that is all. The thought and feeling and external action, linked by our constitution with that movement of the will, must follow.

3. Here it is necessary to note the distinction between a predominant and a subordinate choice or determination. A determination to lead a right life, to give attention to every claim of duty, leads to a determination to undertake some particular work; for example, to become a preacher of the Gospel; and this, again, to particular acts in acquiring an education, seeking out a school, purchasing books, learning the lesson and appearing in the class-room. The determination to live a benevolent life, is a predominant, governing, or ultimate choice. This, under certain conditions, leads to the choice to prepare for the ministry, and to all the succeeding action. These are all subordinate choices, dependent upon, and deriving their character from, the governing choice. With this distinction, our freedom belongs strictly only to the governing choice; when this is made, and while it exists, the subordinate choice—that which is seen to be necessary to the carrying out of the governing choice, must follow. If the man refuses to make the subordinate choice, he surrenders the governing purpose. This

he may do, and thus he is free at every step; but the freedom properly belongs to the predominant purpose; all other choices depend on this.

4. The proof of our freedom is found only in our consciousness, and can be found nowhere else. We know that we are free, and that is the end of the argument; it is a fact of consciousness. Other arguments for freedom are often presented, but they are only different ways of presenting the fact of the consciousness of freedom, or are different indications of the fact. The argument for freedom derived from our moral consciousness, the fact that we hold ourselves bound by duty or obligation to a certain course of action, is a good argument for the freedom of the will. But the perception or conviction of the obligation presupposes the consciousness of freedom. The view is sometimes presented that we infer our freedom from our consciousness of obligation. But it is not merely a logical inference. The consciousness of freedom is doubtless involved in our perception or conviction of obligation. The fact of freedom is the logical antecedent of that of obligation, and the thought of freedom must come before, or with, the thought of obligation.

The general *belief* which men have in their own freedom, is urged as an argument in its favor. It is a good argument; but it is simply an appeal to the universal consciousness of freedom. Men believe they are free because they are conscious of freedom.

Again, the *idea* of freedom is brought forward as an argument for the fact of freedom. This idea, it is said, must be explained. How do we obtain it? There is nothing out of ourselves to suggest it. Everything "in the heavens above, and in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth," is bound in the chain of cause and effect, and cannot suggest the idea of freedom, nor even of necessity. The idea of necessity is the correlative of that of freedom; neither can come without the other. The idea or

conception of freedom comes from the consciousness of freedom within ourselves, and the idea of necessity in the same way. These arguments are all good, because they are indications of our consciousness of freedom, but they can scarcely be regarded as independent arguments.

5. There is a plausible objection to the argument for freedom as derived from consciousness, in this form: that we can only be conscious of an act, not of the power to act. Consciousness of freedom, it is said, would involve consciousness of power to a contrary choice; but we can only be conscious of what we do, not of what we have power to do, but do not do. The obvious answer is, we are conscious of our action, and of the freedom of it—of the choice we make between two courses of action that are open to us; conscious that we choose, or determine, or act freely. In thinking, we are conscious of the thought and of the necessity of it; so with our feeling; under the circumstances, we know that it must be what it is. The action of the will is in its very nature a free choice, and as such we know it in consciousness.

6. The relation of motive to the action of the will is a prominent point of difference among philosophers and theologians. Motive is anything which may operate as a reason for action, or as an influence to it. In regard to the operation of motive there is great danger of misconception. There is a strong tendency to transfer the mechanical ideas of force and motion to the facts of moral action. Motive does not move the will. The agent himself, the moral person, assumes his attitude of will in view of the motive, which he makes the occasion, or reason, of his action.

7. Motives are naturally divided into two classes, or rather are considered under two points of view, as objective and as subjective—employing these terms in a convenient, if not an authorized, application. Objective motives are all those facts, objects, perceptions, desires and feelings, which

address the man, and tend to influence him to action. When we undertake to persuade men to action, we are gathering objective motives around and upon them. Subjective motives are those reasons which the agent accepts, and in view of which he acts. Thus a motive, which was objective, is made subjective by the action of the agent himself. When we inquire what motive a man had for his action, we inquire for the subjective motive—the reason in his own mind for the action.

8. Motives address us through two channels, and thus there are two classes of objective motives appealing to us; and therefore two classes of subjective motives, that is of reasons accepted by men for their action. These two channels are the understanding, or the intelligence, and the feelings. A course of action may commend itself to our intelligence as useful, right and proper, and therefore obligatory; or to our feelings as agreeable or disagreeable, desirable or undesirable.

We contemplate our neighbor's well-being. To our understanding it is a good, valuable, a real interest; and this value of the object is a good reason for choosing it, or regarding it; and thus it becomes a motive, addressing us through the intelligence.

Again, we contemplate our own ease or comfort or gratification. It impresses our sensibility, awakens desire, and this desire becomes a motive—an influence to action, addressing us through the feelings. On one side reason, judgment, appeals to us, producing a conviction of obligation; on the other side feeling, desire, impulse, appeals to us.

Thus in moral action two courses are always open to us, and only two. All motives reduce to these two classes, and all character is formed under one or the other of these two forces, reason or impulse; and these two classes of motives are, probably, always present, objectively, to every moral agent, and one of them is accepted subjectively.

9. Here we must note the fact that motives presented by the intelligence appeal directly to the will; not merely indirectly, by awakening desire, as is often, perhaps generally, maintained. The value of our neighbor's welfare is a motive addressed to the will through the understanding; because his welfare, as apprehended by the understanding, is a proper reason for our action—a direct motive. Desire for our neighbor's welfare may be awakened with the perception, or it may not be; the reason for the action, in the direction of his welfare, remains the same.

If motive acts only in the shape of desire, then there is but one kind of motive acting upon us, and no alternative in action; only one course open to us, and hence no choice, no freedom. The strongest desire, or the resultant of the desires, must control the will. There is nothing possible in action but to obey the feeling.

If it be said there is room for freedom in choosing between the desires, the reply is, that choosing between the desires implies a motive outside of the desires themselves—a reason in the intelligence in view of which the choice is made. One desire may be right, another wrong—one profitable, another unprofitable; but such a fact addresses the intelligence, and thus the will may be moved; hence freedom must be secured by the existence of motives outside of the desires.

10. Motive is necessary to moral action, because there must be some object before the mind, something to be done, something for the choice to terminate upon, in all moral action; and out of this object the motive arises. There could be no obligation without motive; obligation implies something to be chosen or regarded for its own sake.

11. Again, let us remember that the motive is the reason for the action—that in view of which the agent, in the exercise of his will, decides or determines. The motive does not determine the action, in the sense of being the

cause of it. The moral agent is the cause of his own action; and with the same motives acting upon him objectively, he has full power and freedom to put forth one action or another. The motive furnishes the occasion for the action, but it is not the cause.

A demand is sometimes made for a sufficient reason why the agent acts as he does; why one man is sinful, another virtuous. There is no ground for demanding a reasonable reason—one which justifies the action. There can be no such reason for wrong action, but there is always a sufficient motive for the action. The sinner does what he likes to do instead of what he ought to do. Every one knows the operation of this motive in his own consciousness. The motive for wrong-doing is perfectly apparent—the only reason for the action. Nor do we need to look for the cause of any moral action. To look for such cause out of the man himself, in the exercise of his own will, is to make the man a machine, and to set aside personal responsibility.

12. Is the action of the will always as the strongest motive? There are two possible affirmative answers to this question.

(1) The will must be as the strongest motive by necessity; it cannot act against the strongest motive; this is pure necessarianism and leaves no room for freedom.

(2) The will is always as the strongest motive, but not as a matter of necessity, simply as a fact. The true answer to the question is, No, neither as a necessity nor as a fact.

How do we measure the strength of motive? There are two ways—by the judgment or reason, and by the sensibility or feeling. The two standards are entirely different, but the will is not always as the strongest motive, tested by either standard. It is not always as the best judgment; for the sinner always acts against the true reason as presented by his judgment. Nor is it always as the strongest feeling; the good man often obeys his judgment, against his feeling.

If the strongest motive be defined as the motive which prevails, then the answer to the question is determined by the definition. But in this case the will determines for itself what motive shall be the strongest, by yielding to the one or the other. The will then determines the motive, and not the motive the will.

13. The doctrine of Edwards, in his famous treatise on the will, is that the will is always as the greatest apparent good; that is, chooses that which at the time seems most agreeable. Indeed, he did not distinguish between the seeming agreeable and the choosing, because he did not distinguish clearly between the sensibility and the will. He linked the choice to the motive in the relation of cause and effect—as fixed and necessary a relation as that of cause and effect in the natural world; the difference being, as he claimed, not in the nature of the connection, but of the terms connected. The connection between cause and effect in nature, he called natural necessity. The connection between motive and action he called moral necessity. But some adopt the phraseology of Edwards, and say that the will is always as the greatest apparent good, but not by necessity. The expression is vague, and when made definite must be false. Apparent good may be estimated by the judgment or the feeling. The sinner always acts against his judgment, and the good man often against his feelings; and thus the choice is not always as the greatest apparent good.

14. It is a very prevalent doctrine that the will is determined by the inclination, or disposition or character; and this is made up of the aggregate of thoughts, of feelings and tendencies, back of the will. Freedom of the will is supposed to lie in the power to act according to the inclination or disposition, while there is no power to act against that inclination or disposition.

This doctrine obliterates freedom. The man must act according to his character—something back of the will; then

he must have character before he can act. Thus his character determines his action, and not his action his character. Those who hold the view that the inclination determines the action, admit that the will is not free if it is determined by anything outside of the man himself. But if the inclination determines the will, and this inclination is determined by nature or surroundings, then the will is determined by something outside of the man himself, and is not free; and the entire character and action are effects for which the agent is not responsible. Every such linking of the will to motive, inclination, character, making its action determined by something out of itself, makes the man a machine, and annihilates responsibility. The true conception is that man, with his free will, the power to determine his own moral action and character, stands in the presence of the motives which solicit him to choose, and freely makes his choice, or determines his governing purpose. Unless this power exists in men, of determining their action in the midst of whatever motives, there is no free agency, no obligation, no virtue, no sin. It is utter delusion to say there is freedom if there is power to choose according to the inclination, without power to go against the inclination. There is just as much freedom in the falling of an apple, or in water flowing down hill, or according to the inclination; it flows freely. This is the conception of freedom which some have who claim that they maintain the doctrine.

15. But objections to the freedom of the will are found in the divine attributes and the divine government.

(1) It is said that God's foreknowledge implies that events are certain, otherwise they could not be foreknown. This is true, but what do we mean by the certainty of events? It is often meant that they are so linked to existing causes that they must occur as they will occur. This is more than certainty—it is necessity. There are those who discard the word necessity as implying fatalism, and substi-

tute certainty, but they still carry the idea of necessity in their thought.

Certainty is properly simple futurition. The event is in the future and will take place, and God foresees it in the future. His foreknowledge does not cause it, or make it certain. Its certainty or futurition is the condition of his foreknowledge, its logical antecedent. He could not foreknow it if it were not to be. Whatever causes the event to come to pass makes it certain. Free agents are the cause of their own actions, and thus make them certain. In the world of nature the divine will, working through natural forces, makes natural events certain. The choice of a free agent who shall exist a thousand years hence, is just as certain as any event of nature, and thus is an object of God's foreknowledge; but the cause of that certainty is the agent himself that is to be.

(2) Again, there is a theory or explanation of the divine foreknowledge which destroys freedom. It is claimed that God foreknows future events because he knows all present causes; and all future events are linked to these, in the chain of cause and effect. Hence the cause of an act of a free being, who shall live a thousand years hence, is now in existence, and thus God is enabled to foreknow that act. This links all events, finally, in the chain of cause and effect, and does away with freedom. But the proposed explanation of God's foreknowledge is a groundless assumption. It is limiting the divine nature to human conditions, making God's foreknowledge mere finite prescience. God may know the future directly, immediately; the method is mysterious to us.

Some under the pressure of this view of the divine foreknowledge, have felt called upon, in order to save human freedom, to deny God's foreknowledge of the free acts of moral beings. This is a sad limitation of God's infinity. We do not need to explain the divine foreknowledge.

(3) Again, it is said that the divine plan and govern-

ment imply such control of human action as to require that the action shall depend upon, or be determined by, the motive. Thus having all motives at his control, God controls all action. This too is an unwarranted assumption. It is entirely possible that God should be able to govern the world successfully, and accomplish his plans, and still allow freedom of will to men. He can work through free agents without interfering with their free agency. He may interfere with their range of executive action—may cause the wrath of man to praise him, and restrain the remainder. He may send a good man or a wicked man on any errand he has to do. Balaam performs a prophet's mission, although he loves the wages of unrighteousness. The king of Assyria administers God's chastisement upon his people, "although he thinketh not so, neither doth his heart mean so." God's wisdom and power hedge the actions of men round about, but do not set aside their freedom. They can serve God willing or unwillingly, but they must serve him. God shapes their action in its outward bearing; they cherish their own purpose, and form their own character.

10. From this view of human nature it appears that obligation pertains directly only to the attitude of the will. When this is right, the man meets present obligation, and is morally right. When this is wrong, God may bring good out of evil, but the man is morally wrong.

CHAPTER VI.

A FUTURE LIFE.

1. Man, simply as a moral being, must owe duty to God, and come under the obligations of reverence and worship. This constitutes him by nature a religious being. But religion, to have practical force with men, must take hold of a future life. If there were nothing for man beyond the present world, religion would lose its practical value and efficiency, and would probably disappear from human experience. Every religion, then, that has any essential value to man, embraces the fact of a future life. Thus it is a natural inquiry, what evidence have we, apart from revelation, of a life hereafter?

2. The basis upon which we approach the question is, that the world, including man, is the work of a wise and benevolent Creator—that man, therefore, must be wisely and benevolently constituted, so as to illustrate the divine wisdom and goodness. With reasonable diffidence we may undertake to judge from man's constitution, what indications there are of the plan and purpose of the Creator in reference to a life hereafter.

3. The first great fact which meets us, in this inquiry, is the general belief in immortality among all men, in all ages. It may be called the universal belief because it has prevailed in the popular mind without question. It has been called in question, here and there, by some theorist or philosopher who has followed his logic instead of his instinctive judgment; but, in general, philosophers, as well as

others, have held, even without revelation, the doctrine of immortality.

We may account this general belief as evidence of the fact. It must spring from natural promptings of the soul, or from such indications of the fact of immortality that men naturally accept it. If there be no life hereafter, it is difficult to see why men should have been so constituted as to anticipate it. And how could we justify such a constitution as the work of a wise and benevolent Creator?

4. While this anticipation or general belief, amounts to a practical proof of immortality, it is more satisfactory to follow out the inquiry, and ascertain, if possible, what are the reasons upon which the belief rests. The argument must stand, even if we fail to find the satisfactory reasons.

5. We have what may be called the *Metaphysical Argument*, drawn from the existence and nature of mind, as follows: Whatever exists will continue to exist, unless some cause or force appears which tends to destroy it. The soul exists, and the only thing, to outward appearance, that threatens its continued existence is death. But death, so far as we can ascertain, operates only to dissolve the material organism; the mind being immaterial does not fall under its power. Proof of this immateriality of the soul is involved in the first elements of our knowledge; in the different attributes of matter and mind as revealed in perception. We have, as given in consciousness, the perceiver, the subject, the me, and the thing perceived, the object, the not-me. The materialistic philosophy is a pure assumption, setting aside this primary fact of consciousness.

Death, therefore, acting on the material organism, affords no presumption of the dissolution of the spiritual essence which thinks and feels. The presumption of the continued existence of the soul must still stand. Beyond this the metaphysical argument cannot carry us. Other causes

might intervene to destroy the soul, causes which lie beyond our knowledge. We cannot prove its indestructibility, but there is a balance of presumption in favor of its continued existence.

6. We come, then, to what may be called the *Moral Argument*—the argument from man's moral constitution, his tendencies and wants. This argument must rest on the general fact of God's wisdom and goodness; that man, God's handiwork, must be wisely and benevolently constituted, in harmony with the great facts of the universe, in order to his well-being. Let us inquire what facts in human nature seem to look beyond this life.

(1) First, and foremost, there is the *Moral Nature* itself, which brings man under the law of obligation. Our conscience requires us to hold our own ease, our comfort and enjoyment, subordinate to the higher ends of life. It requires us to put duty before pleasure. It makes moral character, virtue, more than meat or raiment, or life itself. It requires us often to sacrifice life to duty. Only thus can a moral being satisfy himself, and retain his own approbation. Such a principle of action is not in harmony with the idea that death is the end. This demand upon every moral being for self-sacrifice should carry with it the pledge of continued existence, of a real blessedness not thus forfeited. In a world wisely and righteously constituted, a moral nature is a charter of immortality.

(2) Another fact in man's nature is the *desire for continued existence*—a shrinking from extinction of being. This is found in every normal constitution, involving not simply the fear of death which involves pain, and apprehension in regard to the future, but a dread of ceasing to be, a desire for continued being. Such an aspiration is an outlook to a future. It seems to answer no purpose in regard to this life. A dread of the pain and the mystery of death would suffice to induce men to avoid death, and to provide for the con-

tinuance of their earthly existence. Milton represents Satan as saying, "Who would lose though full of pain, this intellectual being; these thoughts that wander through eternity?" It is reasonable to regard this craving as divinely implanted with reference to a future existence.

(3) The capability in human nature of *continued progress*, of advancement in all knowledge and excellence, is another significant fact. Every individual of the race, even the most favored, finds in this life an incomplete development; the most advanced seem to themselves like infants. There is boundless room for growth, and only a beginning made. This experience characterizes man, in contrast with all lower creatures. A creature that is to perish in death should naturally, during his life, reach the limit of his being, and realize the full scope of his powers. This is the experience of brutes, but with man there are always plans for the future, purposes unfulfilled, and unexhausted capacities. He forms the habit of such planning and pushing forward, and dies at length with vast possibilities unrealized. This impulse of his nature, springs from his rationality, and suggests a field of endless development hereafter.

(4) There is, again, a *vitality and persistence of the human affections*, that distinguishs man from the brute. Parental affection in brutes serves the purpose of sustaining the young, and then seems to fail; it has no further purpose. In man these natural affections do not wane, but strengthen with advancing years; and are often most potent when the relationship is broken by death. They are not suited to our temporary earthly existence. The only suggestion that can satisfy them is the hope of a life to come. Without such hope they would be a burden laid upon human nature without apparent reason. In the hope of a future life they are a blessing, and not a burden.

(5) A belief in a future life is found *essential to the highest human character*—to such self-control, and restraint of

passion, as leads to any well-ordered life, or to any substantial good. This belief is the natural motive to the exalted virtues of patriotism and consecration to duty, which are involved in our highest ideal of human excellence. The corn of wheat must "fall into the ground and die," that it may bring forth much fruit. Where can we find motive and support for such consecration, but in the hope of immortal life? If individual examples of high character are to be found where there is no such hope or belief, it would not invalidate the argument. The public sentiment which requires such virtues, and which surrounds every such character, is the product of the expectation of another life.

(6) Again, *human character*, in its best attainment, is *too costly a product* to find its extinction in death. It is brought to its best estate through trial and hardship and self-sacrifice —a long course of discipline, the work of a lifetime. It would seem but a poor use of so valuable and costly a product, to obliterate it when it has reached its completeness. There is nothing so costly, or so valuable, as a trained and perfected human soul. Why should it be thrown away in the very hour of its perfection? The hardship and discipline of life, by which this training is secured, cannot be justified but in the light of a continued existence.

(7) The *imperfect exhibition of God's moral government* in this world, finds its natural explanation in a life for man hereafter. The exhibition is manifestly incomplete; needed discrimination is not made here. There are only foreshadowings, in the hopes and apprehensions of men, of a more complete exhibition hereafter. The good are sustained and blessed in this hope; the wicked are oppressed with fear—with "a certain fearful looking for of judgment." The hope and the fear are alike groundless unless there is a judgment to come, a fuller setting forth of God's approval of virtue, and condemnation of sin. For this expectation, on the one side and on the other, there seems no reasonable

explanation except as related to a coming life. It is an outlook to the future for which God will provide.

7. On grounds such as these the human soul has embraced and retained, even in great moral darkness, the belief in a future life. The idea seems the natural product of human instinct and experience. The considerations presented sustain the doctrine of natural immortality; that is, of immortality as an attribute of the human soul—the common birthright of man, rather than as a special appointment or gift of God to a class of men. Yet when philosophers have undertaken to settle the question theoretically, they have sometimes found themselves in doubt. Revelation intervenes to dispel this doubt, and "bring life and immortality to light."

At this point we naturally come to the question of Revelation. What light has God himself given us, in a written revelation, as to the great doctrines and duties of religion? Thus, we are brought to the inquiry, on what grounds do the Scriptures rest? What is their proper authority, and what is their claim to our acceptance?

CHAPTER VII.

THE AUTHENTICITY OR CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

1. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments purport to contain revelations or communications from God to man. They are a history of his manifestations to the race. No more important question can arise than this: What place in our study of religion and theology are we to give to these Scriptures? Are they a true record of the events and communications which they present? If they are substantially correct, if the events which they record really occurred, then the Scriptures must be accepted as the chief source of our knowledge of God, and of religion. They are a revelation of God to men.

2. Our inquiry then is as to the *truth* of the Scripture record. But here we need to discriminate. We have no occasion to inquire as to the truth of the general ethical teachings of the Scriptures; for example, the ten commandments, or the sermon on the mount, or of other prominent statements of ethical principles. We know these to be true, in the nature of the case. That they come to us by God's direct intervention, is an interesting and important fact; but this is not essential to our conviction of their truth. We know the Scriptures to be ethically true, by a direct survey of their contents.

The same can be said of the great essential doctrines of religion contained in the Scriptures. They are seen to be true in their own light. That God exists, the creator and ruler of the universe, infinite in wisdom and power, and perfect in goodness; that men come under the law of obligation,

the law of God, and are responsible to him in reference to all their conduct; that they are bound to reverence and worship him, to love him supremely, and their neighbors as themselves—these great doctrines we know to be true. A revelation may give higher motives to the performance of these duties, but does not change the obligation. These fundamental points of doctrine and of duty are not involved in our inquiry as to the truth of the Scriptures.

The essential point of the inquiry is, are the Scriptures historically true? Is the record which they give of the manifestations of God to men, in the history of the Jewish people, and in the advent and life and teachings of Jesus Christ, an authentic and reliable record? Are the Scriptures essentially true as history? But here let us observe that absolute truthfulness is not necessarily required. If the Scriptures are essentially true—that is, true as other ancient historical writings, then they contain a revelation from God, and we have a revealed religion.

3. Again, the received Scriptures are composed of many parts. We have not only the Old Testament and the New, the first containing the ancient Hebrew writings, the last the later Greek writings, but these again are made up of many books, sixty-six in all, written by different authors, in different ages, some more distinctly connected with the history of God's manifestations than others, each book having its own special evidence, and resting on its own foundation. The truth or falsity of one of these books does not necessarily involve the others. We might not be able to establish the truth of a score of these, and still the essential historical truth of the Scriptures might stand. Indeed, if one of the Gospels can be shown to be historically true, then Jesus Christ, the Son of God, has come into the world, and Christianity is established as a divinely revealed religion.

It is true that if one of the Gospels be historically true then other large portions of the Scriptures must be also

true, and there can be very little question about any essential portion; and Christianity cannot be invalidated by setting aside any less essential part. We must not confound the question of the essential historical truthfulness of the Scriptures with the determination of what is called the sacred canon; that is, the settlement of the question, what books are to be accepted as belonging to the sacred record. The determination of the canon is an important work; but any doubt which may attach to this question does not pertain to the fundamental question of the truthfulness of the Scriptures, or of Christianity itself. The determination of the canon belongs to Biblical literature rather than to theology proper.

4. We are not to overlook the fact that the unity and interdependence of the different parts of the Scriptures are such that if any considerable or characteristic portion be accepted as true, it is scarcely possible to question the rest; and nothing is made against Christianity by such questioning. Admit the Gospels, then the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles follow. The New Testament carries with it the Old, and either of these essential parts gives us revealed religion, with all its essential doctrines.

5. In our inquiry as to the historical truthfulness of the Scriptures, it is better to begin with the New Testament, especially with the Gospels. They come nearer to us in time, and thus are more fully connected with the historical period. The facts they present are more accessible to us. It will be easy to pass from the New Testament to the Old. This is the natural method, but not the necessary one. It would not be difficult to find sufficient direct evidence of the historical credibility of the Old Testament. The materials for such an argument are abundant, and modern research is continually adding to our resources in this direction.

6. The primary question then is, are the historical books of the New Testament a truthful record of events?

Are they reliable history? In pursuing this inquiry we can only touch the salient points and present a mere outline of the argument. To expand these points, or present them minutely, would furnish work for an entire theological course. It would require a volume for each prominent point in the argument.

The inquiry might here be made, why single out these ancient writings of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, as the objects of investigation, rather than other sacred books which exist in the world—the Vedas of the Brahmin, the Zend-Avesta of the Parsee, the Soutras of the Buddhist, the Koran of the Mohammedan? The answer is, simply, because of the importance of the contents of these Greek and Hebrew Scriptures. No other books can compare with them, in this respect. The other books, in comparison, are not historical to any considerable extent, and are not weighty in their contents. It matters little what their origin may be. We will accept them for what they are worth; and this seems to be very little. The highest compliment that can be offered to any of these books is to find some faint resemblance, in some minute portion, to a passage of our sacred Scriptures. If we have any books that come with divine authority, and are worthy of the attention of the world, they are the books of the Christian Scriptures.

7. It is a strong argument in favor of the historical truth of the Gospels, that for ages they have been received as history, and that this reception began in the region where the events are said to have occurred, and in the same age, or as near to it as research can bring us. Their historical truthfulness is the natural explanation of this fact. Such a fact throws the burden of proof upon the objector; he must ascribe some other origin for the books than their historical truthfulness. He must maintain that they are a fiction, composed for entertainment, or with a sinister purpose, to impose a false religion upon men; or they are the natural out-

growth of a religious enthusiasm. Some such theory must be maintained by one who denies the truthfulness of the Scriptures; but it will be found to be a mere hypothesis, utterly improbable in itself and unsustained by any evidence. Considerations like the following set aside forever such a hypothesis.

(1) The books are ancient and can be traced back to the times of the events which they record. Very ancient manuscripts of the books are found, proving the existence of the books as early as A. D., 350. Translations into the Latin and Syriac were made near the close of the second century. The Peshito, a Syriac version, is traced back to the latter part of the second century. The Latin Vulgate, prepared by Jerome in the fourth century, was rendered necessary by the great variety of Latin texts then in existence.

References to the books, and quotations from them, can be found in the writings of Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Irenæus, and Justin Martyr, showing that the books were in existence, and were widely diffused, and relied upon as authority, as early as the first half of the second century. So wide a diffusion, in that age, would have required all the time available between the middle of the first and of the second centuries of the Christian era. Thus the books are sufficiently ancient to justify the claim that they were written by men familiar with the facts, and associated with Christ and the Apostles.

(2) The style and matter of the books connect them with the period and the country, and the surroundings in which Jesus Christ must have lived. This gives them a historical character, and shows that they were written by men familiar with the facts.

In the first place the language, or dialect, is peculiar. It is Hebraistic Greek, used in Palestine by men of Hebrew culture who had learned Greek. This dialect disappeared

with the conquest of Palestine by the Romans. There was no call for it after the first century.

Again, the geographical references show such familiarity with the country as could come only from residence in it. These references are numerous and minute, easy to a resident, but impossible even to a learned man of another country, or another age. Our most cultivated writers go astray when speaking of a distant land. The researches of many ages have verified these references.

The same may be said of the historical references; their exactness has been proved. They are abundant, involving various nations besides the Jewish, namely, the Egyptians, Arabians, Persians, Scythians and Romans. The accuracy of these references proves that the writers were in contact with these nationalities, and obtained their knowledge directly, not by studying them at a distance. This general statement must of course be vague; particulars would be more satisfactory and impressive.

Still again, the archæology of the books, their references to habits and customs, domestic, social and public, are too numerous, minute, and accurate, to be explained upon any supposition but that of familiar, personal acquaintance, on the part of the writers. Designations of divisions of time, of weights and measures, Jewish, Grecian, Roman, are all accurate and in place; and the mingled civilizations of the time and the country made this a very complicated problem. In such particulars the best trained writers fail, when speaking of things with which they are not familiar by life-long association. The books of the New Testament, and indeed of the Scriptures generally, are specially open to these tests because they are historical and treat abundantly of men and things, of times and persons. In this respect they differ from other sacred books, which indulge chiefly in dreams and visions and speculations.

These considerations prove beyond question, that the

writers lived in the time, and the land, of the events which they profess to record. Their works have the character of history.

8. But our chief interest gathers about the question of the historical reality of Jesus Christ. The books give his character and teaching and career; is this genuine history? Did such a being appear upon this earth, and pursue essentially the career which the Gospels ascribe to him? We must answer this question affirmatively, for the following reasons:

(1) The character of Jesus Christ is not a human invention. The reality alone can account for the presentation. It was too elevated to be even comprehended by his disciples who walked with him. The character has stood for ages a mark for criticism, with every motive on the part of men to disparage and vilify it; yet it has never been successfully challenged. The modern attempts to depreciate it are all based upon the assumption that we must allow nothing supernatural in the person and origin of Jesus. This is a baseless assumption, utterly at war with the true spirit of inquiry. The character, as it stands, vindicates itself; and Christians and unbelievers alike have, through all the ages, acknowledged its perfection. We can see the beauty when placed before us; we could not originate, or carry out, the conception. The absolute purity of motive, the absence of the least semblance of self-exaltation; the calm dignity of his bearing, never marred by a hasty or ill-considered word or look; this dignity and simplicity maintained in all emergencies; his marvelous power, never used for display or for any private end; his deeds always appropriate to his position and claims; his words so fit and profound and weighty; his divine meekness and gentleness, coupled with a majestic weight and firmness of character—all these, we can see, are just as they should have been; and then his death, to human estimation so shameful and forbidding, but majestic and glori-

ous in the outcome—the whole scene sustained and carried through with absolutely perfect consistency and propriety, —what human thought could invent such a character and career?

(2) The utterances of Jesus are just as impossible, as a human invention, as his character and life. No one could devise them, without such wisdom and spiritual insight as characterized him. They impressed men at the time: "All bare him witness, and wondered at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth;" "They were astonished at his doctrine; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes;" "Never man spake like this man." The words of Jesus have been the delight and the surprise and inspiration of all ages. What impostor or enthusiast uttered them? For, if there was no real Jesus, some man produced these sermons and parables, and all the utterances which contain the very substance and essence of spiritual truth. Who invented the sermon on the mount, or the parable of the prodigal son, or the Lord's prayer, or the discourse of Jesus with his disciples at the supper, or his last prayer? The men did not live, and have never lived, that could give us these treasures. They are not an invention.

(3) The marvelous combination of the human and the divine in the presentation of Jesus Christ, is not a human invention. The idea of a demigod is not remote from human thought. It characterizes the ancient mythology, but the result is merely a man with some unusual attributes, some extravagance of action or character, like Hercules or Vulcan; but such a blending of the divine and the human, of the infinite and the finite as we find in the person of Jesus Christ, is beyond man's devising. He seems to hold nature in his hand—"commands the wind and the sea and they obey him;" yet he yields to violence and death like any mortal. He places himself by the side of God in exal-

tation and wisdom; "All things that the Father hath are mine;" "Neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him;" "That all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which hath sent him;" still he prays, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." He admits his limitations,—"But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."

The terms Son of man and Son of God, are used in reference to Jesus Christ, with a delicacy and discrimination that could not be expected in a fiction. Jesus calls himself the Son of man, when his divinity is implied, and his humanity affirmed. His disciples never called him the Son of man. Peter says, "We believe and are sure that thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." Jesus calls himself the Son of God when he wishes to affirm his divine nature to one who has not known him, as to the man born blind: "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" But when he calls himself the Son of man, he does not speak simply as a man, but with claims to all divine prerogatives; "The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins;" "The Son of man is Lord even of the Sabbath day;" "The Son of man shall come in his glory, and all his holy angels with him;" "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." The usage is very remarkable and profoundly discriminating, true to nature and to the facts, but utterly beyond the reach of fiction or human invention. In the presence of the facts the usage takes care of itself. As an invention it could not appear. Multitudes read the Scriptures without observing it. No such conception as that of the divine and the human in Jesus, ever entered the imagination of men. The Gospels scarcely state it dogmatically. They contain it, wrought into their very substance.

It must have been a sublime reality. From these considerations, which might be greatly extended, we are compelled to accept the historical reality of Jesus Christ, his nature, his character, his teachings, his career. As a fiction, the Christ of the Gospels is an impossibility.

John Stuart Mill, never suspected of any bias toward Christianity, in his Essays on Religion (page 245), writes as follows: "It is of no use to say that Christ as exhibited in the Gospels is not historical, and that we know not how much of what is admirable has been superadded by the tradition of his followers. The tradition of followers suffices to insert any number of marvels, and may have inserted all the miracles reputed to have been wrought by Christ; but who among his disciples, or among their proselytes, were capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus, or of imagining the life and character revealed in the Gospels? Certainly not the fishermen of Gallilee; as certainly not St. Paul, whose character and idiosyncrasies are of a totally different sort. Still less the early Christian writers, in whom nothing is more evident than that all the good which was in them was derived, as they always professed, from a higher source."

(4) Still further, when we contemplate the doctrines of the New Testament—its ethical and religious teachings, we find them too exalted for human invention. Regard them as proceeding from a being as exalted and perfect as Jesus, and they are explained; any other explanation fails. Where were the men to devise such a system of truth—of religion and morality, placed in exact adjustment to each other, and in their true dependence, giving us a morality for all time, touching the very foundation principles of righteousness, never mistaking the formal or technical for the real; and a religion simple, wholesome, reasonable, and natural, placing God upon the throne of the universe, infinite in power, wisdom and goodness—an infinite Father, and making religious

duty to consist in a hearty obedience to his commands, without a trace of formalism or asceticism? All this is reasonable, and commends itself to the human understanding when it is presented. But whence came the discernment to apprehend and present these truths?

The great principles of righteousness are uquestionably within the reach of the human understanding; and they have been stated at times with more or less of success. But the multiform applications of these in practical duty, and life, without failure or aberration—whence came all this? There was no civilization, or system of philosophy, from which it could spring. There were no men who could devise and present it. It was not an invention, but it came to us with the great teacher, Jesus Christ. Here was its historical origin, and there is no other possible explanation. The morality and religion of the Old Testament Scriptures present similar characteristics and claims.

9. When we come to contemporary historians we find comparatively little light upon Jesus and the apostles. Suetonius, Tacitus, and Pliny the younger, in the latter half of the first century, and the first of the second, briefly refer to the Christians as "a mischievous sect." Suetonius speaks of them as punished by Nero. Tacitus does the same, and speaks of Christus, the founder of the sect, as put to death in Judea by the procurator, Pontius Pilate. Pliny was governor of Pontus, in Asia Minor, and found Christians around him in great numbers. He wrote an account of them to Trajan, asking what he should do with them. He describes their habits of worship, as he had learned them from those who had renounced Christianity: "On a certain day of the week they gathered together, before the rising of the sun, and sung a hymn to Christ as to a God. At a later hour they gathered again, and took a simple meal together, and took an oath together, not to commit any crime, but to abstain from all crimes, as theft, robbery, adultery."

Josephus, a Jew associated with the Roman generals that made the conquest of the Holy Land, and destroyed Jerusalem, must have known something of Christ and of Christians. But the only paragraph in his writings that speaks of Christ is generally supposed to be spurious: "Now there was about this time, Jesus, a wise man (if it be lawful to call him a man, for he was a doer of wonderful works), a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews and many of the Gentiles. He was the Christ, and when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men among us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at first did not forsake him, for he appeared to them alive again the third day, as the divine prophets had foretold these and a thousand other wonderful things concerning him. And the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day." (Ant. 18, 3, 3.) Those who regard this passage from Josephus as spurious, do it on the assumption that if he had been willing to say so much of Christ and Christians, he would have said more. Thus, written history gives us little light.

But the great fact that Christianity, starting from that centre, spread over all the Western world, and changed the whole tide of history, requires, as an explanation, such events as those which the Gospels record. Christendom proves the historical reality of Christ, and confirms the New Testament history. Whence came that change upon the world from paganism and Judaism to Christianity? If we had no New Testament history, we should be obliged to assume essentially the facts which that history presents. The Gospels explain Christendom, its origin, its extension, its institutions and monuments, and its entire history. Aside from these there is no explanation, and can be none.

Suggestion has sometimes been made that the books produced Christendom. This is impossible; fiction has no

such power. The books and Christendom alike, sprung from the facts, from the history. The New Testament, then is historically true, and Christianity is the true religion, divinely set forth in the person and teaching and work of Jesus Christ. Nothing more can be needed to vindicate the historical reality of Christ and the essential truthfulness of the Gospels. Judaism and the Jews sustain a similar relation to the Old Testament. The existence of the Jews to-day, with their ideas and traditions, is proof of the Old Testament; that history is the only explanation of their existence. The land of Palestine is the "tenter bar" to which this double web of history fits. The books and the land belong together.

CHAPTER VIII.

MIRACLES AS RELATED TO REVELATION.

1. A conspicuous feature of the Scriptures, as involving a history of revelation, is the miracles recorded in the Old Testament and the New. It is a natural inquiry, What was their design? What purpose do they serve? What is their bearing upon our acceptance of the Scriptures?

2. It is manifest at a glance, that they do not prove the truth of the Scriptures, because we depend upon the truth of the Scriptures for our belief in the miracles. We cannot prove the miracles by the Scriptures, and then the Scriptures by the miracles. The Scriptures simply transmit the miracles to us as facts. They stand in the place of an eye witness. Nor can we prove religion, in its simple, elementary facts, by the miracles. They do not prove the existence of God. We can make no use of miracles, as proof of anything, until we have the facts of God's existence, his leading attributes and character. We must have natural religion—that is, such facts as we can gather from nature and reason, before we can have revealed religion. Miracles come with revelation, and are the divinely appointed seal and proof of revelation.

3. As an example, take the case of Moses. The bush that burned with fire, and was not consumed, was proof to him that the voice he heard was the voice of God. When he was sent to Pharaoh, the proof of his divine message was the transformation of the rod into a serpent, and similar works. When Gideon was called to save Israel, the angel that bore the message brought fire out of the rock, to

consume the offering. So with the parents of Samson; the angel that appeared to them ascended before their eyes in the flames of the sacrifice. Then, again when the true God was to be proved to Israel, in the days of Elijah, the test was, "The God that answers by fire, let him be God." The miracle proved the true God and the true prophet. This idea runs through the Old Testament. The miracle proves a revelation from God. The same doctrine is abundantly found in the New Testament. When John the Baptist sent his disciples to Jesus with the inquiry, "Art thou he that should come, or look we for another?" he said, "Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and heard; how that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, to the poor the Gospel is preached." So, in his argument with the Jews, the Saviour says, "The works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." Thus the apostles claimed acceptance for the gospel which they preached as a divine message; it was proved by the works they wrought. They prayed, "And now, Lord, behold their threatenings; and grant unto thy servants, that with all boldness they may speak thy word, by stretching forth thy hand to heal; and that signs and wonders may be done by the name of thy holy child Jesus." (Heb. ii. 3, 4), "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with diverse miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will." Paul, in vindicating his apostleship, says (2 Cor. xii. 12), "Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs and wonders, and mighty deeds." Thus the miracle was presented and received as proof that he who wrought it was a messenger from God. The miracle would have

essentially the same force with us to-day. If one should stand before us with a message claimed to be divine, and should attest it by opening the eyes of one born blind, or by calling a dead man from his grave, we should be profoundly moved. We should look to see that there was no deception, should scan the doctrine to see that it contained no manifest falsehood, and then should accept it. This is the only reasonable thing to do. The blind man restored reasoned naturally and soundly, (John ix. 31–33.) "Now we know that God heareth not sinners; but if any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth his will, him he heareth. Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing." Nicodemus (John iii. 2.) says to Jesus, "We know that thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him." In general, the Scriptures are not proved true by the miracles which they record, but the revelations which they contain are proved such by the miracles that attended them.

4. We sometimes hear men say that the miracles do not help them in accepting the Scriptures. They could believe them more easily without the miracles; that the miracles are a hindrance instead of a help—the thing most difficult to believe. Such statements mean that if the Bible contained nothing supernatural it could be more easily accepted; which means, farther, that the Bible should contain no revelation, no communication from God to man; that it should be a mere ordinary record of human life and human thought. To deny or discard the miracle, is to deny all special revelation from God. There can be no special revelation which does not involve something supernatural.

Let us inquire, then, as to the reasonableness of accepting the miracles of the Bible. Are they opposed to reason in any proper sense? Is there any such antecedent presumption against them, as to warrant their rejection?

5. And here we shall need to inquire what characterizes a miracle? What is it in its nature? To this the proper answer is, it is an event which is supernatural and superhuman. Let us consider what is involved in these qualities.

(1) A supernatural event is one which is above or beyond nature, which comes from an outside source; nature being that system of forces and laws by which the events of the natural world are brought to pass. An unusual, or remarkable, or rare, event is not necessarily supernatural. The giant tree of California is not a miracle—not supernatural. It is strange, remarkable; but it has grown by the same established forces which have produced the trees around us. An animal with two heads is not supernatural. We call it unnatural, abnormal; but it is as really a product of nature as the ordinary animal. An eclipse of the sun is not supernatural; it is provided for in the order of nature, as well as the rising and setting of the sun. So with a comet or an earthquake; these phenomena were once thought to be supernatural, but their dependence upon the order of nature has been established; hence they are not miracles, any more than the rising and setting of the sun. A miracle must come ultimately from some other source than natural forces; these forces may be used in the miracle, but there must be some adjustment or ordering of them which indicates a supernatural origin.

(2) Again, the miracle must be superhuman; that is, something not brought to pass by human power or wisdom. A feat of jugglery, a shrewd trick that seems marvelous, is not a miracle. The moment we discover its dependence upon human will or management, we pronounce it no miracle. If a man should possess some secret knowledge and control of physical forces, by which he could rise at will and float in the air, it would be a marvel, but not a miracle. It is neither supernatural nor superhuman; but such a work as another

could achieve by securing the secret knowledge. If Christ stilled the waves simply by some secret knowledge which men can attain and apply, then it was not a miracle. So with the raising of Lazarus; if it was performed by a knowledge of some secret which other men can get or might possess, it was no miracle. It was not superhuman.

6. Here an objection meets us: Since many things were formerly thought to be miracles and are not, why may we not suppose that the deeds of Christ, and other miracles, may sometime be shown to be merely natural events? Answer: The possibility that the miracle worker may have possessed a secret knowledge of nature such as other men might acquire, which enabled him to exhibit a marvel, should make us cautious. We should inquire carefully as to the fact before receiving the miracle. But, in the two thousand years since Christ raised the dead, men have come no nearer to the performance of such works. No one calls a dead man from his grave, or opens the eyes of one born blind by a touch, or stills the waves by his word; nor is there any approach to such knowledge. If those things were done by mere human knowledge men would have attained that knowledge. They have made no approach to such attainment, and we may dismiss the objection.

7. Another objection is made: If we know a miracle simply as supernatural and superhuman, may not some spirit greater than man, some mighty angel or demon, perform miracles, and thus lead us to accept a lie as a revelation from God? Do we know that no being but God can perform a work that is supernatural and superhuman? A man can toss into the sea a rock of a hundred pounds weight. May not some mighty spirit take up a mountain and cast it into the sea?—a work both supernatural and superhuman. This is a point that the Scriptures do not seem to determine, and reason cannot settle it. The magicians called by Pharaoh to withstand Moses, "did so with their enchantments."

Were the serpents which sprung from their rods a reality, or a seeming? Who can tell? Whatever the nature of their performance, it was shown to be inferior to that of Moses, and finally the power failed them utterly. Satan, we are told, smote Job with sore boils. Did he raise the tempest which overwhelmed Job's children? In 2 Thess. ii. 9, we read of a wicked one, "whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power and signs and lying wonders." We read of Satan as "transformed into an angel of light," to deceive if it were possible, even the elect. The Scriptures do not teach us that every supernatural and superhuman work is from God—that is, every miracle. May we not, then, be deceived by some worker of false miracles, and led away from the truth? What is our protection?

We are not to "believe every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God: because many false prophets have gone out into the world." The people of Israel had instruction to guard them: (Deut. xiii. 1–3.) "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder; and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." The Bible teaching is that no sign or wonder is to be accepted which would lead us away from God, from established truth and righteousness—the things we know to be true. The miracle that would lead us away from these, we need not concern ourselves about. It may be a real miracle or a pretense, it matters not; it is nothing to us; we pass it by.

Again, the Jews accused Jesus of casting out devils through Beelzebub the prince of the devils. He did not meet them by denying that Beelzebub had power to cast out

devils, but by showing them that his teaching and work were entirely opposed to Satan, and that if Satan were casting out Satan, he was divided against himself. Paul says (Gal. i. 8), "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." Pay no respect to his supernatural appearance, or to his miracles. The practical conclusion is that no miracle can establish palpable falsehood. A pretended message comes from the spirit world, with rappings and mysterious demonstrations. If the communication is out of harmony with the truth of God, it matters not what demonstrations may attend it. We do not need to examine them. Our dependence is finally upon God, "who will not suffer us to be tempted above that we are able, but will with the temptation make a way of escape." We may assume that if a message, so sent, is supernatural, as to Joseph by a dream, God will some how vindicate and prove his own message.

Some prefer to define a miracle as a work of God; then a supernatural and superhuman work, from any other source, would not be a miracle. The definition cannot change the argument, or set aside the difficulty. We have still to distinguish between the apparent and the real miracle. Our responsibility remains the same.

8. It is further objected against miracles, that the world is governed by fixed laws that cannot be interfered with; hence there can be no miracle. But the universe, with all its laws, is God's work, and he can certainly change or interrupt or modify the action of these laws, if he finds any sufficient reason. The wish to reveal himself to his moral creatures, as a present God, might be such a reason. Nature would receive no detriment in such a case. We ourselves, by the force at our command, can interfere with the ordinary working of the forces of nature, within certain limits. We can lift a weight, or level a mountain, or fell a

forest, and no harm comes to the universe of nature by this interference. The world is improved thereby. What harm comes to the order of nature, or of the universe, when Christ stills the waves, or calls Lazarus from his grave?

A moral disturbance is sometimes apprehended from miracles—an unsettling of the minds of men. Men may come to depend upon miracles instead of depending upon the natural order of events. There might be ground for this apprehension, if miracles were an every-day matter, or were wrought for personal advantage, or if their performance depended upon human intervention and wisdom.

9. A word may not be out of place upon Hume's famous objection to miracles: that there is such a presumption against them, on the ground of the known uniformity of nature, that they can never be proved. All human experience, he says, sustains the uniformity of the course of nature. Human experience, too, proves the fallibility of human testimony. Therefore the balance of the presumption will always be against the miracle. Nature holds on its way, and human testimony has failed. This argument is full of fallacies. The general experience of the uniformity of nature is not evidence against a miracle. It means simply that the majority of people never witnessed a miracle. This does not prove that no man ever saw one. You may bring a thousand men that did not witness a certain murder; two men, that did see it, will establish the fact against the world. Let us look at the thing practically: None of us ever witnessed a miracle; we do not know that a miracle has been wrought in the last fifteen hundred years; yet a few witnesses could convince us, or any other reasonable men, that a dead man was raised to life, in a neighboring town, yesterday. A miracle is a fact that can be proved like any other event. Hume's objection denies the possibility of proving it. That God exists, makes miracles always possible. That he may wish to communicate with men,

does away with any overwhelming presumption against miracles. It is simply a question of divine wisdom. It is not claimed that miracles are frequent, so that people generally can see them; but this infrequency does not render them incapable of proof. The man born blind said to the Pharisees, "Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind." Yet he himself believed that the miracle had been wrought in his own case.

10. But of what value are the miracles of eighteen hundred years ago to us? Of the same value as to the men who witnessed them. The Savior's miracles enabled them to judge of his claims. They do the same for us. We judge of the character and claims of Christ from what the Gospels record of him. The miracles are an essential part of the evidence. He claimed to be the Son of God—God manifest in the flesh. It was appropriate that signs of his divine nature should accompany him. God is walking among men—the Emmanuel. He should show that he is here. As evidence, the miracles of the Savior's time are just as valuable to us as to those who witnessed them; possibly more so. Doubts which hung about the nature of miracles are greatly removed. The suspicion that it might be merely superior human knowledge in Jesus that gave him the power, is done away. We have no idea that he cast out devils through the prince of the devils; hence they bring even more light to us than to the men of those times. Possibly miracles are not so necessary to us since Christianity has been more completely unfolded, but they were necessary in the presentation and unfolding of the Christian system. But the impressiveness of the miracles is not as great to us as to those who witnessed them. It is one thing to read of the raising of Lazarus; it is another thing to see the work performed, or to have it done in our time and neighborhood.

11. Finally, are we to look for miracles in our day? If not, why not? The power to work them remains, because God exists. It is simply a question of their present necessity. Miracles have been employed to establish a revelation, and have been used very sparingly in the history of the world. They appeared in the days of Moses, of Elijah and Elisha, of Daniel, and of Christ. These were epochs in the history of revelation. The great revelations seem to have been made; and miracles have proved them. If further revelations are to be made, we may expect miracles with them; otherwise such an expectation is unwarranted. Miracles are not for private, personal, uses, to relieve us from a burden, or to secure to us a good. The inquiry is a natural one, whether they might not be valuable in the propagation of Christianity where its history is not known; but it is questionable whether the missionary could afford to bear the responsibility of working miracles, even if the power were offered him. Miracles of healing, reported in our day, seem to have a strong presumption against them.

CHAPTER IX.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

1. The question of the *Inspiration* of the Scriptures is quite distinct from that of their truthfulness. The Bible might be true, like a history of the United States or a work on science, and still not be inspired. If the Bible is true as history, it contains revelations—divine communications, such as the messages of the prophets, and the teachings of Jesus. A true Bible, uninspired, would be an honest and intelligent record of the communications of God to the people, through Moses and the prophets ; and of the words, deeds and life, of Jesus and of his disciples ; such as intelligent and truth-loving men might have written—a record like that which Xenophon gives of Socrates, or Tacitus of Agricola ; honest and true records which give us a generally correct idea of the facts they undertake to present. Any honest record of the Savior's life and teaching would be valuable and precious to us. If there were even to come among us a man who had seen Jesus, and heard his words, how we should gather about him, and ask him to repeat all he knew! But a full record, such as the Evangelists have given, is vastly more valuable. Next in value to an inspired gospel, would be an uninspired gospel, essentially true as history.

2. The truth of Christianity—its claim upon us as a revealed religion, does not turn upon the inspiration of the Scriptures. If one of the Gospels be true, as ordinary history, Christianity is true. God has revealed himself to men. Jesus Christ, the Emmanuel, has come into the world.

The question of inspiration, therefore, does not concern the unbeliever. We do not need to discuss the matter with him. It is a question which properly belongs to believers, and is not vital to the claims of Christianity. Christianity is historically proved, without reference to inspiration. It is reasonable to act upon facts resting upon common history, without inspiration. By such evidence we govern our conduct in all ordinary affairs. It is not reasonable to maintain the idea that we must defend inspiration against the unbeliever.

3. What then, more exactly, is the question of inspiration? It is this: Were the sacred writers specially aided by the divine Spirit in making their record of the facts and truths which they presented? Are the Scriptures merely an ordinary human record of these facts, or are they the result of special divine aid granted to the writers? The doctrine of the church has always been that the sacred writers were inspired—divinely guided. There have been differences of opinion as to the manner, and the degree, of the inspiration; none as to the essential fact.

4. How shall the fact of inspiration be determined or investigated? Two lines of inquiry open to us. First, we may look at the work, and see the result. If the writers were supernaturally aided, their work may be expected to show it; and it is not presumption for us to use our judgment upon the question. We know, in general, what mere human intelligence and ability can accomplish; and if these books transcend such ability or wisdom, we shall be very likely to discover the fact. When we stand before a work of art, we can judge whether it exhibits unusual power and genius, without possessing any such genius ourselves. It is proper, then, for us to come to the Scriptures with this inquiry: Do they indicate supernatural aid in their character and style?

Secondly, we can inquire what these writers themselves

thought about the matter. They were honest and earnest men, of well-balanced judgment. Did they regard themselves as inspired? Do the Scriptures themselves, in any of their statements, sustain the idea of inspiration? In either of these two ways we may obtain light on the question.

5. To follow out the first method: if the Scriptures were not inspired, what would be their character? They would be, in the main, historically true. The writers were honest and capable men, and believed what they wrote. They were in the midst of the events, and knew whereof they affirmed. They were fair witnesses; hence the record of the Gospels would be, in the main, true, without inspiration.

But again, if the writers were controlled chiefly by their own impulse to write, and exercised simply their own faculties, these records would contain a considerable admixture of mere human utterance—an expression of the thoughts and feelings and speculations of the writers themselves. They would entertain us with their own ideas and reflections. There is no subject on which men are more inclined to speculate than upon the facts and doctrines of religion. An uninspired Gospel would give us Christ's life and works and words, as men could understand and present them; and we might expect to find, in addition, a considerable admixture of the thoughts and feelings and personal views of the writers themselves—things more or less reasonable; but some of them out of place, and requiring correction, or limitation. The collective judgment of the Church would naturally detect and drop these portions; not drop them from the record, but from acceptance and regard. There would be parts which we should regard as Matthew's personal opinions, or John's imperfect conceptions.

6. But what are the facts in reference to these Gospels? They are simply transparent exhibitions of the words and deeds of Jesus. They set him before us, just as he

stood before the writers, and enable us to see him as he was. They give us Jesus without note or comment of their own. We see nothing of Matthew, or Mark, or Luke, or John; nothing but the Master, in the simplicity and beauty and majesty of his character. It would be human to eulogize and magnify and glorify him. We find scarce a word of this. To let us see him as he was, seems to them the highest eulogy. It would have been human to stigmatize his enemies, to characterize them as they deserved. But we find no word of railing or reproach or bitterness. The facts are set forth, and the world is left to judge between Jesus and his enemies. It would have been human to comment on his discourses and parables, and to expatiate on his miracles; to speak of the profound impression made by his words and deeds. These human elements are not found in the Gospels; and it must be a higher than human wisdom that has guarded them from such additions.

The disciples, in their imperfect enlightenment, and low worldly views, often misunderstood Jesus. They could not grasp his lofty character and mission. Some of the plainest statements in reference to his death and resurrection, several times repeated, they could not receive. How came they at length to understand that character, so as to give it in its beauty and power, without addition or abatement? The wisdom was more than human. A similar argument could be brought to bear in reference to other leading portions of the Scriptures, as the books of Moses and the prophets.

7. Now let us inquire what direct intimation there is, in the Scriptures, of this inspiration. Here the argument must assume the general truthfulness of the Scriptures, which we have already ascertained.

First, we have the Savior's promise of the incoming of the Holy Spirit, and the spiritual enlightenment to result from this; John, xiv. 26, "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he

shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." John, xvi. 13, "When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth. . . . He shall take of mine and show it unto you." Luke, xxiv. 49, "And behold I send the promise of my Father upon you; but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high." These are direct, comprehensive, promises to his disciples, of inspiration. The fulfillment of these promises began with the gift of the Spirit, on the day of Pentecost, and followed them through all their work. Their ideas and utterances were exalted by that bestowment. From that day on, they were inspired men, and they spake and taught in wonderful contrast with the stupidity and crudity, which had before characterized them. Peter before the conncil, urging his right and duty to speak what he had heard and seen, was a a very different man from Peter as he appeared before this heavenly baptism.

In Matthew, x. 19–20, we have another less general promise of inspiration: "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak; for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." They were to be inspired, on these important occasions, in the defense of the Gospel—not to save their own lives; this was not their anxiety; and they were distinctly told that this would not be the result. They were to speak in defense of the truth; to make such a presentation as would tend to the furtherance of the Gospel. This was Paul's satisfaction in speaking of his own imprisonment, and the defense he was enabled to make, (Phil. i. 12). For this purpose inspiration was promised; and thus the promise would imply a wider application, and would cover the case of public teaching, and of writing the Gospel for coming generations.

The writers of the Gospels seem never to refer to their own inspiration; nor, in general, do the Scripture writers fall back upon a claim of inspiration, to secure acceptance of their writings. They present their message, and let it speak for itself. In 1 Cor. i. 12–13, Paul seems distinctly to make the claim for himself, and perhaps for his fellow-apostles: "Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual." In Gal. i. 11–12, he claims revelation for himself, as well as inspiration. "I certify you, brethren, that the Gospel which was preached of me is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." Here the revelation and the inspiration were in the same person, and were essentially the same thing.

The idea of inspiration was familiar to the minds of the apostles, and of the people of that time. 2 Tim. iii. 16, "Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness." This Scripture was, of course, the Old Testament. 2 Peter, i. 21, "For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Such expressions as these are common: "The Holy Ghost spake by the mouth of David;" "Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet."

8. The question of *degree of inspiration* has been abundantly discussed among Christian thinkers, and is, probably, still an unsolved problem—one of the most pressing at the present time. The doctrine which has prevailed, in modern times, in the Church, is that of plenary or full inspiration, involving the absolute truth of every statement

made by the sacred writers, whether more or less important; geographical and historical, as well as doctrinal. This view implies that if we could ascertain, with certainty, the original Scripture statement, on any point, the fact of inspiration would guarantee its absolute correctness.

Another view, to which there is more or less tendency in our day, is that the Scriptures are inspired to such a degree as to present, with all required fullness and accuracy, the great truths which it is the purpose of the Scriptures to present; that is, the truths pertaining to God, and to man as related to God; not facts of geography, history or science; and if an error should appear, in these minuter matters, it would not disprove inspiration, nor sensibly detract from the value of the Scriptures. The first view might be called that of *absolute* inspiration, the second, that of *essential* inspiration. There are difficulties in the first view, that of absolute inspiration, which are coming to be more and more recognized in the Church, such as these:

(1) It is impossible to prove absolute inspiration, in the sense claimed. The Scriptures do not affirm it, and no other proof is possible. No human wisdom is competent to search it out in the Scriptures, and establish it, in reference to every affirmation. It might be safely claimed that there is marvelous accuracy, even in the geographical and historical statements, and marvelous wisdom in reference to all matters of science—such wisdom as seems to imply divine guidance; securing the use of popular expressions such as are always appropriate, and the avoidance of all technical terms which imply a scientific theory. This claim might be reasonably maintained. But to go farther, and claim the absolute accuracy of all minute statements of fact, or the absolute harmony of all these statements with one another—this is a task which the broadest and most thorough scholarship in Scriptural learning would not undertake. Indeed, such scholars suppose they find minute statements, in the

Scriptures, which they cannot reconcile with each other, or with the facts. The advocate of absolute inspiration disposes of these cases by assuming that, if we knew the facts perfectly, the difficulty would disappear. But this is not proved, and cannot be; and absolute inspiration, to avail us as such, must be absolutely proved.

(2) But if the inspiration of the *original text* were absolute and complete, and were absolutely proved, no one can maintain that we have that original text, in every minute particular. Variations have crept in, and it is beyond human power to restore the original text. Here we find an element of uncertainty, in spite of absolute inspiration. We need divine authority for the text, in addition to the original inspiration.

Again, the canon has not been determined by inspiration. It is given by the concurrent opinion of the Church —the result of human judgment; and here is an element of uncertainty, from which absolute inspiration cannot relieve us.

Still again, there is no absolutely inspired translator or interpreter of the Scriptures: and honest, and earnest and scholarly men differ widely upon the translation and interpretation of some important passages. Absolute inspiration does not tell us whether baptize means always, and only, immerse or not, or what is the exact force of the prepositions often connected with the word. What avails absolute inspiration in the presence of these difficulties? We can only say the passage is absolutely true, if we could only be sure of its meaning.

Again, there are precepts in the Scriptures intended for all time and all places. There are others that are temporary in their application. Absolute inspiration does not help us here. When Paul recommends to the Corinthians to abstain from marriage, we all agree to the temporary application; but when he says to them, "Let your women keep silence

in the churches," we do not so agree ; and absolute inspiration does not bring us relief. When the Savior, at the last supper, distributes the bread and the wine, and says, "Do this in remembrance of me," we regard the Lord's supper as an established institution, or ordinance. When he washes his disciples' feet, and says, "I have given you an example that ye should do as as I have done to you," we are disposed to regard it as a symbolical lesson for the hour, and not a permanent ordinance.

The result then seems to be that, in our use and application of the Scriptures, whatever theory of inspiration we adopt, we are not saved from the necessity of the exercise of our own judgment, and from the uncertainty thereby involved. The Scriptures are not given us to be used in a mechanical way, like an algebraic formula, or a carpenter's rule ; and even absolute inspiration could not secure to us such a use of the Scriptures. The two theories practically bring us to the same result, by somewhat different routes.

9. The question of *mode of inspiration* is less important than that of the degree of inspiration ; but the two questions are naturally connected.

(1) The idea has sometimes prevailed that the writers were mere amanuenses under the direction of the Holy Spirit, or like spiritual mediums, transmitting communications made to them. With this view is connected the idea of *verbal inspiration*—that even the words, as well as the thoughts, come to the writers by inspiration. Some who maintain verbal inspiration, hold the words are varied according to the personal culture, and other peculiarities, of the writer, and still come by inspiration.

(2) Over against the theory of verbal inspiration, stands that of *dynamical inspiration:* that the writers were so elevated, and quickened and energized in their faculties, by the Spirit of God, that, in the use of their powers, thus quickened, they could accomplish what would otherwise have been

impossible to them. Thus they were still in the exercise of their faculties, and obliged to put forth effort, as appears from the introduction to Luke's gospel: (Luke i. 1–4), " It seemed good to me also, having traced the course of all things accurately from the first, to write unto thee in order, most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty concerning the things wherein thou wast instructed."

10. The *value of inspiration* to us does not depend solely, or even chiefly, upon the fact of our ability to prove the inspiration. It has accomplished its purpose in giving us the Scriptures as they are. The sacred writers have spoken with the power and clearness and wisdom which we find in the Scriptures, by virtue of their inspiration; and we have the benefit of it, according to Luke xxi. 15, "For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist." The clear utterance and the wisdom are found in the Scriptures, even if we fail to discern their source. A picture from Raphael does not lose its power, or value, because we cannot prove that it is his. It is satisfactory to know that the Bible is inspired, but if we could not prove the fact, or the degree, of the inspiration, it would be inspired all the same. In general we prove inspiration by the excellence of the Scriptures, and not their excellence by their inspiration. The excellence comes from the inspiration, not from the proof of it. Euclid's Elements of Geometry, brought from Arabia into Europe a thousand years ago, might have been given by inspiration; but if it had been, we should not need to prove the fact. The truth speaks for itself. So with the great body of Scripture teaching, like the parable of the prodigal son, or of the good Samaritan, or the sermon on the mount. The great mass of Scripture teaching is self-evident truth—known to be true from its own nature. It is inspiration which has given us such Scriptures; they could not have come without it.

11. *Difficulties in the Scriptures*, in the form of apparent discrepancies, or contradictions, or mistakes, have, properly, no more force than in any other collection of writings. They do not set aside revelation, or even inspiration. Rejectors of Christianity often parade these differences or discrepancies, as if they were valid reasons for rejecting the Scriptures; but we do not deal thus with other writings, and the proposal is utterly unreasonable. Such discrepancies, and even errors, were to be anticipated in a series of writings by so many different hands, preserved and transmitted through so many ages. The marvel is that these discrepancies and errors are so few, and so insignificant. They do not affect, in any appreciable degree, the essential teaching of the Scriptures. If they were ten-fold as important as they are, they could not set aside the Scriptures, or seriously detract from their value. It is comparatively easy to find such difficulties, if one is so disposed. Ignorance is the only required qualification; and it requires knowledge to dispose of them. But the Scriptures are of such unquestionable value and excellence, that they could carry quite a load of this kind without essential detriment to their claims or their force. Those who maintain absolute inspiration, put themselves at a disadvantage. They feel obliged to explain every difficulty, or discrepancy, important or unimportant; because their theory makes no provision even for minute differences. The different accounts given in the Gospels of the healing of the blind men at Jericho, and of the anointing of the head, or of the feet, of Jesus at Bethany, do not properly touch the question of inspiration; but they might disturb the theory of absolute inspiration. With a less mechanical theory, these slight discrepancies and difficulties can be admitted without essential detriment. It is marvelous how few apparent contradictions and errors we find, when we sit down patiently to the task of seeking a reasonable explanation. We are not to imagine that the Scriptures are like a

Prince Rupert's drop, or a Bologna flask, those curiosities of the laboratory, which fly into a thousand fragments with any slight scratch upon the surface.

12. There is a very general impression that the Old Testament involves great difficulties; that it is not only far inferior to the New, in its ethical doctrines and general tone, but that in many of its teachings, it is false and immoral. The opinion of Christ and the Apostles, in reference to the Old Testament, does not sustain this superficial idea. Matt. v. 17, "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." We have no evidence that Jesus ever proposed to improve upon the great ethical principles presented in the Old Testament. The two commandments which he presents as the sum of all duty, he derives directly from the law and the prophets. The duty of love to our neighbors as ourselves, and of love to our enemy, he derives from the Old Testament. His opinion of the practical value of the ancient Scriptures is shown in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus: "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. . . If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." Paul's opinion of the Old Testament we find in 2 Tim. iii. 14-16: "And that from a child thou hast known the holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation. . . All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." Peter holds a somewhat similar view of the Old Testament: 2 Pet. i. 19-26, "We have also the word of prophecy made more sure whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the daystar arise in your hearts; for the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Christ's sermon on the mount is sometimes supposed to justify this depreciation of the Old Testament; but such a view arises from a careless study of his criticisms. It is not the law as given in the Old Testament, which he calls in question; but the traditions and false interpretations and applications of the Jews, by which they had set aside the true spirit of the law. Such perversion of the law he charges upon them in Matthew xv. 3–6: "Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition? Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." We do not find in the New Testament any disparagement of the Old, but a high place of authority and importance accorded to it.

13. A failure to discriminate between a declaration of the great *principles of righteousness* which are found in the Old Testament, and *special precepts* adapted to the needs of the Hebrew people, as civil enactments adapted to special conditions, has often obscured the judgment of men as to the morality of the Old Testament. The moral law, requiring love to God and love to man, is distinctly announced in the Old Testament, as clearly even as in the New; but when practical legislation for the government of society is introduced, the precept seems often to fall below the standard of absolute righteousness. For example, the law of divorce, "If any man will put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement," was a precept given, as the Savior tells us, because of the hardness of their hearts; no higher statute could be wisely enforced. So with the provision of the cities of refuge, to secure to a homicide a fair trial against the avenger of blood. Why was not Moses directed to establish a court, and provide a trial by jury, for the supposed offender, near his own home? Such provision was impossible. The people had not attained that degree of self-restraint and fair consideration which made such a proceeding available. The same is true of the system of servitude

among the Hebrews; it unquestionably had some of the elements of barbarism in it, and was in itself undesirable; but the undesirable system could be regulated, and some of its evils abated. Thus, in all legislation for human society, many things must be tolerated, and regulated, that are not approved, and that are at length to pass away.

14. The failure to discriminate the historical element in the Scriptures, from the didactic, leads to a misunderstanding of their ethical teaching. The practices of good men of old are stated as facts; their polygamy and other imperfect arrangements are presented, but they are not enjoined upon us, or endorsed. These practices may not have been sins to them, because of their comparative darkness; but they are not presented for our imitation. What Abraham and Isaac and Jacob did, are not rules of duty for us; and it is a false application of Scripture to infer that what God does not seem to condemn in them, he approves of our doing. The attempt to justify slavery and wine-drinking from the Scriptures, rests upon such a misunderstanding; and many well-meant efforts to bring the Bible to bear against slavery, and in favor of total abstinence, involve a similar misunderstanding. The Scriptures were not given to solve the problems of social life, or of every-day personal duty, for all time, except by presenting the great principles of duty, of service to God and man, and offering the highest incentives to its performance. The questions which gather about the subject of amusements, in our day, are settled in the Scriptures, only by inculcating the true spirit of the Christian life, and leaving the practical form of that life to the common Christian judgment. If the Bible had undertaken such a work as is often required of it, it would have been a failure; because it could not be adapted to all men and all times.

15. To the superficial reader of the Old Testament, *the conquest of Canaan* by the people of Israel, at the com-

mand of God, appears offensive and even monstrous—repugnant to Christian morality, and dishonorable to God. A more careful study of the situation will show that the Canaanites were an apostate people with whom the Lord had long borne in their idolatry and oppression and cruelty. He had restrained Abraham and his descendants, for generations, from taking possession of the land, "because the iniquity of the Amorites was not yet full." The Lord might have swept the people from the land by a famine or a pestilence; but who can say that it was not a necessary lesson to the people of Israel, that they should be called upon to cooperate with Jehovah in his judgment upon a wicked and abandoned people? It was a necessary part of their discipline, as it is to-day necessary for every people that they should be required to inflict proper punishment upon crime in their own land. If they are excused from such responsibility, they will themselves lapse into corruption. It is quite possible that, in carrying out the divine command, some of the people might conduct themselves as plunderers and murderers, instead of ministers of the divine judgment. Such men, like Achan, would fall under the condemnation of God.

The Imprecatory Psalms and similar Scriptures are often a stumbling-block. They belong to periods of violence, when righteous authority was in deadly conflict with rebellion and crime. They require stirring external conditions to bring out their appropriateness. During the war of the rebellion, Christian men appreciated them as they had not done before. We needed such a lesson read in the church every Sabbath morning, to prepare us for the services of the day, and the life of the week. The Bible would have been deficient to us, if these parts had been omitted.

16. In general we need to distinguish between *objective morality and essential righteousness*, in order to explain the conduct and the character of men as presented in the Scriptures, and even the divine requirements. That Abraham, for

example, should have been called upon to offer up his son as a burnt offering, is shocking to our later views as inconsistent with the goodness of God ; and we are inclined to reject the idea that he could have made such a requirement. It brought no such shock to Abraham. That God required the sacrifice was all that he needed to know, and all that a good man would need to know to-day. In the interpretation and use of the Scriptures, all such facts and principles are to be borne in mind. Revelation and inspiration do not relieve us from the exercise of our judgment as to what is permanent and what is temporary, what is general and what is local; and, practically, such judgment will be brought to bear, and will guide us in our use of the Scriptures, whatever our theory of inspiration may be.

Having considered, thus, the authority of the Scriptures, we may henceforth employ them, without reservation, in our study of God, his attributes and providence and government, and of man's relations to God.

CHAPTER X.

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND PROVIDENCE.

1. God's providential control and regulation of the universe must be contemplated in two aspects: first, as related to physical events, those which lie in the chain of cause and effect, linked directly to the divine will; and second, as related to the voluntary responsible acts of moral agents.

Under the head of physical events must be included the creation of matter, and all its changes and modifications not dependent upon finite will; and the creation of mind, with all its movements and modifications not the result of finite will. The term *physical* is thus used in its comprehensive sense, embracing both the material and the spiritual world.

2. Since the material universe is the work of God's hand, his control of matter, its forces and laws and all its movements, must be immediate and absolute. Matter is his instrument; and the constitution and forces of nature are the machinery he employs for the accomplishment of his plans. This fact needs no proof; it is manifest in the relation which God sustains to the world as creator, and is in harmony with all Scripture.

3. Still further, we know that all the adjustments and movements of the material universe must be determined and regulated by him for the furtherance of his moral plans. The material universe can have no value in itself, and could not possibly be an end in creation. Its movements and results must contemplate some good beyond—must bear at length upon the welfare of sentient beings—beings capable

of good, whose well-being can be a rational end. It is perhaps conceivable that God should create a material universe, and control it, for his own satisfaction. It is not conceivable that he should do this for the sake of the material universe itself; this would be action without reason or motive. The material universe exists as a means, and not as an end.

4. God's infinite attributes imply that his control of this mechanism is complete and perfect; that he must be able to use it with absolute freedom in the furtherance of his plans; and that he cannot be restrained or hampered by the mere machinery, as men are hampered by their own constructions. It must be perfectly subservient to his will.

5. It must be true, moreover, that he can act upon this mechanism to modify or restrain its operation, either from within, through the forces themselves, beyond finite vision; or from without, by manifest and miraculous interposition. The occasion for any such interference cannot lie in God's inability to give the machinery originally any form that might please him. The limitations are not in himself, but in the necessities of finite moral creatures, to whom such a divine manifestation might be useful. Such absolute control of the material universe, on God's part, is involved in our conception of it as the work of his hand.

6. In a similar way God's power must extend to spiritual beings, so far as their existence and movements come under the sway of natural law, or, rather, lie in the chain of cause and effect. To this extent spiritual beings constitute a part of nature, and of the mechanism of the universe.

7. In reference to all these events, both material and spiritual, God's plan, or purpose, must be all-pervading and controlling. This is a necessary inference from his natural attributes and his moral character. Such purpose and control are desirable, and God is able and willing. These ideas, too, are in harmony with all Scripture on the subject; Luke

xii. 24, Consider the ravens; for they neither sow nor reap; which neither have storehouse nor barn; and God feedeth them. 28, If then God so clothe the grass, which is to-day in the field, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith. Mat. x. 29–31. Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows. In reference to all these necessitated conditions and movements of the world, the purpose of God may be regarded as his decree, in the absolute sense. The term is so used in the Scriptures. Job xxviii. 26, When he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder. Prov. viii. 29, When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment. The order, or course, of nature, and all events lying in the chain of cause and effect, beyond the reach of finite will, are embraced in God's decree.

8. When we come to the responsible, voluntary action of moral beings, a new relation must subsist between God's plan and purpose, and the result. The causative force in such action, as we have seen, is the agent himself. God's relation to that action is moral; that is, permissive or persuasive, not properly causative. His power, however exerted, must work in harmony with, and through, the voluntary powers of his creatures. The power of God in such cases, therefore, must operate in the form of motive, not force, in the sense of natural omnipotence. The finite will is interposed between the will of God and the result in the free action of the creature; and the chain of cause and effect between the will of God and that result, in the strict sense, is broken. The resulting action is not directly, and properly, the work of God, but of the moral creature to whom the act belongs. The sinful action of such a being,

cannot properly be spoken of as God's act. God has given the power to the creature, for such action, and permitted its exercise. The virtuous action of the moral being is not God's in any other sense than that he gives the power, and furnishes the motive, or incentive.

9. Thus the creation of moral beings involves the existence of a power which is not directly, in its action, controlled by omnipotence; and thus the occurrence of events is provided for, which God disapproves, and which he can not wisely prevent. The existence of moral beings implies the existence of the power to sin; and the result is actual sin; and this God cannot approve or desire. Of course he could, in the exercise of his omnipotence, annihilate the creature, or suppress his moral agency. Perhaps he could prevent his sin by an excess of restraining motive, but not wisely; and if God should act unwisely his great power to secure righteousness in the moral universe would be lost, and he himself would fail in righteousness.

10. The existence of created moral beings, and of a moral universe, implies that there is a portion of God's kingdom which he does not control by omnipotence. He can create, or refuse to create, such beings; but when created, they come, by the necessity of the case, under the sway of moral law and of moral forces, instead of physical power or omnipotence. If we regard this as a limitation of omnipotence, we must remember that the limitation is self-imposed, provided for and accepted by God himself, in giving existence to moral beings. But the clearer thought is that omnipotence can sustain no direct relation to moral action, in the way of determining its character, to prevent sin or to produce virtue. Such results lie out of the domain of physical power; they cannot be thought of as the result of power on God's part, but of the free will, the personality which he has given to his creatures. The physical world God controls by power, and the moral by motive. With the creation of moral beings

arises the obligation, on God's part, to treat them according to their nature ; their well-being becomes an end to be regarded.

11. Notwithstanding this break in the chain of cause and effect between the will of God and the free action of his creatures, the plan of God pervades the moral universe as really as the natural. He accomplishes his plan, through the movement of his moral creatures, as really as through the natural forces in the material world. Without suppressing, or interfering with, free agency, he gives such form and direction to the actions of the good and the bad as shall best serve his ends. The Scriptures abound in examples and illustrations of these facts ; and secular history as well. The career of Joseph is a notable example. The piety and fidelity of Joseph, and the envy and malice of his brethren, were alike made subservient to the accomplishment of the divine plan ; and in Egypt a multitude of persons, from Pharaoh on the throne to the lowest of his servants, were brought in to bear a part in the fulfilment of God's purpose ; while they were, for the most part, in utter ignorance of the bearing of their action. At a later day the obstinacy of Pharaoh in resisting the demand of Jehovah, "Let my people go," was employed in the furtherance of the great movement of his providence. Further on in the history of the Jewish people, Sennacherib, king of Assyria, led by his own ambition "to destroy and cut off nations not a few," is sent by the Lord for the chastisement of Israel, not knowing that he is furthering the divine purpose. In the same way the treachery of Judas is employed, and the malignity of people and priests and rulers, in lifting up the crucified Savior in the eyes of men. Yet he was "delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." These are a few typical instances in which the divine plan is seen as over-ruling the plans and movements of men. They are only conspicuous illustrations of an all-pervading fact. That plan must ex-

tend to all human action. All men, willingly or unwillingly, are working out the divine purpose, not often aware of the place they occupy.

12. This over-ruling of human action, in the furtherance of the divine plan, involves no direct interference with free agency. One man often directs the action of other men to the accomplishment of his own plans, either with or without their knowledge or consent. A reasonable knowledge of human nature, and of the motives by which it is actuated, gives him such power. There is no difficulty in believing that God, in the exercise of his infinite attributes, must have a power in this direction essentially without limit.

13. Again, it is obvious that such over-ruling of human action does not necessarily affect, or touch, the character of the agent. That character depends upon his own purpose or intention, and not on the plan or purpose of God, or upon the use which God makes of his action. In John xi. 51, Caiaphas spake not "of himself," but "prophesied;" that is, his words were shaped by divine wisdom, and conveyed a meaning which Caiaphas did not intend. We can ascribe to him only the selfish and heartless character which belonged to his own intention.

14. So far as outward action goes, a good man or a bad man may be brought to co-operate in any plan of God. The man will have his own intention, and his own character; but God will determine the form and outcome of his outward action. If a man chooses to be a sinner, it is for God to say what form his sinful action shall take. Pharaoh refused to obey God, and God made him an example and warning to men, and exhibited his power and providence through him. He could escape that career which opened to him, only by renouncing his disobedience. When called upon to let the people go, he might have listened to God's voice and become, perhaps, the leader of the hosts. He maintained his position of resistance to God, and thus presented the occa-

sion for an exhibition of divine majesty, in the deliverance of the people. So with Judas; he maintained, of his own choice, a selfish and dishonest character; and God opened the way to him, so that he betrayed the Master. But for the over-ruling providence which shaped his course, he would have lived as other dishonest men live, and would have died, perhaps, without any gross exposure of his character.

15. The sin may be aggravated by this change of direction given to human action by divine over-ruling, or it may not be. If new light is given to the evil-doer, as in the case of Pharaoh and of Judas, it must increase the guilt; but the new light is at the same time a new motive to repentance and righteousness.

16. This sovereign plan of God, encompassing all human life and action, and working through it, implies a foreknowledge of all human character and action, and implies, as we have seen, the certainty of that action, but not its necessity. When the acts are put forth, they are as free as if not certain, or foreknown, and prearranged for, in the plan of God. The will of the agent to whom they belong, brings them to pass, makes them certain, and thus foreknown. The objection that the divine foreknowledge implies a *predetermination* of the act, on God's part, is, as we have seen, a pure assumption—a fruitless attempt to explain the divine foreknowlege. Such a theory of foreknowledge is set aside at once by man's consciousness of freedom.

17. The word decree is not properly used to express the relation of God's plan and purpose to the voluntary, responsible, acts of his creatures. The existence of men, and the conditions under which they live, so far as not dependent upon human will, are subjects of God's decrees; as also the precise form which their outward action shall take, and the use which God shall make of their acts; but human character, free action, and voluntary choice, are not decreed. By God's arrangement men form their own character, cher-

ish their own intentions, plans and purposes ; but the divine plan envelopes them all ; and, do what they may, they subserve that plan. The divine arrangement, in reference to human action, has sometimes been called God's *permissive decree;* which must mean simply that he has not decreed the free acts of men, but decreed to permit them. A permissive decree can mean no more than this.

18. This view of the relation of human character and action to the will of God, makes God the author of the moral system, and his moral creatures the authors of sin. Sin exists by permission on God's part, and by responsible action and causation on the part of his creatures.

In view of God's infinite attributes, his power and wisdom and goodness, we must believe that, as a matter of creation, this is the best possible world ; the best that infinite wisdom could devise, and infinite power execute. God has done his best in it, and could not make it better. But the world, with all its moral conditions and facts, is not the work of God alone. Every moral being has co-operated with God in its production. The world, therefore, is not necessarily the best world that could exist ; but the best that God could make. Every moral being who has sinned could have made it better. It would have been better without his sin.

To the question, is sin necessary to the greatest good, we must answer, no ; but the possibility of sin, or the permission of sin on God's part, is necessary to the best world, because it is necessary to any moral system.

19. This view of the divine sovereignty we gather from the universe as it is, and from revelation. What God does, and has done, is a disclosure of his purpose. Men know that they are free and responsible and capable of sinning and not sinning. It is the divine plan and purpose that they should be so. We gather his purpose from what he has done. With this limitation he exercises his sovereignty.

The two facts of divine sovereignty and human freedom exist; they cannot be in conflict. Any conception or statement which places them in collision, is imperfect and false. The difficulty of reconciling them is not in the facts themselves, but in our inadequate apprehension of them. The Calvinistic and Arminian theologies diverge at this point. Calvinism, in its more pronounced forms, so defines and explains the divine sovereignty as to set aside human freedom. Arminianism begins with human freedom as a postulate, and, in its extreme form, so explains and extends it as to intrench upon God's sovereignty, even to the denial of God's foreknowledge of human action. The great thought, in each system, is true; and a satisfactory theology must embrace them both, and provide for the harmony of the two. It must be both Calvinistic and Arminian.

20. The sovereignty of God places him at the head of the universe, a universal and absolute monarch. But it does not involve the right on his part to treat his creatures arbitrarily, or in any manner not suitable to their nature. In creating moral beings, he comes under the obligations of benevolence in regard to their treatment. He must be just, and good and merciful. His sovereignty is the sovereignty of infinite power and wisdom and goodness, exercised in doing the best that is possible for all the beings he has created.

21. When we come to the minuter question, as to the relation of God's power and providence and will to the forces and course of nature, three different views are possible and have prevailed, to a greater or less extent, all theistic and all intended to be Scriptural and Christian.

(1) There is what may be called the mechanical view: that all events in the physical world are wrought into the course of nature from the beginning; that the mechanism of the universe was so constructed from the first as to be in exact correspondence with the moral conditions of the world,

every movement and modification occurring under law at the right moment, all mechanically prearranged; and that answers to prayer, so far as these are admissible in reference to natural events, and even miracles, were wrought into the constitution of nature from the beginning. When the miracle appears, it appears under a law of nature, produced by the forces of nature, as truly as the rising and the setting of the sun. Nothing ever occurs, naturally or providentially, that was not wrought into the original mechanism of nature.

(2) The second view, sometimes represented as the doctrine of the divine immanence, lies over against the mechanical conception, on the other extreme. The conception is that all material force is God's force. Every movement in nature is the result of the immediate divine volition. Nature, if it has a distinct existence, gives no change or movement except as God works that change. The ordinary movements of nature are his ordinary forms of action, while miracles and special providences are unusual or extraordinary forms. The ordinary and the extraordinary are equally, and directly, the result of God's volition.

Neither the first nor the second view makes any clear distinction between a miracle and a natural event. In the first all is natural; in the second all is supernatural.

(3) The third view provides for a distinction between ordinary events and miracles; and assumes that there are established forces in nature, and laws in accordance with which they act—forces which God has instituted, and which work mechanically, according to the nature which he has given them, bringing to pass the ordinary events of nature, under divine supervision and control. At the same time there is room for divine intervention in the form of miracles, which involve a suspension of the ordinary forces, or rather of their operation, and the bringing to pass of events by direct divine agency. Again, there is room for divine inter-

vention in the form of a direct action on the forces of nature, and through them, to bring about a result not provided for in the original constitution of nature, and which would not have occurred but for this direct action of the divine will. In its inherent nature such action is like a miracle; but, as it is not apparent to the senses, we call it a special providence. Thus, rain granted in answer to prayer would be a special providence, rather than a miracle.

22. Each of the three preceding views has its advocates among Christian believers. Can we determine which of them is the more Scriptural, or more probable?

(1) The mechanical view does not seem to involve any impossibility, so far as related to the divine prescience and power; but from a moral point of view, in its relation to the moral needs of the world, it seems improbable. It robs the miracle of its essential nature, as a proof of God's direct action. The discovery that what seemed a miracle was linked with the mechanism of the universe, and came under a law of nature, would rob the event of the influence of a miracle. Possibly some attending condition in the moral world to which this unusual, though natural, event was adjusted, might make manifest the purpose of God in the case; so that we could accept the event as a miracle. The miracle would then lie in the adjustment of the natural event to the moral need. Again, the mechanical scheme removes God too far from our thought, for the best moral effect. The moral want of a manifested God is not provided for, and prayer becomes impossible. The mechanism of the universe stands between the soul and God. The answer to the prayer is in the machinery, and it will be brought out at the proper time. But we cannot pray with such an idea. The essential thought in prayer is that God hears, and is ready to be influenced as a gracious father. Take away this sense of God's nearness, by interposing nature between our souls and

God, and prayer becomes out of place. It does not meet our want.

The whole drift of Scripture seems opposed to this mechanical idea. The Bible brings man face to face with God, and not with the machinery of nature. The Savior taught us to pray, "Our Father who art in heaven; give us this day our daily bread." In the Epistle of James we read, "Elias was a man subject to like passions as we are, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain; and it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And he prayed again, and the heaven gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit. The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much."

(2) The second view is improbable. Nature is a reality. There are real forces, real existences, a real mechanism. Nature is not a mere mode of immediate divine action; and it is unphilosophical to resolve all force into immediate divine volition. The tendency of the doctrine must be pantheistic, leading us to confound the world with God, reducing even matter to a mode of God's volition. It is true that we cannot know the inherent nature of matter; but that there are finite existences in the spiritual world we know. The consciousness of our own personal being is the proof of it. The human soul is a reality, not a mode of God's volition. We have thus a presumption for the existence of material things and the forces of nature.

(3) The third view is in harmony with the general convictions of mankind, meets our moral nature, and is in harmony with Scripture. It is sometimes objected that it implies imperfection in the machinery of the universe, that a miracle or special providence must from time to time be interposed; but this is a misapprehension. The perfection of the machinery of the universe consists in its adaptation to the wants of moral beings, and it has no end in itself. The material world finds its end and purpose in the moral; that

machinery is best which best meets moral ends. This view still provides for a reasonable doctrine of the divine immanence—the constant presence of God in his creation, and his direct supervision of all the interests of the universe.

CHAPTER XI.

OBLIGATION—ITS NATURE AND CONDITIONS.

Before taking up the moral government of God, we need to consider obligation—its nature, grounds and conditions; also the nature of virtue and sin.

1. Obligation is a fact which every moral being perceives in reference to himself, and affirms of others like himself. It is a simple fact, not capable of analysis—not reducible to simpler elements. It is therefore incapable of definition except by a synonym, or by a statement of its grounds, conditions and limitations.

Thus the idea of obligation is an ultimate idea, in the sense that it cannot be resolved into other ideas, but is an immediate, rational, intuitive, perception. It is not ultimate in the sense that there are not antecedent ideas and perceptions, in connection with which the idea of obligation arises.

2. Obligation necessarily implies an object; that is, a somewhat toward which it is directed, which, by its own nature, imposes the duty of respect or regard. This object

makes it necessary to take some voluntary attitude in respect to it—to put forth some act of will. The apprehension of this object must precede the apprehension of obligation in the case. To determine the ground or fundamental reason of the obligation, we must determine what the object is which suggests duty; which is directly seen to demand regard on its own account. This final object philosophers have sometimes called the *summum bonum*, in the sense of the ultimate good, or the object of ultimate regard.

3. Diverse objects have been proposed as ultimate—as that beyond which our thoughts cannot go, in searching for the right, or in other words, for the final reason of obligation.

(1) A popular conception is that the will of God is ultimate in fact and in thought—that when we have reached his will we have found the ultimate reason for the rightness of any course of action, and can go no farther. But this view will not bear examination. We can and must ask why we ought to obey the will of God; and reasons are given in answer to the question, even by those who propose the will of God as ultimate. They tell us the will of God is right—that God is holy and just and good, or that he has a right to govern us because he created us. Every such reason implies some fact or principle back of the will of God, which makes it obligatory to obey God. But a direct consideration of the subject will show that no will can change obligation in its ultimate form, and that it depends upon no will for its existence. No will can make it wrong to regard our neighbor's good, or right to disregard it. If we found ourselves face to face with a fellow-creature, and knew nothing of any superior being, or of his will, we should perceive our obligation to regard that neighbor's well-being. Right is thus seen to be independent of will.

Again, we have a conception of the character of God.

We believe that he is good, worthy of our confidence and adoration. But goodness, in the sense in which we speak of God's goodness, involves action in accordance with obligation ; it implies a standard or principle of righteousness in the light of which we judge of God, as we judge of our fellow-men. All this would be impossible, if the will of God determined the right. He himself could have no moral character. The Scriptures contemplate God as acting righteously, justly, and he asks men to judge of his doings. Abraham, in his intercession for the righteous in Sodom, exercised such judgment : "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"

It is sometimes claimed that God is righteous in his *nature*, and that the nature of God is the fountain of all obligation and all righteousness. The statement involves no distinct thought. There can be no moral character in the nature of any being. The difficulty is essentially the same in proposing the *reason* of God as the final source of obligation. The reason of God perceives the right, but does not originate it.

(2) Thus, back of the will of God, we find the Right to which he conforms his will. Hence it is a very common view to regard the Right as ultimate, and to make the Right the standard of action—the thing to be respected on its own account—the ground and grand reason for obligation. Right, it is said, is first seen, and obligation is inferred. Thus benevolence or good-will to sentient beings is seen to be right, and therefore it is obligatory ; and all duties thus have their origin in the Right. Our inquiry is first for the Right ; then we know duty.

But this analysis is incomplete, and the order of thought is inverted. We can give a reason for the rightness of any action, and always do so, when the rightness is called in question. We do not practically treat it as ultimate ; we can not stop with the right, but go on to show the relation of

the act to well-being. This is an acknowledgment that the right is not ultimate.

A little closer thought discloses the fact that right or rightness cannot be ultimate. The word expresses a relation, a correspondence with some other fact or rule or standard. When we affirm that an act is right, we mean that it conforms to obligation—that it is obligatory or ought to be done. We mean nothing more. To affirm the rightness of the act, is only another form of affirming its obligatoriness. The ground of the obligatoriness remains to be inquired into. When we have found what makes an act obligatory, we have found what makes it right. If there were nothing back of, or beyond, the right, such an inquiry would be impossible, and would seem absurd.

As a modification of this idea of the right as ultimate, we sometimes have the fitness or harmony of things proposed as the fact which calls for respect on its own account. But we can find no new light in this modification of the statement. The term, order, harmony, fitness, is too broad and indefinite. Fitness in one form implies obligation, duty; in another form it does not. Music fits the ear. A coat fits the wearer. No obligation is suggested in these facts. The fitness that suggests obligation is moral. The act that is morally fit, is the act that ought to be done; that is, the act which is obligatory or right. Fitness then is only another expression of rightness, and it cannot be ultimate in the analysis. We must still look for the reason of the fitness; that is, for the ground of the obligation or of the rightness.

(3) Still again, virtue is said to be ultimate; that is, the object which is to be chosen on its own account; and here we need to discriminate. If by virtue is meant that course of action which we call virtue, objective virtue, then it is the same as the right; that is, the course of action which fulfils obligation; and it cannot be ultimate. There is a ground of its rightness or virtuousness.

Or again, if by virtue is meant subjective virtue, the inward state of virtuousness, this cannot be ultimate. It is the condition which arises from meeting obligation, and the obligation must lie back of the virtue; and the virtue is not the ground of the obligation, but the obligation is rather the ground of the virtue. Virtue is right action, and this action must have an end; that is, something on which it terminates, and which makes it right. This end, whatever it may be, must be the foundation of the obligation, and thus also of the virtue.

(4) There is still another view in which virtue is made an ultimate good; as follows: happiness or well-being is a good. Benevolence, making general well-being its object, is virtue. This virtue or benevolence becomes itself a good; a higher good than well-being. Benevolence thus becomes the object of approval or of love, which is called complacency, or delight in virtue. This complacency having thus a higher good as its object, becomes a higher virtue; and we have two kinds of virtue, benevolence and complacency. The first, which is benevolence, terminates on well-being as its object; the second which is complacency, terminates upon benevolence, a higher good, as its object. Benevolence is the first virtue in the order of time; complacency the highest in the order of dignity.

To this view it must be objected that complacency is merely an intellectual and emotional exercise; not a voluntary and responsible activity; hence not virtuous in itself. It is a spontaneous tribute of the rational soul to the excellence of virtue; it exists in all men, to a greater or less degree, irrespective of their moral character. A benevolent attitude is more favorable to complacency, or to a delight in virtue; but all the virtue, all the moral praiseworthiness, is found in the benevolent attitude.

(5) Worthiness of spiritual approbation is sometimes presented as the ultimate or final good. The law of our own

worthiness is the final appeal. The imperatives of the spirit's own excellence are the rules of duty. Do what will render you worthy. But, as thus presented, the worthiness itself is a moral state, which can arise only from the fulfilment of obligation; and we judge of our worthiness in the light of obligation, and not of our obligation in the light of our worthiness. Obligation must exist, must be perceived or thought of, and an attitude taken with reference to it, before there can be any thought of our worthiness. This difficulty has been met by some writers, who make the worthiness referred to natural, and not moral; and find the rule of duty in respect for our own excellence. We are to do that which our personal excellence requires; that is, each moral being must regard as the end of his action, his own personal excellence. This is the comprehensive, generic duty. Specific duties, as duties to our fellow-men, to sentient creatures, and even to God himself, must be derived from that which is due to our own personal excellence. The proposal is not satisfactory. My neighbor's excellence, or personality, is as important as my own, and he must have a claim, on his own account, to my regard, and benevolent activity. The Scripture standard of righteousness is to love our neighbor as ourselves, not to love our neighbor because that loving is in harmony with our own excellence.

(6) A more successful analysis of the facts in the case will show us that all duty or obligation terminates at length on sentient beings; that is, beings capable of well-being or of good. It is a fact of immediate intuition that nothing can be due, except to a sentient being, and only as affecting his sentient nature. In the satisfaction of this sentient nature we find final, or ultimate, or absolute good. In the presence of such good we affirm obligation. Every being capable of apprehending this good as valuable, sees the obligation to respect it, to treat it as valuable, to pay it due regard. Thus he comes under the law of obligation. We

find the origin of obligation, its foundation, in the value of well-being. No obligation, or thought of it, can arise except in reference to this well-being. Here is the only ultimate or absolute good ; but for this there would be no duty, no obligation. A sentient being alone can be an object of duty or of obligation, or can call for any action on the part of moral beings. The order of thought is this : good or happiness as valuable in itself ; then the perception of the obligation to treat it so. The value of the happiness is the reason for the obligation. Why am I bound to love my neighbor, or to stand ready to promote his well-being ? Because it is valuable in itself. Why am I bound to love him as myself? Because his well-being is as valuable as my own. All reasons for obligation or duty, in any form, finally reduce to this. Benevolence, therefore, the attitude of will regardful of well-being, is the primary, comprehensive duty —the duty from which all others spring. It is "the love which fulfils the law."

4. With this view of the origin and nature of obligation we sometimes find misapprehensions associated, which need to be corrected.

(1) There is first, what may be properly called the selfish scheme, which represents our own good as the only reason for obligation, the only motive to virtuous action. Paley says, "Virtue is doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." Here, one's own happiness is presented as the object of ultimate regard, the ground or reason for doing good to mankind. This must be wrong; because the happiness of our neighbor is as valuable as our own, and ought to be regarded on its own account. The happiness of all is more valuable than of one ; and we ought to be ready to sacrifice our own happiness for the welfare of all, if there should be occasion for it. God has so constituted us and the world, that such a sacrifice always brings its compensation ; but if we had no

assurance of this, we should still be bound to make the sacrifice. True benevolence respects all good; that is, the well-being of all that are capable of good.

(2) There is a modification of Paley's view which makes desire of happiness the only motive to action, that which finally moves the will—the subjective motive. The good of others is an objective motive, in that it awakens our desire, but the satisfaction of the desire, which brings happiness to us, is the final motive, the motive in the consciousness of the soul.

This view involves a psychological error. Motives can come to us through the intelligence, as well as through the feelings and desires. The value of our neighbor's good, in itself, and on its own account, intellectually apprehended, is not only a *possible* motive to action, but it is the true motive to action—the motive to true benevolence; and it does not depend upon any desire. The good itself is the motive, and is valuable on its own account, not my own good merely. We have already seen, in treating of the will, that this psychological error destroys the foundation of human freedom. If desire alone can move the will, then the will must yield to the strongest desire, or to the resultant of the desires. There could be no freedom to choose between the desires, because this would require a motive outside of the desires. In order to freedom, motives must come from two sources, and address the will directly.

(3) Again, there is a *utilitarian* misapprehension of the benevolent view which should be noticed. This represents that the obligation to benevolence rests on its *tendency to promote* happiness or well-being. Thus the younger Edwards says, "I am bound to love my neighbor"—to will his good, "because loving him tends to his good." It would have been a truer statement to say, "I am bound to will my neighbor's good, or to love him, because his good is valuable in itself." A benevolent disposition towards him is due,

because of the value of his well-being. The benevolent disposition, or state of will, which is required, precedes all attempt to do good, and is itself the "love which is the fulfilling of the law."

The obligation to any executive action, to do something for my neighbor's good, does depend upon the perceived tendency of the action. I must do what seems to be profitable to him. But if I can do nothing, I am still to love him, or to will his good; that is, to stand ready to promote it. If it were conceivable that benevolence toward my neighbor might injure him, and I should undertake to refuse to be benevolent for that reason, this refusal would still be benevolence. Benevolence therefore is obligatory, entirely irrespective of tendency. This cannot be true in the case of any specific duty. When we perceive that the tendency of any act is bad, we must refuse to perform that act; but we must still maintain the benevolent attitude.

5. The ground, then, or grand reason of obligation, or its foundation, is the value of happiness or well-being. Every being susceptible of this good, in any degree whatsoever, becomes an object of obligation. Benevolent regard is due him. All sentient beings from the lowest to the highest, beginning with the meanest of lower animals, and rising to the highest intelligence, to God himself, are objects of obligation; and all beings capable of rationally apprehending this good, and of having a purpose, are subjects of obligation, or are moral beings. God himself must come under the obligation to treat the sentient beings he has made according to their nature. He is not under government or authority, but under the great rational principle of duty and righteousness, as affirmed in his own reason.

6. It is convenient to distinguish the conditions of obligation, from its ground, or grand reason. These conditions are the circumstances without which the obligation could not exist in a particular case. The existence of a sentient

being involves the ground of obligation ; but in order to actual obligation a being must exist with the faculties of a moral agent, intellect, sensibility and free will. The possession of these faculties is the condition of his obligation. The sentient being, too, must fall within his knowledge. Thus light is another condition of obligation. When these conditions are supplied, the obligation arises. The obligation of benevolence therefore is the universal law, binding upon all rational beings. Obligation, in this primary form, does not spring from government or authority ; it precedes all authority.

7. The terms *right* and *wrong* are somewhat ambiguous ; and we need to consider their relation to obligation. In general, that attitude or course of action which is in conformity with obligation, is right. That form of action which is opposed to obligation, is wrong. The terms thus have a moral significance. Benevolence, or regard for well-being, which is a state of will, a voluntary choice, is always right, irrespective of any conditions. No supposition can make it wrong. It is right in the absolute sense ; known to be right from its own nature. A refusal to be benevolent, is wrong in its own nature, absolute wrong. The character of all other purposes and acts is known from their relations or bearings ; that is from their tendency in regard to well-being. Hence such acts and purposes are *relatively* right or wrong. To love our neighbor, to regard his good, is absolute right ; but to help him, in this or that way, to bestow upon him this or that good, may be right or wrong, according to the circumstances. Obedience to God is always right ; yet it is known to be right from a knowledge of God's nature and character, and our relation to him ; hence it is relatively right. Any voluntary attitude which in its own nature implies benevolence, is absolutely right ; as justice, mercy, veracity, gratitude. A proper definition of these virtues must make them forms of benevolence. They are

benevolence under special conditions, or accompanied by special emotions.

8. To act from true principle, is to maintain a benevolent attitude; since true principle must imply the fulfilment of obligation, and benevolence fulfils obligation. Benevolence therefore is the only eternal, unchangeable, universal principle of action.

Other principles, as regard for life, property, truth, authority, are proximate principles, or relative duties, binding, in general, because benevolence requires them. If at any time benevolence, or respect for all good, does not require such regard, the principle ceases to be binding. Thus all relative duties find their ground and limitation in benevolence.

9. The faculty by which we perceive or affirm obligation, in our own case, is Conscience. This is an exercise or function of the reason acting in view of apprehended good or well-being. Conscience directly affirms the obligation to maintain a benevolent state of will or purpose; that is, a constant regard for the good. This perception is rational, intuitive, belonging to all rational beings. There can be no more discrepancy among moral beings, in regard to this judgment, or perception, or affirmation, than in regard to any mathematical axiom. Thus far the testimony of Conscience is forever the same, and always right, imposing upon every moral being the absolute duty of benevolence. There are emotions and feelings connected with this perception of duty, giving an impulse to the performance of the duty, and involving self-approbation or self-condemnation, according as the duty is performed or not performed. These movements of the sensibility are not properly Conscience, though often so called, and are not necessary to the knowledge of duty.

Proximate or relative duties, obligation in reference to any executive action, are determined, not directly by Con-

science as a rational faculty, but by the judgment, deciding, in each particular case, what benevolence requires. The inquiry, in every case, is what on the whole will promote good or well-being? This action of the judgment is not always the same in different persons, or in the same person at different times. Its decisions are variable and fallible; nevertheless they must be followed. We have no other guide in practical duty. All available evidence and light will of course be sought, in forming an honest judgment; still, the decision may be wrong; that is, not in accordance with the facts in the case.

10. The man who obeys his conscience is benevolent, and thus is virtuous in his inner purpose; he fulfils obligation, or, as we express it, "has a right heart." In outward conduct he does what benevolence seems to him to require, that which is duty to him. He performs what we may call subjective duty. If he is mistaken in his judgment of practical or outward duty, he is still virtuous, right at heart, but mistaken. He fails in what may be called objective duty; that which would be duty if the facts were understood by him. But as they are not understood, the objective duty is not binding. What, with a right heart, we think to be duty, is just as binding as what we know to be duty; and the performance of it is just as worthy of moral approval.

11. Hence duty, as that which is actually binding, cannot be unknown; it may be unrecognized. The condition of its being duty is that it shall seem to be such to the benevolent heart. Subjective duty, the duty of benevolence, is absolutely known. Objective duty is not absolutely known. It may be unknown, but in that case it is not duty.

CHAPTER XII.

VIRTUE AND SIN.

1. We have seen that all obligation reduces to the duty of regard for the good, this good being the welfare of sentient beings. There is no other ultimate good.

2. In view of this good, two attitudes are possible to every moral agent.

(1) He can respect the good, can treat it according to its value, and thus fulfill obligation. Such fulfilment of obligation is Virtue. It is subjective righteousness, or rightness of heart. The proper definition of virtue is, the fulfilment of obligation. Other terms express the same idea, as righteousness, holiness. It covers the whole range of action that is morally praiseworthy. Some writers speak of praiseworthy acts that are not obligatory—acts that are desirable but not binding. But it seems a self-evident principle that every desirable act, possible to the agent, ought to be performed, or is obligatory. The distinction may be dismissed as unreal.

(2) As obligation can pertain directly to that action only over which we have control, it must be limited to attitudes or acts of will. The attitude of will required, and which constitutes Virtue, is a regard to good for its own sake; respect to it for what it is; a readiness to give it its place. This attitude of will is properly called benevolence, or the willing of good—a convenient and suitable name for virtuous action. President Edwards calls it love of being, a definition which we may accept in the sense of willing the good of being.

Let us observe that this Virtue is action, an attitude of the will; hence it must be distinguished from all intellectual perceptions and exercises, and from all movements of the sensibility or emotions. Thoughts and feelings involving approbation of Virtue, and satisfaction in view of it, may exist without Virtue; and Virtue may exist without these thoughts and feelings. Even devotional feeling may be simply natural or constitutional, and does not necessarily imply Virtue.

Again, benevolence or the virtuous attitude must be distinguished from beneficence, which is outward, and may exist without benevolence; and benevolence may exist without beneficence in outward form. Beneficence necessarily follows benevolence when opportunity arises, but it may also spring from some emotional impulse, and not be proof of Virtue.

(3) All *virtuous character* consists in benevolence, and is as permanent as the benevolence itself. Particular virtuous acts are outcroppings or expressions of the benevolence, and are prompted by it; they are but exhibitions of the virtuous character. In general the virtue exists before the act, and remains after the act is completed; if there had been no occasion or opportunity for the act, the virtue would have existed all the same. We naturally express our approbation of the virtuous act, because the act furnishes occasion for such expression, but the praiseworthiness is not limited to the act; it belongs to the character, which is not temporary but permanent.

(4) The *particular virtues* are but attitudes of will required by benevolence, or benevolence under special conditions and relations. Virtuous love in its various forms, gratitude, justice, mercy, self-denial, obedience, faith, humility, veracity, and every other special virtue, can be analyzed and shown to be benevolence under varying conditions. All these are virtuous because they involve benevolence, and

they cease to be virtuous when the benevolence disappears. Accompanying emotions color and modify the action, but do not constitute the virtue.

In the view of many writers, *justice* is supposed to resist such an analysis. It is regarded by them as an independent virtue, co-ordinate with benevolence. Thus benevolence and justice together are made the source and foundation of all the other virtues. This position leads to inevitable confusion, and doubtless springs from a misunderstanding. Justice, if a virtue, must be an active voluntary state, an attitude or condition of the will, not of the intellect or of the sensibility. Any definition of justice which involves these limitations will be a definition of benevolence. If we take the practical and popular definition of justice as the virtue which consists in giving every one what is his due—that is, manifestly, what ought to be given him, we find that justice involves a consideration of all interests, and a due regard to each. It must be, therefore, a purpose, a disposition, to treat every interest according to its value ; which is the proper definition of benevolence. Dugald Stewart, who very earnestly claims for justice a rank co-ordinate with benevolence, defines it to be that disposition which leads us, in cases where our own temper, or passions, or interests, are concerned, to determine and act without being biased by partial considerations. The definition is satisfactory, and interpreted it means an impartial regard for all interests, which is benevolence. Every definition which expresses the true nature of justice, and makes it a permanent duty, will yield the same result. Justice always implies a being to whom something is due, and who has interests at stake—a sentient being. It has no abstract or independent existence.

Next to justice, *veracity* is likely to be regarded as an independent virtue, resting on its own foundation, and not reducible to benevolence. Truth for the sake of the truth,

is a maxim often heard, but not distinctly conceived. Truth in itself has no value; its value is in its relation to well-being, and all the arguments in support of truth-telling must bring us at length to the one point of its bearing upon the general welfare. All moralists admit limitations to the duty of truth-telling; and these limitations are all determined by the claims of benevolence. Thus in a full analysis it will be found that all the virtues are embraced in the one comprehensive duty or virtue of benevolence.

(5) Thus it comes to pass that duties can never clash. There can never be a conflict of duties, because they are all grounded in, and spring from, benevolence. If justice and mercy and veracity were independent and co-ordinate virtues, then who could tell which should have the precedence, and how could a conflict be avoided?

A prominent theologian, in an essay on the atonement, says, "God may be merciful or not as he pleases. We cannot say God may be just or not as he pleases." There seems to be no proper basis for such a statement. We require of God justice and mercy equally, and both are provided for in his benevolence or goodness. The whole subject is luminous when we make benevolence the comprehensive virtue, and derive all others from it."

(6) Benevolence is, in its nature, generic; it is regard for all good, according to its value. As a conscious exercise, however, it is, in general, specific, terminating on particular objects which may be in the thought—particular beings present or contemplated; but no change of moral attitude is required to extend the benevolence to other objects. A benevolent man embraces in his benevolence the beings that he knows; bring other beings to his knowledge, and his benevolence at once embraces them, without any new, or additional, moral action. The apprehension only is limited, the benevolent disposition is general.

(7) The whole drift of the Scriptures is in harmony

with this view of benevolence as the generic or fundamental duty. The Savior sums up the law as consisting in two commandments, love to God and love to our neighbor; and in love to our neighbor he includes love to the unworthy, to enemies. Such impartial love is benevolence. Paul (Romans xiii.10) says, "Love is the fulfilling of the law." In the preceding verse he enumerates the commandments, and adds, "If there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." In 1 Corinthians xiii., the whole burden of the chapter is to show the superiority of love or benevolence; a superiority of such a nature that where this is wanting there is nothing. The marvel is that any other view could ever have prevailed among Christian moralists.

(8) The term holiness is essentially sinlessness, suggesting rather the negative conception of freedom from sin; but, except in a figurative way, it is applied only to moral beings, and must involve positive righteousness or virtue; that is, benevolence. No moral being, in the exercise of his faculties, is in a merely negative state.

SIN.

1. The other attitude possible to a moral agent in view of obligation is, to fail to meet it. This failure to meet obligation is Sin. The definition of the Apostle is, "Sin is the transgression of the law." This view of Sin as a failure to meet obligation, is the one commonly presented in the teachings of the Savior, as in the parables of the virgins, and of the talents. As obligation requires regard for the good of all, sin must be a refusal or neglect to regard the good of all, an indisposition of will to such regard; because obligation can directly pertain only to the attitude of the will.

2. To analyze this sinful action more fully, we must

consider that two classes of motives are always before the mind, and address themselves to every moral being. First, the well-being of the sentient universe, on the ground of its own value or worth, appeals to the intelligence, and demands regard on its own account. The feelings may or may not be moved. Secondly, the impulses, desires and passions, belonging to all moral beings, crave indulgence. They become motives by their direct, impulsive force, not simply by virtue of the remote apprehended good involved in their gratification. The perception of the correlated object awakens desire; and the desire, soliciting to its own gratification, becomes a motive. Between these two classes of motives the agent is free to act. He can listen to his intelligence, and respect the apprehended good, and thus be benevolent and virtuous; or he can yield to his impulses and desires, and fail to regard the good or well-being of all; and this is Sin. The mere gratification of desire is not Sin. The law of action for brutes is to yield to desire; but in order to Sin the good must be apprehended and refused or neglected. The brute has no such apprehension and therefore no Sin.

There is a superficial illusion connected with these impulses, a *seeming* good involved in their gratification; not a rational judgment. The moral being always knows that his own true good lies in the direction of his intelligence, not of his impulses.

3. A common misapprehension of the nature of Sin is, that the sinner loves or chooses Sin for its own sake, that he has a taste for Sin as such. No, he has a taste for self-indulgence, and accepts the sin in his pursuit of the self-indulgence, or the indulgence of desire. Sin, involving blameworthiness or guilt, is always distasteful to a moral being. It cannot be chosen for its own sake; it is a quality of the sinful choice, not the object of the choice.

4. Another misapprehension is that the sinner chooses his own good as supreme, instead of the good of all. No,

he neglects his own true good, as he does the good of others. He does not even think he is pursuing his own good. Our first appeal to the sinner is based upon the fact that he is destroying himself, and that he knows it. It is just as difficult to persuade him to be just and true to himself, as to be just and true to others. Sin, therefore, is not selfishness, in the sense that the sinner makes his own good supreme. It is selfishness, in the sense that he makes his own desires and impulses supreme, and gives himself up to these impulses.

5. A modification of this view is that the sinner seeks his own highest gratification as an end, or his own highest pleasure. But he does not even pursue gratification or pleasure as his intelligence apprehends it. He does not act according to the facts as he knows them. If he did so act, he would choose wisely, according to his best judgment. the self-indulgent man knows that he will regret his course. He knows that his present brief pleasure is bought at a greater future pain. If he were seeking the highest enjoyment or pleasure, he would renounce his base lusts. He would regulate his desires and passions, and choose a life of virtue instead of self-indulgence ; that is, he would become benevolent. The sinner does pursue the highest gratification, in the sense of yielding to the strongest desire. There is a degree of apprehended good in the immediate gratification ; but, in the pursuit of that good, the sinner follows his desire, not his intelligence or his judgment.

6. There is, again, a misapprehension in the idea that, besides this active voluntary form of sin, there is a sin in coming short of obligation, in a want of conformity to a law which is above our present powers. The law, it is said, was made for perfect beings. We are fallen ; our powers are deficient, while the measure of our obligation, and indeed the law, is what we might have done, if neither we nor our ancestors had sinned. No, the law to which we are to be con-

formed, and want of conformity to which is sin, is the law of nature, of reason and of Scripture. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength," is the law addressed to us with such powers as we have. There can be no obligation beyond. A benevolent heart always fulfills the obligation. Present power is the measure of present duty; and there can be no sin in any coming short, where the supposed duty lies beyond our power. This must be regarded as a simple, self-evident, truth—an ethical axiom.

7. Still again, it is claimed that we must recognize original sin—a corruption of the nature, out of which actual transgression springs; that the definition of sin as positive and voluntary transgression is too narrow. Sin, it is said, belongs to the fallen nature, as well as to the action which results from that nature. No, there can be no sin, that is blameworthiness, in nature. The idea is inconceivable and impossible; and it is unphilosophical and unreasonable to apply the same term to a derangement of nature, and to actual, voluntary transgression. A perverted nature may involve temptation to sin, but it cannot involve sin, as blameworthiness, in any reasonable or intelligible sense.

8. Again, certain outward acts or exercises are represented as sin, apart from the intention or purpose which animates them. Thus, one writer on Christian Ethics says, "No amount of good intention can make atheism, or blasphemy or murder right or virtuous." Such a conception is self-contradictory. These acts are crimes because of the unbenevolent intention which they involve. Take this away, and put in the place a good intention, and you have no murder or blasphemy remaining, whatever the outward form of the action may be. In every act the sin is in the intention which animates it. The outward act itself can have no moral character.

9. Still again, it is sometimes claimed that there is in men a set of the will, voluntarily assumed by the human race in Adam—the sin in Adam resulting in a voluntary sinful state, or set of will, in every human soul, which is the source of all particular acts of sin, but which cannot be changed by any power of the sinner himself. Nothing, it is said, but divine power can change, or remove, this set of will in the direction of sin.

Such a conception of human will implies that freedom and free agency were lost in the fall. If this be true, then the set of the will is a fact of nature, and not of voluntary action. The sinner was responsible for incurring, in Adam, this slavery of the will; but the slavery itself cannot be sin. Any set of the will which is not a voluntary state, in the sense that it is freely entered into and maintained, and can at any moment be abandoned, is not a sinful state. It is not a state of will, but of nature or constitution; and can not involve present blameworthiness. A set of will which is not voluntary, is not subject to the control of the agent himself, is inconsistent with any proper conception of moral agency.

10. *Sins of ignorance* are spoken of in the Scriptures. They are of two kinds: First, acts of inadvertence involving some infraction of a ceremonial law, as in the matter of cleanness and uncleanness, for which some ceremonial observance is provided, and which cannot be sins at all. Secondly, there are sins mitigated by ignorance, like the crucifixion of the Savior by his enemies, for whom the Savior prayed, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do;" and like the persecution of the church by Saul of Tarsus, for which, as he says, he obtained mercy because he "did it ignorantly in unbelief." The sin in each case, though mitigated by the ignorance, was co-extensive with the knowledge, and needed forgiveness.

11. Sin, then, in its generic form, is the refusal to be

benevolent. It is the disregard of good or well-being under the impulse of the desires and passions. Such an attitude of self-subjugation to the control of the sensibility, constitutes sinful character. Particular sinful acts are but the outworkings of the sinful character. The more permanent or prevalent forms of action, in the direction of the leading desires, constitute the vices which often characterize sinful men, such as sensuality, avarice, ambition, pride, selfishness and the like. Each of these is a sinful state, springing from some predominant desire. The sin lies, not in the desire, but in the disregard of well-being, the refusal to be benevolent, which is involved in the attitude. The sin is not in the outward sinful act, but in the inward sinful state. The outward act is an exhibition of the inward state.

Sinful character exists, even if there be no particular vice, or sinful outward act; and changing desires will give different forms to the outward action, without any change of character. If the ruling impulse be amiable, the outward action will be pleasing and beneficent. If a malignant passion controls, the action corresponds; but the sinful character remains through all these changes. The degree of guilt, or blameworthiness, may not be constant; that depends upon the varying degrees of light—the facts apprehended in the course of the action.

12. Virtuous action brings praiseworthiness, sinful action blameworthiness. These are not thoughts or feelings, but facts and realities. Feelings and judgments arise in connection with these facts—self-approval and satisfaction in virtuous action, self-condemnation and remorse, in sinful action; but the praiseworthiness or the blameworthiness remains when these feelings may have passed away.

CHAPTER XIII.

CO-EXISTENCE OF HOLINESS AND SIN.

1. Holiness or virtue is benevolent regard for the good —a disposition to respect and promote it. This is a voluntary attitude, a state of will, a simple exercise, not changed in its character by changing perceptions or feelings. The object before the mind may change, the perception of the quantity or value of the good may change or vary; the accompanying emotions will vary with the perceptions, but the benevolent regard, as an attitude of the will, remains the same, a disposition to respect the good, and give it its rightful place.

2. Sin is a refusal to be benevolent—the direct contradictory of holiness; hence wherever it exists it necessarily excludes benevolence. The will cannot present these contradictory attitudes at the same time; hence they cannot co-exist; each necessarily displaces the other in the human soul. Unless there be holiness which is not benevolence, or sin which is not a refusal to be benevolent, their co-existence must be impossible. The statement may be made broader. Unless sin or holiness can exist apart from any action of the will, they cannot co-exist.

3. The common doctrine of the church has been that where the character is generically sinful, as in the case of the unregenerate, there is no admixture of holiness whatever, not even by alternation. The character is wholly sinful. But after regeneration, when the virtuous principle has been established in the soul, somewhat of the sinful character remains, leading to occasional sinful acts. Thus the two prin-

ciples or the two elements of character are believed to co-exist in the individual soul.

4. Various theories are proposed for explaining this co-existence, or showing the possibility of it. It is necessary to notice only such views as involve the admission that sin and holiness are confined to the attitude or action of the will; no others can need to be examined. We have seen already that sin and holiness pertain only to voluntary action. Evil tendencies or impulses, in the nature, are temptations, not sin; and good impulses are not virtue. Again, any theory which involves the co-existence of the two contradictory attitudes of the will, must be ruled out as impossible; and any theory which reduces to this assumption must be discarded. In the nature of the case such double and contradictory action cannot exist; it would require two wills, or a double personality, which is contrary to our consciousness. This principle must, in fact, set aside all theories of mixed action at the outset; but it may be helpful to consider a few hypotheses upon which such action is maintained.

(1) The motives that address the human heart are constantly varied and mixed, some leading to virtuous action, some to sinful action. The mind is influenced partly by one class of motives and partly by the other, in the performance of the same act; and thus the character at any moment is the resultant of all these conflicting forces. This view of moral character and action is too mechanical; it overlooks the very nature of moral action; it represents the question as a problem in mechanics, involving the combination of forces. It is true that the mind is addressed by these conflicting motives; and this must always be true of every moral agent, on earth or in heaven; but the motive which is accepted as the reason for the action determines the character. Motives, as we have seen, are of two classes; one class persuading to benevolence, the other to self-indulgence, involving the re-

fusal to be benevolent. If one of these classes of motives is accepted as the reason for action, the other must be rejected, unless the will can be divided in a dual self-contradictory action, which is impossible. Hence while motives are mixed objectively, they cannot be mixed subjectively. The mixture of motives, objectively, does not produce mixed character.

(2) Another view is that right action, or right character, may be defective from the fact that the benevolence which constitutes such character may embrace some objects, and omit others, and thus be partial, not comprehensive. Some good is regarded, not all good.

But genuine regard for good is necessarily impartial. It is respect to the good for its own sake—not because of any relation of that good to ourselves, or to our own feelings. Impartiality is essential to its being benevolence. He that regards the well-being of his friends, and not of his enemies, is not, in any virtuous sense, benevolent; and we have the Savior's authority for accounting such partial benevolence, whatever its nature may be, as utterly defective. "If ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye? Do not even the publicans so? But I say unto you, love your enemies; do good to them which hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven."

(3) Again, it is represented that the benevolent choice may be defective from lack of intensity, while the obligation rests upon us to love with all our powers. Now this love may be genuine, it is said, virtuous, as far as it goes; but not coming up to the full measure of power or ability, there is a short-coming which is sin. It is claimed that we are conscious of different degrees of intensity in our virtuous exercises, and only when the intensity is the highest possible, is the obligation met. Thus all our ordinary virtuous states involve a sinful deficiency

In regard to the varying intensity of our voluntary action there is doubtless a misinterpretation of consciousness. The probability is that the different degrees of intensity, of which we appear to be conscious, belong to the emotions, and not to the will. The emotions will vary with the object before the mind ; they depend upon the perception of the agent at the time, and upon other conditions outside of the will itself. That attitude of will which implies a true and genuine regard for the good before us, is all for which we are responsible. The accompanying emotions will vary in intensity, according to the laws which govern them. The virtuousness of the act is not involved in these emotions, and does not depend upon them. The man who is resting from the performance of an exhausting duty, involving the highest intensity of activity, is conscious of little thought and less emotion ; yet he is just as true to God and to man, and just as really fulfills obligation, as when he was acting with the greatest intensity. If then the varying intensity belongs to the feelings, and not to the will, no deficiency of responsible goodness, no admixture of holiness and sin, can arise from that source. Still further, granting that the varying intensity is predicable of the action of the will, it may still not depend on the choice, or voluntary action of the agent. It may depend on the objects of perception before the mind, or on other conditions of the agent, over which he has no control. In this case he cannot be responsible for the intensity, and no blameworthy deficiency of goodness can arise from any such lack.

But again, granting that the intensity of the action does depend upon the will of the agent, then, in order to a virtuous choice, the will must act with all its force ; otherwise ease or self-indulgence is preferred, and the good is refused or disregarded ; unless we assume that the will can act at the same time in two contradictory directions. The agent must regard the good and refuse to regard it in the same ac-

tion, which we have seen to be inconceivable and impossible. We sometimes speak, in a popular way, of "half-hearted action;" but we never speak of it as virtuous or genuine; it always implies insincerity. A genuine, benevolent choice is all that is binding upon any man. The intensity of the choice will take care of itself.

(4) Another method of explaining the co-existence of virtue and sin is, that a benevolent choice or attitude of the will may exist without interruption, while isolated acts may be admitted opposed to that prevailing choice or attitude. Thus the prevailing, continuous choice, the deep undercurrent of the will, it is said, is virtuous, while sinful acts disturb the suface, and mar the character; or, as one of our prominent lecturers says, "The mighty tide of the Mississippi sweeps on, while in eddies along the shore the water turns backward, in opposition to the prevailing current."

The argument of the illustration is only a seeming one. There is only the semblance of an analogy between the movement of any material object whatever and the action of the will. The current of the Mississippi is vast enough to absorb a score of rivers, but the movement of the human will, in consciousness and in thought, must be a unity.

Another illustration is often given, as follows: a man may have the purpose to go to New York, and maintain that purpose on his journey, while he turns aside, here and there, for business or for pleasure. The purpose, it is said, is not renounced, but it is interfered with and deferred by other, and conflicting, plans.

The illustration is plausible, but does not meet the case. The purpose to go to New York is not an ultimate, predominant purpose which governs all executive action and determines the character. It is a subordinate purpose springing from some predominant choice or attitude of the will. The purpose to go to New York, and to linger or delay, are both subordinate to a choice of benevolence or of self-indulgence.

These subordinate purposes, serving that governing purpose, are in no respect in conflict with each other; no contradictory action is involved. Not so in the case of an executive act inconsistent with the ultimate choice. Such executive act involves moral character. It must have its origin, therefore, in some ultimate attitude of the will; and this ultimate attitude must be opposed to the prevailing attitude. The result is that in the prevailing choice there must be regard for the good, and in the opposing executive choice there must be a refusal to regard it, at the same time; and benevolence and its contradictory must co-exist in ultimate purpose, which is impossible. It is much simpler and clearer to suppose that the prevailing attitude of benevolence is interrupted by the opposing act, and that soon the will returns to its wonted course of action. In that opposing act the man is wholly wrong, but soon turns back in the line of his established character.

But what constitutes *established character*, and how does it arise? And is that established character wholly set aside, or annulled, by an act inconsistent with the ultimate choice? Answer: established character, in the proper conception of it, involves many things besides the action of the will. The most important element in that character must be the moral choice or attitude, which makes the man benevolent or unbenevolent. But, in addition, established character involves a settled and habitual state of thought, and state of conviction. Every man has a settled line of thinking which lies in the direction of his action. His objects of thought, and the associations connected with them, are essentially the same, from day to day; his judgments in regard to these objects are uniform. His mind runs in that channel; and action out of harmony with this settled thought, though always possible, is always constrained and temporary. There is, besides, an average and settled condition of feeling in harmony with the prevailing thought; the affections having

their prevailing objects, and stimulating both thought and action in their own direction. The feelings of a good man run in a settled channel, in harmony with his character and life. Perturbation of feeling may be produced by outside pressure of temptation, and the current of right action be interrupted by an opposing act. But there is a constant tendency to return to the normal form of activity. These prevailing tendencies of thought and feeling result in a certain momentum acquired in the direction of the usual action, and induce a facility of movement, constituting habit. Action out of this line of habit is forced and constrained, but it may occur under the sudden operation of motive. These conditions all lie outside of the immediate moral attitude, but they make up what we call, in a general way, character; such character as every man, to a greater or less extent, possesses.

How does this character arise? To the sinful man, by a constant and habitual action in the direction of his desires and impulses; these desires and impulses lying in his constitution to begin with, and modified by surrounding influences and his self-indulgent life. The impulses and desires in a bad man living under Christian civilization, are very different from those found in savage life; although human nature, in its essential elements, is the same in both conditions, and the moral character of the self-indulgent civilized man, and that of the savage, are essentially the same.

In the good man, the settled character begins with his benevolent choice, prompted and sustained by God's indwelling Spirit which stimulates thought and feeling and desire, and presents the objects of thought which pertain to God and to the spiritual life. Thus there is, in the good man, a supernatural element blending with the natural tendencies and habits of the soul, but not over-ruling or setting aside personal activity and responsibility. There is also, in the good man, the natural effect of habitual action, es-

tablishing the current of thought and feeling, and inclining the action in a given direction.

The question arises, in what sense is this complex, established, character set aside by an action opposed to it? The answer is, only as to the moral element, the choice or attitude of the will. The general current of thought or feeling cannot be changed, at once, by such opposing act; the habits of action are not instantly overcome, or set aside. In the sense in which character lies outside of the will, it abides and survives; and when the blast of temptation is over, the man springs up again to his old position, and goes on in the old life. The moral element of his character, which was interrupted for the time, is restored.

What then is the state of a Christian falling into sin? Does the Christian character remain? In the sense of moral rightness there is a total failure: the moral action, in that sin, is wholly wrong; the man is totally wrong, morally, and must repent and be forgiven, as truly as any sinner. But God has not forsaken him; the Spirit of God dwells in him, until he becomes an utter apostate, a reprobate. 2 Cor. xiii. 5, "Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?" Farther, the natural drift of his thought and feeling and of his habits of action is unchanged, and his cherished plan of life remains; but not the benevolent purpose of that life. His past experience and all his associations are a power with him, and we expect him to return soon to his usual action. This view seems clear and simple, in harmony with the Scriptures and with our own consciousness, and possible in philosophy.

5. In the Scriptures I find nothing that naturally implies mixed action, and there are many passages in which simplicity of action seems to be assumed. Matt. vi. 24, "No man can serve two masters: . . Ye cannot serve God and mammon." Luke xvi. 10, "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust

in the least, is unjust also in much." Luke xiv. 33, "Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." 1 John ii. 15, "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." Matt. xii. 30, "He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad." James ii. 10, "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."

6. That human consciousness is essentially in harmony with this view, is shown in the fact that religious teachers, who do not admit the doctrine theoretically, always insist upon entire obedience as the only acceptable obedience. No one, in presenting the conditions of life and godliness, hesitates a moment to urge that any reservation of the heart corrupts the whole action. It would be regarded as monstrous heresy to teach that one can render acceptable obedience while indulging in known sin.

Again, the general consciousness is shown in the intuitive popular judgment that any sin indulged, or cherished, destroys all ground for confidence in the character to which it pertains. It is regarded as an indication of an utter want of principle; and we apply the Savior's test, "He that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much." We require that the sin shall be repented of and renounced, as a condition of our confidence.

7. But it is objected that our consciousness is decisive against the doctrine; that every good man feels in himself a conscious deficiency, and is constrained to confess the imperfection of his most holy acts, his highest exercises. Answer: The impression referred to is not consciousness, in the sense of an immediate beholding of the moral state, but a somewhat indefinite idea of our past condition, derived from memory and judgment. Consciousness, strictly, could testify to the fact of mixed action, only by separating the attitude of will from all else, and detecting in that attitude

the co-existence of right and wrong purposes. In the vague impression we have of mixed action in the past, we do not discriminate between a failure which is continuous, and mars every act, and failures which interrupt the course of action. Co-existence in either of these forms would satisfy the facts of memory and of consciousness; but alternation is not properly co-existence.

Again, the sense of deficiency, in thought and feeling, which is the result of past failures, is often confounded with a sense of present sinfulness. There are few who sufficiently analyze their consciousness to make these necessary discriminations. Desirable and proper thoughts and feelings are set down as virtuous action; and undesirable and improper thoughts and feelings are regarded as sin. The unregenerate man, whose moral character is wholly wrong, has the same vague impression of mixed action in his own character and life.

8. Again, it is claimed that every sin should produce a shock in the soul, if it involves a total change from righteousness to sinfulness. Not at all; a single act of sin does not change the drift of thought or feeling, or of outward action. It is a temporary failure of the benevolent purpose or attitude of the will, a yielding to impulse. Even the radical change in conversion is not always, perhaps not often, revealed instantaneously in the reflective consciousness. The ultimate attitude of the will in which moral character lies, is less distinct in consciousness than thoughts and feelings, and proximate, or executive, purposes. It often requires the most careful direct attention, and the most searching inquiry, to determine the fact of sinful action, in a particular case, in our own hearts. No shock in experience is called for by the theory of simplicity.

9. A difficulty is sometimes felt as to the work of Christian progress and growth in grace, in this conception of the simplicity and unity of moral action. There is no

special occasion for the difficulty. There is just as real call for improvement and progress in ruling out "the sin which so easily besets," and interrupts the virtuous activity, thus making the interruptions less and less frequent, as in repressing and diminishing the sin which is supposed to be in constant co-existence with the benevolent choice.

10. In practical teaching and preaching there is little occasion for these philosophical discriminations. The preacher needs to have them in mind, as essential to clear thought upon the nature and relations of sin and holiness. Then let him use popular language in addressing the hearts and consciences of men, and he will make the right impression. The usual language of religious instruction is essentially correct. No sin is to be tolerated for a moment. Any sin indulged corrupts the entire character.

CHAPTER XIV.

PERSONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES—GOVERNMENT, HUMAN AND DIVINE.

1. The claim which any being properly has to respect or regard, we call a right; in a moral being, a personal right. These claims, taken collectively, we call the rights of the person. The basis of all rights is susceptibility of happiness or well-being. This is the only ground of regard, of attention, to any being. It is the only basis of a claim to such attention. A sentient being alone can be a subject of rights.

2. The fundamental comprehensive right, is the right to happiness or well-being, which is the general satisfaction of susceptibilities. This covers the whole ground, and all claims or rights are embraced in it. Respect rendered to any being to this extent, fills the full measure of his claims.

3. But since well-being depends on certain conditions, and cannot be secured without them, there arise subordinate rights corresponding with these conditions; such as the rights of life, liberty, reputation, property, and the like; and every moral being, at least every human being, has claims in all these directions.

4. That these rights are subordinate to the grand comprehensive right of well-being, is shown in the fact that, whenever any one of these ceases to be a condition of well-being, the right terminates; for example, the right to liberty in the case of the insane; the right of property, or the right to control it, in their case, and in that of infants.

These rights are nothing apart from their relation to well-being.

5. Rights are limited, in the case of one person, by the corresponding rights of another—the rights of each, by the rights of all. No one can claim life, liberty, property or even happiness, when such claim conflicts with the happiness of all; or strictly speaking, when a higher good will be sacrificed by the claim. If a man's property is needed for the preservation of a city, his right ceases; he is not only bound to surrender it, voluntarily, for such a purpose; others have a right to take it without his consent.

In determining the question involved in any particular case, respect is to be had not merely to the value of the property, or any other good, to the owner; but also to the importance of the right of property, or any other right in question, to the interests of all. A man has a right to demand truth from his neighbor, not merely because of its value to him, in the special case, but because of the importance of veracity to all. The measure of the obligation is not simply the present interest at stake, but the entire circle of interests connected with the principle. Still, when we have made allowance for all these interests, personal rights have their limits, and must, from time to time, give way to higher interests.

6. These rights then are not inalienable in the sense that they may not be forfeited by crime, so that the claim or right may become inconsistent with the good of others, and therefore cease; or that higher wants and interests may not set them aside. Rights are not absolute in any such sense. They are inalienable in the sense that, while one remains a rational or even a sentient being, be he innocent or guilty, his well-being is to be taken into account, and to have its due weight, in any conflict of interests. Under all possible conditions, every sentient being has a right to have his welfare respected according to its intrinsic value.

7. The nature of the being must be considered in determining his rights. A being that is merely sentient, like a lower animal, has a claim to regard, as respects his well-being; his sentient nature must be respected; no pain must be inflicted without an adequate reason, that adequate reason being some higher good to be secured.

The addition of a rational nature, changes the conditions of well-being, and therefore the rights of the being. A rational being has a past and a future, memories and anticipations, hopes and fears; he has a sense of what is reasonable and just, and all these facts in his nature must be provided for, as a condition of his welfare. He must have plans of life, and scope to realize them. To the irrational being, the brute, there is no past or future in his apprehension; enjoyment of the present is all there can be of good. Hence the brute may be treated as a utility, or held as property, without any disregard of the conditions of his well-being. His existence even may be sacrificed for the well-being of men. A human being cannot be so held or treated, with any proper respect for his well-being, or regard for his rights. In a comparison of rights, in beings of different orders, the rights of God must be paramount, because of the infinite value of his being.

8. Every right in one being implies duty on the part of others capable of appreciating the right. A right or natural claim to well-being, or to the conditions of it, in any case, must be respected; and all who apprehend that claim must come under the obligation to respect it. Hence rights and duties are correlative. Every right implies a duty, and every duty suggests a right. It is the right of some one to claim the fulfillment of that duty.

9. The condition of duties, as distinguished from rights, is the power to do, to regard and promote good or well-being. The generic duty is benevolence. Specific duties are the carrying out of benevolence in particular cases

or relations. Duties are not abstract; they always have an object, and are due finally to sentient beings. There is no duty independent of a bearing upon good as related to sentient beings. When we speak, in a general way, of duty, with no object expressed, there is an implied reference to to the well-being of the universe, the interests of God and of man.

GOVERNMENT—HUMAN AND DIVINE.

1. Government has its basis in the wants of finite beings; the fact that they need to be governed, gives them a right to a government, and makes it the right and duty of those who can meet this necessity, to govern them, and of those who need the government, to accept it.

2. This want lies, first, in their finite nature. Beings of a limited range of thought and view, cannot strike out for themselves a course of life and action which is best for themselves, without direction; nor can they adjust themselves to other beings, with a due regard to their interests and rights, without some regulative authority above them, to prescribe their duties, and settle their differences. It is not probable that finite beings can ever reach a point where such a government will not be needed.

Another ground of the need of government among finite beings, at least among human beings, lies in their proneness to sin, to disregard each other's interests, and trespass on each other's rights, as well as to neglect their own true interests. Wise and well ordered government is the needed restraint.

3. Government meets these wants, first, by prescribing the duties and determining the rights of its subjects, and, secondly, by furnishing motives and restraints, influences needed to secure proper respect for rights and duties. These motives lie, first, in the influence of authority, the announcement of obligation by a properly constituted government,

by rulers who, by virtue of their position and presumed wisdom, have the right to make such announcement. In the divine government, this influence of authority is vast; in the family, it is very great; in civil government it is sometimes comparatively feeble. But, secondly, this immediate influence of authority, is powerfully reinforced by the use of sanctions, that is, rewards and penalties, employed by the government to secure obedience to law.

4. Every government must have a head—a person, or group of persons, standing in the place of authority and power, to frame and execute the laws, and thus secure the rights and interests of all concerned. Whoever can best secure these interests, or best accomplish the ends of government, naturally has the right to stand at the head and exercise the functions of the ruler.

5. The mode in which the ruler is indicated, varies with the nature of the government. In the divine government, God's pre-eminence is such that there is no room for question; he alone is qualified to administer the government of the universe. Hence he is sole head, an absolute and unlimited ruler. He rules the universe, because his creatures need such government, and because he is competent to exercise it. In the family there is a similar pre-eminence on the part of the parents, which continues until the children attain maturity; hence, for a limited period, parents have a right to govern the family. In civil government, he is the rightful head who can command the confidence of the people in his ability and disposition to secure the ends of government. In every well ordered civil government, there is an established method in which the ruler is to be designated; and no one who is not thus designated can have any power, or any right, to govern. Where there is no established order, he has a right to govern who feels in himself the qualification, and has the means of giving effect to his conviction; that is, whoever has the means of putting in operation

an effective government. The most obvious method among beings essentially equal, as in human society, is to designate the ruler by the expression of the individual choice of the subjects; and to this form all civil government seems to tend.

6. In every government, *law* is the authoritative expression of the obligations which the subjects owe to the ruler and to each other. These obligations arise under the great principle of benevolence, and law is an expression of these obligations; it does not originate them. Such interests as the government can wisely regulate and secure, it has a right to undertake; this is the natural limit to all legislation, all governmental control. The right to govern goes just so far as the interests concerned require, and no farther.

7. The *sanctions* of government are rewards and penalties. In general, reward is limited to the privilege of living secure under the government, in the enjoyment of its benefits. Occasionally distinct rewards are given, chiefly for some conspicuous service rendered to the community, and not for simple obedience to law.

Penalty is positive evil, inflicted by the government upon the transgressor of law. Its object is to restrain from transgression, not merely or chiefly in the case of the offender himself, but of all the subjects of the government. Penalty induces fear of transgression, and a more distinct apprehension of its wickedness, and thus tends to its prevention. The right to inflict penalty is based upon its necessity; it serves the general welfare. Ill-desert is a condition of the penalty, but not the sufficient reason. There can be no penalty without ill-desert, but if it were not useful there would be no right to inflict it; the utility is its final warrant.

Penalties must be proportioned to the crime, otherwise they cannot serve their purpose; but the absolute amount of penalty is to be determined by its effect upon the com-

munity; there is no absolute standard. The only guide is the public welfare. The more impressive the penalty, and the less the actual evil involved, the better; but impressiveness is, in general, in proportion to the evil inflicted. This may not always be true. The absolute evil in solitary imprisonment for life, may be greater than that of capital punishment; but the penalty of imprisonment is not so impressive.

8. There are two extreme and conflicting theories of penalty, somewhat prevalent, both inadequate and unsatisfactory.

(1) It is maintained that the proper aim of penalty, is the improvement of those who suffer it. No, this is strictly discipline and not penalty. The proper aim of penalty, is the protection of all by the prevention of crime.

(2) On the other extreme it is maintained that penalty is intended to satisfy justice, or meet ill-desert. If this were the object, pardon would always be unjust, because ill-desert is never canceled.

DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

1. God is the absolute head of the government of the universe, because there is need of such a head, and because he alone is qualified for the position. He exercises all the functions of government, legislative, judicial, and executive; he assumes the position as his right and duty.

2. His government is universal in two senses; first, it embraces all moral beings, and, secondly, it extends to all their moral conduct. All other governments are limited in both respects; their subjects are only a portion of mankind; and the interests to which they pertain are restricted.

3. The divine law is God's expression of the law of obligation, the law of nature and of reason, the law of benevolence. It is his law, not because he creates the principle of obligation, but because he publishes and enforces it, ad-

ding to the original force of obligation, the effect of his own will and authority. This expression of his will is found in the constitution of his creatures, in the course of his providence, and in his written word. Every finite moral creature recognizes himself, in his first apprehension of God, as a subject of his government, accountable to him for all his moral conduct. The knowledge of the fact comes with the knowledge of God, and of himself. This law of God, expressed in nature and in revelation, is of untold value, as giving distinctness and impressiveness to obligation.

4. *Penalties* in the divine government must be of the same nature, and serve the same purpose, as in human government. The warrant for their infliction is their necessity, and the necessity is the same as in human government; that is, to furnish motives to obedience. God punishes offenders, not because they deserve it, but because his creatures need this expression of his disapprobation of sin. Whenever the necessity ceases, he pardons; that is, he remits the penalty, although the ill-desert remains.

5. Of the form, degree aud duration of penalty in the government of God, we know chiefly from revelation. God's word is explicit on this subject, and leaves scarce room for doubt. The punishment of the persistent sinner is everlasting. A full examination of the teaching of Scripture on this subject, will come later, in connection with Eschatology, or the doctrine of the future life. We will here consider the usual theoretical objections to penalty in the divine government.

(1) Men cannot deserve everlasting punishment. Answer: If the sinner persists in his sin, the continued punishment will be deserved, and will be necessary; but if the sinner turns from his sin, his ill-desert is not thereby removed. Guilt once incurred, attaches to the person forever; thus the ill-desert of every sin is everlasting. It must be right for God to make the expression of his disapprobation

of the sin as lasting as the good of the universe may require. His wisdom alone can determine what is thus required.

(2) God is too good to punish sinners eternally. Answer: God punishes sinners because he is good; there is not the semblance of conflict between his goodness and the infliction of needed penalty. Genuine goodness is fidelity to all interests, involving a willingness to inflict evil, when such infliction is necessary to the general good.

(3) It is unreasonable to think that evil is to be everlasting in the universe. Answer: All the difficulty, in principle, is involved in the existence of evil at all. If God has found it necessary to tolerate and use evil, in the form of pain, for a day or an hour, it is conceivable that he may find it necessary forever. We are utterly incompetent to judge of this necessity.

(4) God is omnipotent, and not restricted to the use of such means as are found necessary in human government; he can manage the world as he pleases, and does not need to resort to such instrumentalities. Answer: Omnipotence does not enable him to dispense with penalty, any more than to dispense with government. God has moral beings to govern, and must use the means adapted to their nature; they must be governed by motive rather than by power.

6. It is a somewhat prevalent view that the *natural consequences* of wrong-doing are the only penalty of the divine law, and that there is no such thing as the direct infliction of evil in the way of penalty. The transgressor brings evil upon himself, as a natural result of wrong-doing. There are difficulties in this view, and various discriminations and limitations must be applied.

(1) It is not in accordance with the general representation of the Scriptures, that punishment comes without direct divine action. Matt. xxv. 30, "Cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness." Matt. xxv. 41, "Depart

from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Matt. xiii. 49, 50, "The angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire." Romans ii. 8, 9, "But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil." Such utterances are the usual language of the Scriptures, and do not suggest the idea, that the final punishment of the wicked, is simply the natural consequence of their sin. There are passages which would possibly admit the idea, and are often quoted as proof of it. Gal. vi. 7, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." The complete view requires the quotation of the first part of the verse, "Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." Prov. xi. 19, "As righteousness tendeth to life, so he that pursueth evil, pursueth it to his own death." But such passages do not limit the evil of punishment to the natural consequences of the sin.

(2) But what light is there in the nature of the case, or in the reason of things, upon this subject?

Natural consequences are of two kinds, the consequences of the outward act, and of the inward sinful state. The consequence of the outward act is the direct physical effect of that act as a cause. This effect must follow, whatever the purpose or intention of the agent. The effect of going into the fire, is the pain and injury of the burn. The effect of taking poison, is death; of drinking alcoholic spirits, intoxication, and the resulting damage; and all this comes, whatever the motive or character of the agent in the act. His act may have been a crime, or a mistake, or even a virtuous, benevolent, act; the result is the same, injury or death. The conditions of penalty are not involved in the case; the result sustains no definite relation to any guilt, and cannot be

an expression of the disapprobation of the government in reference to the act.

Again, these outward acts become sinful, only because of the evil consequences which follow. But for that evil, which is called the penalty, the act would involve no wrong. There would seem to be no more propricty in regarding the evil which follows these outward acts as penalty, than in making the pleasure which attends other outward acts of sin, the reward of these acts; both are natural consequences.

The second kind of natural consequence is self-condemnation, or remorse, which follows wrong-doing. This consequence must proceed from the inward sinful state, and is an inevitable result of sin; it can arise in no other way. There are still difficulties in the way of considering simple self-condemnation, and its attendant pain, as the penalty of sin. In the first place, it does not proceed manifestly, and directly, from the government, and does not appear to be a governmental expression. The self-condemnation is inseparable from the nature of the moral agent, without reference to any governmental action. If God himself should sin, he would suffer as a moral being; yet he is not a subject of government, and the suffering is not penalty. It is true, the moral constitution of man is God's work; but it is inconceivable that a moral being could exist, or could be constituted, without feeling self-condemnation in connection with sin; hence such an expression does not suggest government or penalty. Again, there is want of correspondence, in degree, between the pain and the guilt. The most abandoned sinner seems naturally to suffer least; which is a fatal difficulty in penalty. Finally, the conception of penalty as natural consequence, sets aside the idea of pardon, which is remission of penalty. Natural consequences are inevitable, and cannot be remitted.

But here it is to be observed that direct and positive penalties take effect through the human constitution, and

under natural laws; and thus remorse becomes one of the chief elements of penalty, in the government of God, and, to a limited extent, in human government. A divine arrangement by which a sinner should be shut up to his own soul, and thus become a victim of remorse, would be a positive penalty; the hand of God is in it; it is a positive infliction. Such arrangements for punishment are sometimes made in human government, in the case of solitary confinement. That form or degree of remorse which comes from the evidence of God's disapprobation, in some way communicated to the soul, is real penalty, the result of governmental arrangement.

Again, a distinction must be made between natural and providential consequences. Occurrences in the form of a stroke of lightning, or the bursting of a gun, may bring with them evidence of a providential purpose, and thus have the effect of a judicial dispensation, and of penalty; as when the earth opened and swallowed Korah, and his adherents, or when Herod was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost. Such events are not linked to the act, or the sin, as natural effects; they are natural events providentially ordered and adjusted as an expression of divine disapprobation. True, it is not always easy to discriminate the meaning of such an event, and misjudgments may arise, as in the case of Job and his friends; but the indications may be so clear as to produce a universal conviction that God has made a manifestation of his displeasure. History abounds in examples of such providences.

7. It has been common to speak of natural consequences as the penalty of physical law; but this expression involves great confusion. Physical law is not a law of obligation, and, of itself, imposes no duty. Its violation or counteraction involves no sin, and can have no penalty. Physical law is merely a certain established order of events in nature. Alcohol produces intoxication, malaria fever, poison death.

The obligation to shun these evils, comes from the moral law—the obligation of benevolence. What is called the violation of physical law, that is, such an encounter of the forces of nature as to involve evil, even unto death, is not necessarily sin. Sometimes the highest duty leads in the path of danger. If there be sin in the case, it is because the law of benevolence is violated, the moral law. Physical law has consequences, but no penalty. The very conception of penalty of physical law, except as a figure of speech, involves absurdity; and even as a figure it leads to confusion of thought, and should be avoided.

8. The tendency, and often the purpose, of the doctrine of natural consequences, is to separate God from the penalty, and save him from the responsibility of its infliction. The thought at bottom is, that God could not be justified in inflicting positive penalty; and while it is claimed that these natural consequences come by God's arrangement, there is still a secret feeling that God is relieved of the responsibility, and that the sinner brings the ruin upon himself. It is impossible to harmonize the two ideas. If the consequences come by God's arrangement, as an expression of his condemnation of sin, then God is responsible, as really as if the evil were a direct infliction. If they do not come by such arrangement, then they are no expression of his view of sin, and are not penalty under his government.

But there is no occasion to vindicate the goodness of God, by relieving him from the responsibility of inflicting penalty. He has an infinite disapprobation of sin, and must express that disapprobation in some effective way. His condemnation must fall upon the persistent sinner; and that condemnation, however expressed, will be penalty, and will rest upon the guilty soul, an eternal weight of evil.

9. The penalty of the divine law must carry with it evidence that it is divinely appointed as an expression of God's view of sin. It must have a supernatural element in

it, like a miracle or a special providence, so that there shall be no possible danger of misapprehension as to its source. It must involve not merely evil, but the evil must come by God's appointment. Thus only can it be the penalty of his law.

CHAPTER XV.

SIN, HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED.

We have already considered the question of the nature of sin, what it must be as a voluntary failure to meet obligation. It remains to inquire as to the facts of sin in connection with the human race.

1. Sin in the world is one of the most prominent and weighty facts of human history. The movements of mankind, and the course of divine Providence, have been, to a great extent, determined by it. The facts, as we meet them on every side, exhibit men as a race of sinners.

2. This fact is shown in the selfishness and sensuality and violence and crime which appear, and have appeared, in the history of the race. We may establish a community for the purpose of excluding sin, and sin will have possession before our walls are completed. The attempt is vain. So all-pervading is sin, and the expectation of it, that if one should come upon an island in a distant sea, entirely cut off from the rest of the world, he would approach it with the greatest circumspection, should he see there traces of human life; and he would be received with equal apprehension. No place is found where sin is not, none from which it can be excluded.

3. The universal sinfulness of men is shown also in human consciousness. There are none, so far as human experience testifies, that have reached years of maturity without a consciousness of sin. This is true in all lands, and among all conditions of mankind.

4. The general statements and implications of the Scriptures are in harmony with this experience: Rom. iii. 23, "For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." 1 John i. 19, "The whole world lieth in wickedness." 1 John ii. 2, "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." 1 John i. 10, "If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us;" and so on throughout the Scriptures.

5. This sinfulness is developed early in the history of the individual man, probably in all cases with the opening of moral agency; but that the first moral act of every individual of our race is sinful, if it be a fact, lies beyond our knowledge. It cannot be proved by any induction possible to us; we could only know it by divine revelation; and it is not probable that any such revelation is given us. The passage sometimes quoted as involving the fact (1 John i. 10), will scarcely bear such an interpretation: "If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us." The passage must be accepted as a general statement of the fact, in the case of men as we find them, that all are sinners; but it would be a violent interpretation to regard the passage as extending to the first moral act of every child. This, at least, we know, that the ordinary, spontaneous movement of human nature is to sin.

It is a common affirmation that the sinfulness of mankind is total. The statement requires explanation: what is the proper significance of the term? Human sinfulness may be regarded as total in two senses:

(1) First as resulting from the simplicity of moral action. Where sin exists, in any soul, there cannot co-exist with it any righteousness. The man in sin is totally destitute of righteousness. This appears to be a necessity in human action.

(2) But the doctrine of total sinfulness, as maintained,

in general, in the church, is intended to apply to all unregenerate persons, implying that their sinfulness, in this condition, is uninterrupted; that, in their unregenerate life or action, they do not rise to any acts of virtue or holiness, and that the acts which seem amiable and excellent lack the genuineness of right motive. Until a change of character comes, in the renewal of heart and life, the character and life are uninterruptedly sinful. This seems to be the testimony of experience, and of the Scriptures. The fact involved does not imply desperate wickedness, as is sometimes supposed. It is consistent with much that is amiable in feeling, and desirable in outward action. Total depravity, properly understood, is the entire absence of genuine benevolence; an attitude of will, rather than of thought or of feeling.

6. A farther fact in human sinfulness is that, naturally, it is persistent. Sinners do not, of themselves, without some movement upon them from without, turn from sin to righteousness and obedience. A moral force, more or less direct from God himself, is found necessary to arouse the sinful soul, and induce a change of character and life. We may call this need of a force from without, the persistence of sin; it is shown in the fact that sinners, left to themselves, according to all experience, hold on in sin, and, as the Scriptures express it, "wax worse and worse."

7. All these facts tend to show that sin is a constant fact of human experience, an attendant upon human nature. Some attempt to express the fact by saying that sin is an attribute of human nature. It would be better, and more exact, to say that sin is an attribute, or rather a fact, of human character. It is a voluntary state, involving responsible action; not an attribute of human nature. There is a propenseness to sin in human nature; or rather a predominance of impulses and passions which induce sin. This is sometimes called a love of sinning; but it is a mistake to affirm of the human soul a love of sinning for the sake of

the sin. Men have not a taste for sin as sin; but they have a love of self-indulgence. The impulses and desires lying back of the will are not sin, but are temptations to sin. The sin is in the voluntary action which results.

8. The question now arises, what account or explanation have we in the Scriptures, in history, or in the reason of things, of this remarkable condition of the race, involving the propenseness to sin, and the prevalence of sin among men? When, and where, and how, did it begin?

The Scriptures give us the fact that God created man in his own image; that is, with a moral nature, capable of moral action and moral character. It is not affirmed that man was created holy, but capable of holiness. We learn further, from the Scriptures, that God placed him under pleasant conditions and favorable motives, with a fair forewarning of the consequences of sin; that he fell into sin and came under condemnation. This was the first sin, the origin or beginning of sin to our race. There are indications that it was not the beginning of sin in the universe; for a sinner, in the form of a tempter, appeared upon the scene, and instigated this first transgression. We are not distinctly informed from what source the tempter came—"that old serpent, called the Devil and Satan;" but he was in the world which God had made.

9. When we look at the sin of our first parents we find that it was like all sin in its conditions and characteristics. There was, first, a susceptible, temptable nature. "The woman saw that the tree was pleasant to the eyes, and good for food, and a tree to be desired to make one wise," and a desire for the possession of the fruit was aroused. There was, again, the knowledge that to eat was wrong, forbidden by the highest wisdom and goodness. There was then a yielding in spite of the better knowledge. In the same way Adam was tempted and yielded. Sin, as we know it, is precisely the same. The tendency to self-

gratification in our first parents was like that in all their children, and the yielding to this impulse, in opposition to a better knowledge, is still the same.

10. We may regard this trial and fall of our first parents as the trial and fall of human nature. It was a trial of a good specimen of human nature, under favorable conditions. For the sake of the experiment, to illustrate the weakness and frailty of human nature, there was no occasion to go farther. To God it was not an experiment; he foresaw the result, but it was necessary that such an exhibition of the weakness of human nature should be made to the world, to justify the ways of God to men.

11. At once there was a change, to outward appearance, in God's treatment of the race. A sterner discipline was adopted—a treatment better fitted to a weak and temptable and sinful race. The conditions of Eden were good to begin with, but not to continue; and thus our first parents were sent out of the garden, and subjected to new conditions of hardship, labor, suffering, toil and death; and the race went with them into these stern conditions. The change must be accepted as a token of God's displeasure; yet it was rather disciplinary than penal. A promise was added, with the expulsion from Eden, and hope encouraged. God's providence and care over his sinful creatures were continued; and the work of regeneration and redemption of man went on. Rom. viii. 20, 21, "For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God."

This was the fall of man—a fall into a depressed and painful condition. On the part of our first parents it was a fall into sin; on the part of the race, it was a coming down from ease and external blessedness, bordering on heaven and immortal life, to hardship, suffering and death. Under

these stern conditions the race has been propagated, and has existed, from that day to this. Every man is born to a heritage of hardship and evil; and every man, as he enters upon moral agency, falls into sin. The evidence is that this condition of hardship is appropriate to a temptable and sinful race; that the ease and pleasantness of Eden were not favorable. The trial, or experiment, of Eden was necessary at the beginning; otherwise men might have had occasion to call in question God's wisdom and goodness.

12. Thus it was that "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." All the descendants of Adam inherit his weak and temptable nature, and in their turn fall under temptation and sin, and thus come into condemnation; "And so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." (Rom. v. 12). The phrase, fall of man, is theological rather than Scriptural. Men are a fallen race not simply because Adam sinned, but because "all have sinned, and have come short of the glory of God." We receive, then, from Adam, by natural generation, our weak and temptable nature, by which we sin and come into condemnation; and also, this depressed condition of the race, involving all the trials and hardships and discipline of life, and finally death itself.

Let us guard against some misapprehensions in regard to the fall. It does not imply,

(1) That men are born sinners. Such an idea is contrary to our reason and impossible. Sin cannot be a matter of nature, but of responsible voluntary action. Human nature is not sinful as a nature; it is temptable and weak, liable to fail. A sinful nature, in the sense of a blameworthy nature, that which brings the soul under the condemnation of God, is inconceivable and impossible. The idea involves a confusion of nature and character, which should be held as utterly distinct. The passages of Scripture supposed to prove the doctrine that men are sinners by birth, are doubt-

less misinterpreted. Psalms, i. 5, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me," is an intense, poetical, expression of utter sinfulness; and it is poor interpretation to employ it in the sense of a theological dogma. Psalms, viii. 3, "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies." This is a similar expression of the utter perverseness of abandoned men. Eph. ii. 3, "Among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." It is not necessary to make the passage involve an absurdity; and we are permitted to interpret the phrase, *by nature*, with proper regard to what is reasonable and possible.

(2) Nor is it implied that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity in the sense that it is regarded as theirs. Sin belongs to him who commits it; and it cannot, in any proper sense, be charged to another. The least offensive form of this imputation is, that the sin of Adam is charged to his posterity, not in the sense that the unworthiness or wickedness of the sin is theirs, but the guilt, or liability to punishment, is imputed to them. This imputation is supposed to be the ground upon which God gives to Adam's posterity, by a sovereign act, a corrupt nature. The corrupt nature is sinful, ill-deserving, and all its motions are necessarily sinful; and thus men fall under the wrath and curse of God. The ground of this supposed imputation is, by some, held to be that Adam was the natural and federal head of the race; that by God's appointment he acted for his posterity. His acts are properly attributed to them, and they are held responsible, in a legal sense—not responsible for all the sins of Adam, nor for the sins of our ancestors generally, but only for the first sin. This it is claimed, was in accordance with a special covenant, or appointment, of God. The view is too formal and mechanical, and arbitrary;

it lacks the character of naturalness and reasonableness; and could be accepted, if at all, only on the ground of a positive revelation. It cannot be shown that we have such a revelation.

(3) Nor is there occasion to accept the idea, that we were in Adam, in a natural, realistic, sense; that he embodied in himself all the human race, and that all humanity acted responsibly in him. It is claimed that this is the realistic theory of Augustine; but whatever its source it is a mere speculation, without proof in Scripture or in reason.

(4) Nor shall we find any better foundation for the theory of pre-existence, which maintains that all souls were created at the beginning; that some went forward in virtue, without lapse, like the angels, while others fell into sin. These were at length brought into this world, as a race of beings already involved in sin, with a strong tendency to sin in their nature, and with the guilt of past sin upon them. This view is equally without proof in the Scriptures, and lies entirely beyond the reach of human knowledge. Like other theories, it is an artificial device for disposing of the difficulties of the general sinfulness of mankind. It is not clear that, even if proved, it would relieve us at all of the difficulties which we feel in the present condition of human nature; it only takes us farther back into a past uncertainty. The necessity which is felt for such an explanation grows out of exaggerated views of the condition of human nature—an overstatement of its helplessness and degradation.

(5) Nor can we accept the idea that men lost their free agency in Adam, or their power to fulfill obligation. Losing free agency they would cease to be moral agents; losing their power to fulfill obligation they would be no longer under obligation. In this case they must lose their power to sin, as well as their power to be righteous. But men have not lost their power of sinning, and the possession of this power implies the possession of the power to cease to

sin. We cannot accept the idea that men are brought by the fall into any necessity of sinning. The idea of such necessity is a self-contradiction. Sin is necessarily the free, responsible, action of the agent himself.

(6) Nor does the fall of the race in Adam imply that men lost the privilege of probation. The idea has extensively prevailed that Adam was on probation for the race; that if he had stood faithful, the race would have had the benefit, and no one of his children would ever have been liable to fall. But in his fall all his posterity come under condemnation, and have no offer of life on condition of faithfulness, and therefore no probation. Some are elected, in God's sovereign grace, and regenerated by his almighty power, and thus rescued from the consequences of the fall; or, as a distinguished theologian expresses it, "Men stood their probation in Adam, and do not stand each man for himself." It seems scarcely necessary to say that this doctrine is not in the Scriptures, nor in the reason of things. Every man has his own probation, and would doubtless have had it even if Adam had not sinned. The whole idea that Adam stood for the race, in the sense that they are condemned for his sin, is without foundation.

(7) Nor is it clear that we inherit directly from Adam, by reason of the fall, a great accession of physical depravity; that is, aggravated tendencies, or propensions, in the direction of sin. Of course, such physical derangement is the only depravity that could be inherited; a depravity predicable of man's nature, in distinction from his character.

It is commonly assumed, even by New School theologians, that human nature was greatly changed in the fall; that the balance of powers and susceptibilities and passions was greatly disturbed; so that our nature is altogether different from that of Adam before the fall. It is a very general view that, by an act of divine power, man's nature was degraded, in connection with Adam's sin. This doctrine is

not affirmed in the Scriptures, and cannot safely be inferred from the nature of the case. The evidence rather is that our first parents, before the fall, were essentially like ourselves. They were weak and temptable, and sinned, as we do, weakly and unreasonably. There is no inherent power in an act of sin to change radically the sinner's nature. We are not informed that God changed human nature for the worse, by a direct use of his power. In the absence of such a statement it is unreasonable to affirm it. The trial in the garden was probably a trial of average human nature —not of angelic nature. The trial is significant to us because our nature was exhibited in it. The birth of Cain has been urged as evidence of a change of human nature; the birth of Abel and of Seth might be urged in opposition. It is reasonable to suppose that there was some unfavorable reaction of the sin of our first parents upon their own nature; and the principle of heredity would operate then as now. Beyond this, we have no evidence of a depression of human nature in the fall. Nor is there reason to suppose that the first sin would produce such effects, in contrast with subsequent sins. Of a supernatural change in Adam's constitution, in connection with his first sin, we seem to have no proof.

(8) But what we receive from Adam, by natural generation, is our weak and temptable human nature; such a nature, essentially, as he had from the beginning; a human nature never strong in itself, never intended to be self-sustaining, always needing the support of the divine Spirit—a weakness and need demonstrated in the fall. We inherit also from Adam, appointed to him for his sin, a depressed condition of hardship, suffering, discipline; penal and disciplinary in reference to Adam, disciplinary as to his posterity. In addition, we inherit from Adam, and other sinful ancestors, derangements of constitution, to an unknown extent, aggravated tendencies to self-indulgence and sin. But we

are not to overlook the fact that the law of heredity is a channel of good as well as evil; and that good traits and tendencies, the result of right character and fidelity in our ancestors, are a part of our heritage.

13. The existence of sin, on the human side of the problem, is explained by the constitution or nature of man. He is free, voluntary, responsible, weak, and susceptible to temptation; and such he came from the hand of the Creator. That with such a nature he should sin, is no mystery. Every sinner knows, in his own consciousness, how it is that he is led to do what he wishes, or desires, instead of what he ought. Thus far the solution of the problem lies in every man's consciousness.

The real mystery of sin is in God's relation to it; how he came to give existence to a race so weak and temptable. On this point we are not competent judges; we cannot know what was possible in the creation of a moral world. We can only say that God must do the best possible, and we may trust him in the end to vindicate his own work and ways. Perhaps the only method of producing strength of moral character is by temptation, hardship, discipline; and our idea that God could have made men morally strong, at the outset, is quite likely without foundation. The care and patience and expense to himself with which he has carried forward the work of human elevation and redemption, is a demonstration that there has been, on his part, no remissness.

14. But we do not relieve God from the responsibility for the weak and depressed condition of the race, by assuming that he made Adam originally strong, but so arranged that immediately upon his first sin, which he foresaw would at once occur, his nature should become deranged and corrupted, and he should propagate a weak and sinful race. The work is the work of God, as truly as if he had created man weak at the beginning. The problem is the old one of

the origin of evil; that is, the reason, in the mind of God, for giving existence to a moral world in which he foresaw sin would arise. We are not in a position to attempt the solution of this problem.

15. The great fact illustrated and enforced in the fall is, that men are weak, and dependent upon God for spiritual life and strength; that human nature is insufficient of itself. This is the great essential truth, brought out by the fact and history of sin. When we apprehend this fact, we see the necessity of the gospel provision; a plan of salvation for the weak and temptable, and of redemption for those who have sinned. In this great fact all Evangelical Christians agree. As to the question how we became weak and temptable and sinful, there is difference of opinion among Christian thinkers and teachers; and this question is comparatively unimportant. What man's condition actually is, whether his sinfulness lies in his nature or in his voluntary and responsible attitude and activity—this question is important; it involves the true idea of sin and of salvation. Indeed at the bottom of all this doctrine of a sinful nature, and hereditary moral depravity, lies an essentially false idea of moral action and moral character—an utter confusion of ethical ideas.

16. The idea that the power and the mischief of sin, and the moral weakness and dependence of the race, are best shown by attributing to men absolute impotence, an utter inability to righteousness, by nature, is without foundation. Such views are often called deep views of sin; they are rather superficial and shallow. They overlook the very essence of sin as voluntary, responsible, transgression, and confound it with defects of constitution or of nature, defects with which a man can be born. They tend inevitably to weaken the sense of responsibility, and of guilt. Let one accept the idea that his nature is such that he must sin, and he feels at once relieved. Sin in nature, or by any necessity,

can never trouble the human conscience, and never does. Such defect of nature is not sin but misfortune, and the responsibility for its existence is laid back upon the Creator, or upon remote ancestors, as every connate evil must be.

17. Every attempt to provide for original sin, or sin in the nature, involves the confusion and error of two kinds of sin, as we have already seen, and calls by the same name things utterly unlike. To call the defect which is constitutional, or involuntary, sin, and then to apply the same name to responsible voluntary action, is to confound things that differ. The idea of sin as involving guilt, in the sense of ill-desert, blameworthiness, is perfectly distinct in human thought; and to call anything else by the same name is a grievous mistake; it begins with bewilderment, and ends in greater confusion. The doctrine of sin in the nature, corrupts the meaning of many of the strongest words which touch the human conscience; such as obligation, sin, holiness, depravity, forgiveness, guilt, regeneration, punishment. The true ethical idea is dropped from them all.

18. But finally the problem is proposed to us, if there is no sin in nature, but only in the voluntary action or attitude of will, how can an infant, dying before moral agency begins, need regeneration, or be saved through the atonement, or have any share in salvation through Christ? To this we must reply,

(1) If the question could not be answered, the fact would have no tendency to prove that there is sin in human nature calling for forgiveness. Nothing but positive transgression, voluntary and responsible, can require forgiveness.

(2) For any deficiency or depravity in human nature, divine omnipotence, recreative power, is needed—not an atonement. The atonement is a moral force, and can have no more application to such a derangement of constitution, than to deafness or blindness or paralysis. If the difficulty in human nature were the loss of free agency, or the cor-

ruption of any faculty, or part of soul or body, the death of Christ could not restore it. Forgiveness has no place. Creative power must act. If the difficulty be moral weakness, temptability, liability to fail, then the moral power of the atonement, the love of God in Christ, and the gift of the Spirit, have a bearing in the case; to such a condition they are adapted. Truth can help moral weakness, can give strength against temptation. It cannot cure an impotent or corrupt nature.

(3) The case of infants dying before moral agency begins is not set forth in the Scriptures. Our ideas on the subject must be wholly speculative, inferences from our ethical philosophy. In the first place we can affirm, without misgiving, that such an infant is not a sinner, and cannot need forgiveness; yet he may have a share in the atonement in a variety of ways. Perhaps his very existence is due to the plan of the atonement. There would probably have been no human race but for this prearranged plan. The first pair would not have been created, or having been created, and having fallen, they would probably have suffered at once the penalty of the law, and the human race would never have existed beyond. Perhaps the privilege of translation to a better world, before entering upon a life of sin, is an arrangement dependent upon the atonement. If the race had been propagated without an atonement, it would have been a doomed race. No one could be punished without sin; but all, upon attaining responsibility, would fall into sin, and die without hope. We may conceive that the benefits of the atonement reach the infant in the other world. He passes into that world without an established character of righteousness; he finds himself in the society of the redeemed, of those who in this life have been recovered from sin, and forgiven through the atonement. The character and experience of these saints may be of advantage to him; he may be brought up in righteousness under their care, and

thus indirectly become a partaker in the atonement. Then, directly, all the truths of the atonement, and the gift of the Spirit, become his possession; and these may be the essential means of his preservation from sin, and continuance in blessedness. Without the atonement, heaven might have been to infants what Eden was to the human race; a place where there was no experience, and where the moral influences were feeble; but received into the family of the redeemed in heaven, these infants are surrounded by all the experiences and moral forces which have accumulated in the church below and the church above. Thus the infant, dying before moral agency begins, may have part in the song of Moses and the Lamb.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PERSON AND NATURE OF CHRIST.

The great personage in Revelation, next to God himself, is Jesus Christ. His appearance in the world, and his career, his life and death, is the great fact of Revelation. In the Old Testament he is presented in prophecy as the Messiah, that is, the anointed; in the New as the Christ—the anointed, as Jesus, the Savior, as Immanuel, "God with us." God is the foundation of all true religion, Christ is the grand feature of Christianity. No more important question meets us in our study of religion and theology than the question in reference to the Christ. Is he human or divine —finite or more than finite?

The question may be treated either inductively or dogmatically; that is, we may enter the field as inquirers, investigators, and gather from the history of Jesus, from his works and words and life, the facts upon which we can base an opinion. This was essentially the course open to those who witnessed his works, and heard his words. They had no theoretical announcement in regard to him, to shape and determine their opinions. They must look upon his deeds, and hear his words, and judge for themselves who and what he was.

The second or dogmatic method, which is open to one who regards himself as having the true doctrine in reference to the person and nature of Christ, is to announce the doctrine, and bring from the Scriptures the proofs of it. This is the method often adopted in instruction, and is generally more easily pursued than the inductive method. Indeed,

with our preconceived and settled views in reference to Jesus Christ, it is very difficult not to use the dogmatic method, in spirit, if not in form. The materials available are the same, whichever method we pursue; the only difference is in their use, the method of presentation. As far as practicable we will adopt the analytical, or inductive, method. We will endeavor to take a survey of the leading facts in the life and character of Jesus, and reach our results somewhat as men must have done who lived at the time of his appearance. In this survey we take the Gospels as reliable history—a true record of the life of Jesus, of his words and deeds.

1. At the time of the appearing of Jesus there was a widespread expectation, among the Jews, of the appearance of a remarkable personage—the Messiah or the Christ, the anointed. This expectation was based upon the prophetic announcement of his coming. As examples of these predictions we have Isaiah, ix. 6: "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given . . . and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace." Isaiah, xi. 1–5: "And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him . . . and righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." In Dan. ix. 25, 26, we have his name given, "Messiah the Prince," and the time of his coming foretold. From these, and similar Scriptures, a popular and widespread expectation had resulted, an expectation so general as to give rise to impostors who drew away considerable numbers of the people. It pervaded all classes. When Herod asked the chief priests and scribes where the Christ should be born (Matt. ii. 4, 5), they were able to say, "In Bethlehem of Judea; for thus it is written by the prophet." In John, i. 20, we find priests and scribes asking of John the Baptist, "Art thou the Christ?" "And he confessed, and denied not;

but confessed, I am not the Christ." In John, iv. 25, 29, the woman of Samaria, comparatively uninstructed, and outside of the circle of Jewish thought, could say, "I know that Messiah cometh, which is called Christ." "She went her way into the city, and saith to the men, Come, see a man, which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ?" The expectation seems to have passed beyond the bounds of Palestine, bringing the wise men of the East to inquire, "Where is he that is born King of the Jews? for we have seen his star in the East and have come to worship him."

2. Another noteworthy circumstance is the coming of a herald prophet, of remarkable birth and character, whose coming had been predicted by prophets, and who preached the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, in preparation for the coming of the kingdom of heaven. He spoke of the speedy appearance of the Christ (John, i. 26), "There standeth one among you, whom ye know not; he it is, who coming after me is preferred before me, whose shoe's latchet I am not worthy to unloose." "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." The multitudes that came to John's preaching and baptism were doubtless more easily gathered, because of the widespread expectation of the Messiah. The appearance of John was caculated to heighten the expectation, and prepare for the reception of the remarkable personage.

3. The birth of Jesus was remarkable as pre-announced to his mother, and at the same time miraculous as foretold, and as realized. Luke, i. 35, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee; wherefore also that which is to be born shall be called holy, the Son of God." Joseph and Mary could not receive this son as an ordinary child; nor could others who learned of the facts. He was not an ordinary child; the manner and circumstances of his birth separate him

from others. The claim to a supernatural birth has led many to doubt, and some to ridicule; but the fact is in harmony with the other supernatural facts connected with his career. There is no such inherent incredibility in it as to warrant its rejection; it harmonizes with the character and claims of Jesus, and is not out of harmony with the traditions of the world.

4. Striking events attended his birth (Luke, ii. 8-14). A heavenly messenger announced the birth to the shepherds at night; a heavenly host attended, with their song of praise, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men." In Luke, ii. 25–38, the recognition of the wonderful child by the old prophets, Simeon and Anna, in the temple, and their testimony to his exalted mission, are worthy of observation, and add to the distinction of his birth, and to the impression that something extraordinary had occurred.

The visit of the wise men of the East, guided by a strange star, is significant. The land from which they came was the seat of a religion the least degraded in its worship which the world could present, outside of Palestine. They were sent to recognize the coming of the King of the Jews. The mission was a providential indication of the need of higher wisdom and better light than the wisest of the East had attained. They were divinely guided to this new-born child. All these things combined to indicate the coming of a remarkable person.

5. Of the childhood and youth of Jesus, the Gospels give us little information; and the records which have been invented to fill the gap, the apocryphal gospels, have no historical authority, and are not worthy of our attention. Once Jesus appeared at Jerusalem at a feast with his parents, at the age of twelve years. He was left behind by his parents, (Luke ii. 43–50), and on their return, after three days, they found him in the midst of the doctors, hearing them and

asking them questions. "And all that heard him were astonished at his understanding and answers." His reply to his mother sometimes perplexes us: "How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" This answer would have been out of place, but for the fact that he had come to them as a supernatural child, and somewhat of his supernatural character might be expected to be exhibited from time to time. His parents perhaps needed such reminders. The exhibition was probably exceptional; "He went down with them . . . and was subject unto them; but his mother kept all these sayings in her heart."

6. The facts gathering about his entrance into public life distinguish him from other men. Like others he came to John to be baptized of him; and John, with some apparent apprehension of what he was, said, "I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me?" The Spirit descends like a dove upon him, and a voice from heaven is heard, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." Led into the wilderness to be tempted, he fasts forty days and nights, and Satan assails him, and angels minister to him—an experience which separates him from common men. A few days later, John, looking upon him, as he walks before him, bears witness: "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," and repeats the testimony on the following day. The events connected with his first public miracle are significant (John ii. 1–10), especially his reply to his mother, who suggested that he should use his power in providing the wine lacking at the feast: "Woman, what have I to do with thee? Mine hour is not yet come." The proposal of his mother implies that she had some intimation of his supernatural power; the reply is not the answer of a merely human son to his mother, and for this reason it does not offend us. The suggestion that the power she supposed him to possess was not to be used

at human dictation, nor for personal convenience, was entirely in place. The mother needed the admonition, and the coming church would need it as well; yet in spite of it, worship has been tendered, in the church, to the mother of Jesus.

Soon after this miracle he entered the temple, and drove out the traders and money-changers, the oxen and the sheep, with a kind of holy violence. It was not an ordinary human act. No ordinary young man could have undertaken it; and in performing it he assumed more than human authority: "Make not my Father's house a house of merchandise." We justify the act, the zeal and authority, in view of the character and claims of him who performed it.

7. The miracles of Christ are peculiar both as to their manner and their matter. They are distinguished from those of the prophets and the apostles, in that he ever claims that the power to work miracles attaches to himself as a personal possession. Mat. viii. 2–3, to the leper who fell at his feet saying, "Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean," Jesus replied, "I will; be thou clean." Mat. viii. 8–10, when the centurion said, "Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my roof; but only say the word, and my servant shall be healed; for I also am a man under authority, having soldiers under me; and I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh;" Jesus, turning to his disciples, said, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." He approved this ascription of power to himself, and wrought the miracle. Mat. viii. 26, in the storm he rose and rebuked the winds and the sea, saying, "Peace, be still! and there was a great calm." Mat. ix. 2–8, "He said unto the sick of the palsy . . . thy sins be forgiven thee." And to those who cavilled he replied, "That ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins," turning to the paralytic he said, "Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house."

How different from this is the manner of other workers of miracles presented in the Scriptures! Gen. xli. 16, when Joseph was asked to interpret the dream of Pharaoh, he said, "It is not in me; God shall give Pharaoh an answer of peace." Ex. xiv. 13, 14, Moses said to the people, "Stand still, and see the salvation of the Lord, which he will show to you to-day." "The Lord shall fight for you, and ye shall hold your peace." And, at the command of Jehovah he stretched out his rod over the sea; "and the Lord caused the sea to go back . . . and the waters were divided." Once only Moses seemed to forget himself and the source of his power (Num. xx. 10). The people were murmuring for water. Moses led them to a rock, and lifting his rod he said, "Hear now, ye rebels: must we fetch you water out of this rock? . . . and he smote the rock twice." The Lord rebuked him, "Because ye believed me not, to sanctify me in the eyes of the children of Israel." Peter and John, when healing the lame man in the temple (Acts. iii. 6), said, "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth rise up and walk." Peter was as liable as any man to make a mistake in this direction, but the habit of the apostles was invariable; they referred their power to a higher source.

The power of working miracles seemed to be always present with Jesus, as if it were a personal attribute. When the centurion's servant was sick (Matt. viii. 7), Jesus said, "I will come and heal him." The old prophets, Elijah and Elisha, could not speak with such confidence, nor use their power in this way (1 Kings, xvii, 20–21; 2 Kings, iv. 34): they stretched themselves upon the bodies of the dead children and prayed again and again, and with great difficulty the life seemed to return. In the case of the death of Dorcas at Joppa (Acts ix. 40), the people sent for Peter, in their distress, and he came, but without any promise that he could raise her from the dead. He put them all out of the

room, and knelt down and prayed, and then turned and said, "Tabitha, arise."

There are a few passages in reference to the miracles of Christ that might possibly give a different impression: Mark viii. 23–25, with two applications of his hands he healed the blind man. Luke v. 17, "The power of the Lord was present to heal;" the better translation is, "was for healing." John xi. 41, Jesus prayed at the grave of Lazarus saying, "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me." The prayer seems to imply no doubt in his mind that he possessed the power. There were special occasions when the fulness of miracle-working power seemed to rest upon the apostles. Acts v. 15, "They brought forth the sick into the streets, and laid them on beds and couches, that at the least the shadow of Peter passing by might overshadow some of them." Acts xix. 11-12, "God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul; so that from his body were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs or aprons, and the diseases departed from them." These were apparently unusual exhibitions, and there is no indication that the power attached to the apostles personally; it was recognized as a power from a higher source.

The character of some of the miracles of Christ demands attention. They indicate his personal control over the forces of nature, as in changing water into wine, multiplying the few loaves and fishes to feed the thousands, walking on the sea. In the case of an ordinary man this would seem an arbitrary show of power, without reasonable purpose; in Christ it was an exhibition of his personal attributes. It could not please us to see Paul walking on the water. Peter once volunteered in the presence of Jesus, but the exhibition was not satisfactory. Christ's rebuking the winds and the sea, was an assumption of power; Paul had similar occasion, but never undertook the work. Such miracles as these exhibit Christ's power over nature; they show

that the laws and the forces of nature were his servants. They fall in with the wonders of his birth, and seem natural and becoming to him. In a mere man they would be offensive.

8. The words of Jesus are as remarkable and supernatural as his works; and quite as difficult to harmonize with the assumption of a mere human character. John xiv. 8, Philip said, "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." Jesus replied, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, Show us the Father?" John vi. 51, 53, 57, "The bread which I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." . . "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." . . "As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me." John iv. 10–14, to the woman at the well Jesus says, "If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink, thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water. . . . Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life." John vi. 40, "And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day." John x. 27, 28, "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." Matt. xi. 28–30, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest . . For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light." John xi. 25, 26, "I am the resurrection, and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall

he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die." John xiv. 1–3, "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also."

These examples might be greatly multiplied. Indeed, if we exclude these lofty utterances of the Savior, there is almost nothing left. But they are not human utterances; we cannot adjust them to a human character; we cannot think of any prophet or apostle as using such words. In Jesus they please us because they harmonize with his deeds, and with all the facts of his history and character. His works sustain his words. He that could call the dead from the grave, that could rebuke the winds and the sea, had a right to say, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;" "I am the resurrection and the life."

At the close of the sermon on the mount we are told that "the people were astonished at his doctrine; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes." The manner of his teaching impressed them. He stripped away all their illusions, all their perversions of Scripture, and let the full light of truth fall upon their souls. The whole realm of spiritual reality stood open to his vision, and he spoke of that he knew. Such divine discernment characterized all his teachings. Even his parables involve the same spiritual insight In the parable of the prodigal son he sets forth the yearning of the heavenly Father over his wandering children. It is the simple, manifest, transparent truth; but what mortal lips could utter it? John i. 18, "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." The parable of the rich man and Lazarus implies a direct beholding of things within the vail. Imagine, if you can, Paul or John as uttering such a parable! Paul was

once caught up to the third heaven, but the things he heard were unspeakable—impossible for man to utter. John, in the Revelation, unfolds an unseen world; but he is taken up by the Spirit, and led and instructed by an angel. The things he saw were as much a surprise to him as to us; but to Jesus these great spiritual things seemed to lie open as the natural realm of his personal life. The supernatural is to him the natural; his words are as supernatural as his deeds, and both are in harmony with his claims and his character. Rule out the deeds, and the words must go with them. They cannot stand alone. Take away the supernatural works and words, and there is no historical character left. The Christ of the Gospels, and of history, is gone.

9. Out of these works and words of Jesus, and his supernatural history and character, there grew up a reverent regard for him, among his disciples and others who approached him—such a regard as is not cherished for men, taking on the forms of worship. This reverence and worship Jesus did not repel; he accepted and invited it. Matt. viii. 2, 3, "There came a leper and worshipped him, saying, Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean." Without a sign of disapproval Jesus replied, "I will; be thou clean." "They that were in the ship," when he rebuked the winds and the sea (Matt. xiv. 33), "came and worshipped him, saying, Of a truth thou art the Son of God." Jesus did not disclaim the title nor the worship. The Samaritan leper (Luke xvii. 16–18), "fell down on his face at his feet, giving him thanks." The Savior accepted the worship with the reply, "Were there not ten cleased? but where are the nine? There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this stranger." To the man born blind he said (John ix. 35–38), "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" He answered and said, "Who is he, Lord, that I might believe on him?" And Jesus said unto him, "Thou hast both seen him, and it is he that talketh with thee. . . And he

worshipped him." John xx. 28, Thomas said to him, "My Lord and my God," without rebuke. John v. 22, 23, Jesus said, "The father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son; that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which hath sent him."

Men do not make such claims, nor accept such reverence and worship; and Jesus himself proclaimed that worship belonged to God alone. Matt. iv. 10, when Satan proposed himself as an object of worship, Jesus replied, "It is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." Acts x. 26, Peter raised up Cornelius who had bowed before him in reverence, and said, "Stand up; I myself also am a man." Acts xiv. 11–18, Paul and Barnabas at Lystra, when the people were about to offer sacrifice to them, "rent their clothes and ran in among the people, crying out, Sirs, why do ye these things? We also are men of like passions with you, and preach unto you that ye should turn from these vanities unto the living God. . . . And with these sayings scarce restrained they the people, that they had not done sacrifice unto them." Rev. xxii. 8, 9, The angel who guided the seer, and explained the heavenly visions, refused to be worshipped; "See thou do it not; for I am thy fellow-servant, and of thy brethren the prophets, and of them which keep the sayings of this book; worship God." The conduct of Jesus in this respect is unlike that of any created being; and yet we are not offended. The worship becomes him. It is in place. We would have rendered it ourselves, under like conditions.

10. Wonderful events, like those that gathered about his birth, attended his death. When a force was sent to arrest him (John xviii. 6), overborne by his simple presence, "they went backward, and fell to the ground." While he hung on the cross the heavens were darkened, the earth quaked, and the rocks were rent. He had already (John x.

17, 18) announced his death and resurrection. "I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." In accordance with this announcement, on the third day he came out of the tomb and walked again among his disciples, being seen of them, at various times, during forty days. Then he ascended from their presence through the opened heavens, leaving the promise that he would come again to judge the world (Matt. xxv. 31). Angels stood by him, and confirmed the promise (Acts i. 11), saying, "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into the heavens? This same Jesus which is taken up from you into heaven shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." By facts like these, Jesus, the Christ, is distinguished from men. No form or condition of human nature, or human experience, will explain the facts. Never man spake or wrought or lived or died like this man.

11. But along side of these facts which mark his supernatural character, there are other facts which present another side of his nature and experience.

(1) He was born into the world like a human being. He had a human body, subject to the ordinary conditions of such body, with infirmities and wants. He experienced hunger and thirst and weariness and sleep and death. He grew in stature from a child to a man, all proving the possession of a corporeal nature with all its liabilities.

(2) His internal, mental, experiences present some human aspects. Luke ii. 52, "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man." In some sense he was limited in knowledge; Mark xiii. 32, "Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." His prayer in the garden (Matt. xxvi. 39), "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou

wilt," is like a human prayer, in the dependence and the limitations of knowledge implied.

(3) His need of prayer presents an element of finite experience. His praying was not an example for his disciples; it was the expression of a personal want. Matt. xxvi. 36, "Sit ye here, while I go and pray yonder." Luke vi. 12, "He went out into a mountain to pray, and continued all night in prayer to God." Mark i. 35, "In the morning, rising up a great while before day, he went out, and departed into a solitary place, and there prayed." John xix. 16, "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another comforter, that he may abide with you forever." The need of prayer implies dependence and belongs to finiteness.

(4) Among other utterances of Jesus we find many expressions of dependence and limitation. John vi. 57, "As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me." John v. 19, 20, 26, 30, "The Son can do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father do." "For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth; and he will show him greater works than these, that ye may marvel." "For as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." "I can of mine own self do nothing." John xiv. 28, "My Father is greater than I." Most of these expressions, indicating dependence upon the Father, imply at the same time a divine element—even the fullness of deity in himself.

(5) The Savior experienced temptation as a man, except that it was without sin. Matt. iv. 1–11, we have an account of an extended temptation by Satan, diversified and long continued. Heb. iv. 15, "We have not a high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." Such temptation implies limitation.

12. These elements then of finiteness and dependence

must be blended with the supernatural and the divine, to complete our conception of the person and nature of Jesus. These are the facts, as the gospel history gives them. Our theory of his nature must embody all the facts; and what shall it be?

(1) If we would make him simply a man, his mighty works and words and claims all stand in the way. How shall we adjust the single problem of his moral character? With the most perfect spiritual discernment, and conformity of his actions, in general, to the great law of righteousness, he still claimed equality with God, and allowed himself to be worshipped. This stumbled the Jews. John x. 33, "For a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God." Judged upon the assumption of mere humanity, Jesus must have been, not a good man, but a very unworthy one—a base impostor. But such an idea has not a shadow of possibility to sustain it. All ages have acknowledged him the perfect type and embodiment of excellence. Some have attempted to make him the model man; but this is impossible except by ruling out the supernatural in his nature and career, thus ignoring the chief element of the problem. If we rule out these supernatural elements, we reconstruct the history, and make Jesus another being—a being of fancy and not of history. Read the discussion between James Martineau, of England, who claims for Jesus only a perfect humanity, and Prof. F. W. Newman, a rationalist; both accepting the idea that he was simply a man. Mr. Newman demonstrates, on this assumption, many imperfections in his character, most formidable ones; and manifestly has the better of the argument. But this argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*. It exhibits such gross deficiencies in the character of Jesus that men must instantly reject the conception. Every attempt to explain the character of Christ by any standard of mere humanity will prove a shocking failure.

Most of the treatises, setting forth the human excellence of Jesus without reference to his divine claims, fall little short of such failure.

(2) We encounter the same difficulties in making Jesus superhuman, in the sense of an angelic or other exalted finite being. We come no nearer to the divine by any such exaltation of the finite. An angel can no more assume the prerogatives of God, or accept worship, than can a human being. An angel is only a well-grown man. Heb. i. 6, "When he bringeth in the first begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him." All finite beings worship the Infinite.

(3) If, on the other hand, we account Jesus simply divine, we overlook a wide class of facts pertaining to his nature and experience—the facts which imply some finiteness or limitation in his consciousness. We are left then to accept the simple statement of the gospel: John i. 1–14, "The Word which was in the beginning, . . the Word which was with God and was God . . by whom also the world was made, . . that Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth." A similar statement we find in Romans i. 3–4, "Concerning his Son, who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh; who was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead." This is, and has been through the ages, the essential doctrine of the church, that God became incarnate in the human body, with a reasonable, human, soul, that Jesus Christ is therefore human and divine; and that from this combined personality arise the mingled phenomena of his life and character. We must admit such a combination to be a mystery, beyond our comprehension, but not contrary to our reason. There is perhaps an analogy, which may serve to illustrate the case, in the inspiration of the human soul by the divine

Spirit; different, possibly, only in degree, from the possession of the human nature in Christ by the Spirit of God. In the Old Testament prophecies it is common to represent the divinity of the Messiah as an endowment of the Spirit of God. Isaiah ix. 2, "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord." Isaiah xlii. 1, "Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth: I have put my Spirit upon him: he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles." John iii. 34, "For he whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God; for God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him."

13. Jesus calls himself the Son of man, and is called by others, sometimes by himself, the Son of God: and these appellations are in harmony with the two-fold nature in the person of Christ. There is probably only one clear instance in which he is called by others the Son of man: Acts vii. 56. Stephen, at his death, said, "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." This might possibly be a reference to the words of Jesus himself, (John i. 51): "Hereafter, ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man." The term, the Son of man, assumes divinity and calls attention to the humanity. No human being calls himself the son of man. As Jesus uses it, it seems equivalent to Emmanuel, God with us,—God among men.

We may observe, too, that the Savior uses the term, commonly, in connection with the claim of divine attributes and prerogatives: Matt. xxv. 31, "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him." John v. 27, "And hath given him authority to execute judgment also because he is the Son of man." John i. 51, "Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man." John vi. 62, "What

then if ye should behold the Son of man ascending where he was before?" Matt. xii. 8, "For the Son of man is Lord even of the sabbath day." Matt. ix. 6, "The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins." Matt. xiii. 41, "The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend." John vi. 53, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." It was not natural to others to apply this term to Jesus Christ. His humanity was open and manifest, observed of all men. When the disciples professed their faith in him they used terms which expressed his divinity. Matt. xvi. 16, when Christ asked his disciples, "Who say ye that I am?" Peter replied, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."

In a few instances Christ called himself the Son of God, and was often so called by others. The term assumes his humanity, and affirms his divinity. John ix. 35, to the man born blind, whose sight he had restored, he said, "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" The term Son of man would have been unintelligible to him; he must first know him as the Son of God, and then he would see him as the Son of man.

14. It is a question of some importance whether the term Son of God expresses an eternal relationship of the Word to the Father, or does its application begin with the incarnation, and apply only to the Word made flesh, that is, to Jesus, the Christ, the Messiah? On this question there are differences of opinion. The prevalent doctrine of the church has doubtless been that of Eternal Sonship; that there was a Son of God before the incarnation,—that the Word is the Son of God from eternity. The question is important from its bearing upon our conception of the doctrine of the Trinity,—the separateness of the so-called persons of the Trinity. A careful study of the Scriptures seems to sustain the idea that the fact of sonship grows out of the

incarnation; and that the Word is not, in any instance, called the Son of God, but only "the Word made flesh" is so named. The reason for the application of the name is given in Luke i. 35, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee: wherefore also that which is to be born shall be called holy, the Son of God." No other explanation of the name is given, and it is applied only to the person of Jesus Christ,—not to the humanity of Christ alone, but to the complex personality. John i. 17, 18, "For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Romans i. 3, "Concerning his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord." Heb. i. 1, 2, 6, "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." "When he bringeth in the first begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him." The expression in the second verse, "Through whom also he made the worlds," must be understood of Christ as the Word, and corresponds with John i. 3, "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made." The Savior often affirmed his pre-existence, but not distinctly his pre-existence as the Son of God. The Word was in the beginning, not the Son. In John vi. 62, we read, "What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?" This implies a pre-existence, but does not necessarily imply his pre-existence as the Son of man, or as the Son of God. The Son of God, in the Old Testament, is the predicted Messiah. Gal. iv. 4, "When the fullness of the time came, God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law." The term Son of God belongs to the New Testament and to the Gospels.

15. *The dogmatic, or didactic, argument* for Christ's divinity might take a form like the following:

(1) The names of God are ascribed to him: Isa. ix. 6: "His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace." John i. 1, "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God." 1 John v. 20, "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true: and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life."

(2) The attributes of God are ascribed to him. Only a few of the many examples can be needed: Matt. xviii. 20, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Matt. xxviii. 20, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." John viii. 58, "Before Abraham was, I am." John xiv. 23, "If a man love me he will keep my word: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him. Heb. xiii. 8, "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."

(3) The words of God are ascribed to him: John i. 3, "All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made." This naturally connects with verse 14: "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." Matt. ix. 2–7, "That ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins (then saith he to the sick of the palsy), Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house." Matt. xi. 28, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

(4) The relations of God to his creatures are ascribed to Jesus: Luke xiii. 34, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee: how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings, and ye would not."

In the tenth chapter of John he presents himself as the good shepherd: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly. The good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep." "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life."

(5) Divine worship was rendered to him and accepted by him: Matt. xiv. 33, "Then they that were in the ship came and worshipped him." He even invited such worship: John ix. 35, 38, "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" "And he worshipped him."

(6) The claims of Christ mark him as conscious of his divine nature and relations. We will take a few examples: John v. 23, "That all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which hath sent him." John xi. 25, "I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live." John xiv. 9, 10, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?"

(7) The place given him by the apostles and the church is in harmony with this claim to divinity: Eph. i. 19–23, "What is the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fullness of him that filleth all in all." Phil. ii. 9–11, "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above

every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth: and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." The apostles and the church addressed prayer to Christ: 2 Cor. xii. 8, 9, "For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that it might depart from me: and he said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made perfect in weakness. Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me." Heb. i. 6, "When he bringeth in the first begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him." Pliny, the younger, in a letter to Trajan, the Roman Emperor, describes the Christians of his province as "wont to meet together on a stated day, before it was light, and sing among themselves, alternately, a hymn to Christ as to a god." This letter was written about forty years after the death of Paul. Manifestly the Christians of that period worshipped Christ.

(8) Thus, in the Scriptures, Christ is distinguished from all men, and from all finite beings. A few of the passages, often quoted to prove the fact, may be liable to unfavorable criticism; but we may drop all such doubtful passages, and the doctrine remains so inwrought into the very substance of the gospels and the Scriptures generally, that it cannot be eliminated without destroying the entire structure.

By a similar course of argument the humanity of Jesus Christ may be established, and thus we should be brought to the same result which we had already reached, that Jesus Christ is "the Word made flesh." It is not necessary to repeat the argument.

16. There has been abundant labor expended upon the criticism and interpretation of particular passages and proof-texts bearing upon the question of the nature of Christ. No such minute inquiry can be necessary, because the doctrine pervades the entire gospel record, and does not depend,

in any appreciable degree, upon special texts. There are subordinate questions in reference to the relations of Christ, in the Messianic office, which do depend upon such careful study and interpretation; as, for example, the dependence of Christ upon the Father, and his subordination in the Messianic work. John x. 27–29, "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand." John xiv. 28, "If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto the Father: for my Father is greater than I." John v. 38, "I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me." 1 Cor. xv. 28, "When all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all."

17. Many interesting questions gather about the Incarnation, some important, others less so—some of which the Scriptures do not answer.

(1) Among the more important is this: Is the Incarnation to continue a permanent fact in the kingdom of God, or does it terminate with the judgment? The Scriptures seem clearly to teach that the Incarnation exists at present, and will exist until after the second advent of Christ. The resurrection of Christ involves its continuance, also the ascension, and the testimony of the angels that appeared: Acts i. 11, "This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." The Son of man, the Messiah, is to judge the world: (Matt. xxv. 31, Acts xvii. 31). The passage in 1 Cor. xv. 24–28, sometimes supposed to teach that Christ is at length to surrender his mediatorial position, implying the termination of the Incarnation, is probably

misinterpreted. The expression, "When he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power," clearly indicates the putting down of opposing power, and the subjecting of the world to God. It is said, "He must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet." The word, "till," does not necessarily involve a termination of the reigning; he is then in a position to reign effectively. The phrase, "Then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him," does not express any change of relationship; he has always been subject, and always must be, and God continues to be all in all, as he has ever been; and the Messianic reign is not to terminate in order to bring this about. It is not conceivable that the Messianic reign should ever have interfered with the divine supremacy.

A few passages seem to bring Jesus, the Emmanuel, to our view after the judgment: John xiv. 3, "I will come again, and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also." 1 Thess. iv. 14–17, "Even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." . . "And so shall we ever be with the Lord."

The Incarnation, or some equivalent manifestation of God, seems to be a permanent need of human nature—a revelation of God almost to the senses of men. Possibly it might have been necessary, even without sin, and apart from redemption and atonement, in order to bring God within the reach of men. The ancient theophanies, the pillar of cloud and of fire, the glory in the tabernacle, and afterward in the temple, served this purpose. The Incarnation takes the place of all these theophanies, and aids men in the apprehension of God. The Messiah is to be, probably, through all the future, our way to God, our Mediator.

(2) The question is sometimes asked whether the human nature of Christ was a perfect human nature, like that of Adam, or was it fallen? The Scriptures give us no answer. It has been commonly assumed that it was a per-

fect human nature; but some theological writers have held a different opinion. The Scriptures teach us that Jesus was sinless: Heb. vii. 26, "Who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners." 1 Peter ii. 22, "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth." The question does not seem to be an important one. Fallen human nature carries with it no sin; it involves simply a higher degree of susceptibility to temptation; and it is said of Jesus that he "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin."

(3) Was Christ's human nature personal or impersonal? is a question discussed by some theologians. If we could understand what is meant by impersonal human nature, we might pursue the inquiry with more success; without such light the discussion must prove unprofitable.

18. The two-fold nature of Christ has been the source of endless speculation and discussion, and has led to various sects and heresies in the church—especially in the early church. The Ebionites, in the first century, held that Jesus was born a man, the son of Joseph and Mary, by ordinary generation; that at his baptism he received the Spirit of God, and became conscious of his call as the Messiah. They were essentially humanitarians, as the Socinians of later days.

The Apollinarians, in the fourth century, denied a reasonable human soul to Christ, regarding the Word as the rational soul, and adding an animal or unreasoning soul from human nature. In opposition to this heresy, the orthodox doctrine affirmed a reasonable human soul, an expression still retained.

The Nestorians held to two natures in Christ—so distinct, apparently, as to involve a double personality, united only in a moral union. The view was regarded as heretical, making too great a separation in the personalities.

The Docetæ, a Gnostic Christian sect, denied a human body to Christ, and affirmed that what seemed to be a

human body was apparent, not real. The Gnostic idea was that Christ's sinless perfection was impossible in connection with a human body.

Arianism appeared early in the fourth century, and involved a denial of the supreme divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. Arius himself maintained that Christ pre-existed as the Word, but the Word was not eternal; he was created or begotten, "and there was a time when he was not." The term *first born*, in Col. i. 15, 16, "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature; for by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him," has been literally interpreted in support of the view of Arius.

The Monophysites, in the fifth century, held to one spiritual nature in Christ, denying to him a human soul. His humanity, in their view, consisted of a human body merely. The churches of Egypt and of Abyssinia embraced the doctrine, and hold it to this day. Individuals in modern Protestant Christendom have held essentially this view, presenting it as the doctrine of the *Kenosis:* Phil. ii. 6, 7, "Who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men." The essential idea of the doctrine is that the divine Spirit took possession of a human body, voluntarily subjecting himself to the limitations of humanity—limitations which necessarily attach to a mind acting through a material organism. Hence the manifestation of human infirmity and want, weakness, ignorance and temptation, and hence the growth in wisdom which is affirmed of Jesus—the gradual development and manifestation of the divine nature advancing with the growth of the human organism. The difficulty is to conceive how Christ could give any manifestation but that of

human nature, limited as he was by a human organism. We seem to get no divinity, or manifestation of divinity, on such a theory, and the difficulties involved in the nature of Christ are increased rather than diminished.

The Socinians, so called from Socinus, an Italian of the sixteenth century, living in Poland, held that Christ was a man without pre-existence, but supernaturally born, and divinely commissioned as the Messiah; that he now possesses all power in heaven and on earth—the gift of God to him; and thus he is an object of worship, not by his own nature, but by appointment of God. Modern Unitarianism has presented no harmony of view in respect to the person of Christ, except in the denial of his supreme divinity; and ranges, in positive doctrine, from Arianism to mere humanitarianism.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE HOLY SPIRIT OR THE SPIRIT OF GOD.

The Holy Spirit is presented throughout the Scriptures, both in the Old Testament and in the New, in various operations or manifestations, wherever divine energy or power is involved.

1. In the work of creation: Gen. i. 2, "And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." Job xxvi. 13, "By his Spirit he hath garnished the heavens; his hand hath formed the crooked serpent." Job xxxiii. 4, "The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life." Psalms civ. 30, "Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the ground." Luke i. 35, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee: wherefore also that which is to be born of thee shall be called holy, the Son of God."

2. The Spirit of God is represented as raising the dead: Romans viii. 11, "But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." 2 Peter iii. 18, "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit."

3. The Spirit is represented as possessing divine knowledge: Isaiah xl. 13, "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being his counsellor hath taught him?" 1 Cor. ii. 10, "For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the

deep things of God. For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him? Even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God." Psalms cxxxix. 7, "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?"

4. The Spirit is represented as imparting supernatural gifts and knowledge: Ex. xxxi. 3, "And I have filled him with the Spirit of God in wisdom, and in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship, to devise cunning works." 1 Cor. xii. 8, 11, "For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discerning of Spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues; but all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will." Romans, xiv. 19, "Through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God." Acts ii. 17, (quoted from Joel ii. 28, 29) "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions and your old men shall dream dreams."

5. The Spirit works morally and spiritually in the hearts of men: John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." 1 Cor. xii. 3, "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." Gal. v. 22, 23, "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." This moral work of the Spirit is abundantly set forth in the New Testament, and more sparingly in the Old Testament. Psalms li. 11, 12, "Cast me not away from thy presence; and take not thy Holy Spirit from me. Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation; and uphold me with thy free Spirit."

6. The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of Christ, and is represented as sent by the Father

and the Son. Romans viii. 9, "But ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." John xiv. 26, "But the Comforter (helper) which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." John xvi. 7, "For if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you." Luke xi. 13, "How much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him." John xv. 26, "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me." These passages suggest the ancient controversy between the Eastern and Western churches. The Nicene creed, as originally adopted in the East, had the phrase, "I believe in the Holy Ghost which proceedeth from the Father." The Latin church in the fifth Century changed the expression, reading it, "which proceedeth from the Father and the Son," adding *filioque* in the Latin version of the Nicene creed; hence the controversy is called the *Filioque* controversy, which still subsists between the Greek church and the western churches of Europe.

7. The idea is sometimes maintained that the Gospel dispensation is especially the dispensation of the Holy Spirit. The difference is probably only in degree; the bestowment of the Spirit is more general and abundant under the Gospel, according to the prophecy of Joel, as quoted by Peter on the day of Pentecost. The Old Testament saints knew of the Holy Spirit. The passage, Acts xix. 2, "We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost," is more accurately translated in the Revision, "We did not so much as hear whether the Holy Ghost was given," or, was come.

8. The Spirit of God is not presented as an attribute or power in the Scriptures, but as a divine person: Acts v. 3, "Ananias, why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost?" 2 Peter i. 21, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Acts i. 16, "This Scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost spake before by the mouth of David." Acts xiii. 2, "The Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them." Matt. xii. 31, "But the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men." Eph. iv. 30, "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption." Matt. xxviii. 19, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." 2 Cor. xiii. 14, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all." We have no example of worship paid to the Holy Ghost, except that involved in the formula of baptism, and in the apostolic benediction. It is perhaps safer to say that the Scriptures do not sustain, or inculcate, such worship.

9. There has been comparatively little doubt in the Church as to the divinity of the Holy Spirit. The attributes and works of God, are ascribed to him, and no finite attributes. The chief question has been as to his distinct and separate personality; yet the Arians held that the Holy Spirit was created, the Word first, the Spirit next; but much of the language of the Scriptures can only be applied to a person.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE TRINITY.

In the study of the Scriptures we have found God presented as a person, the Word as a person, incarnate in the Messiah, and the Holy Spirit as a person. From these facts in the presentation of God, has sprung up the doctrine of the Trinity. Our only source of light on this subject must be the Scriptures themselves. Human reason cannot lead in this inquiry; it can only follow, and suggest here and there a limitation. What then is the Scripture basis for the doctrine of the Trinity, and what is the doctrine?

1. The Scriptures present God as one—a personal unity. This fact is implied in the use of the personal pronouns, I, when he speaks, thou, when spoken to, and he, when spoken of. This must be regarded as the uniform usage of the Scriptures; the exceptions are only apparent. Many passages expressly affirm his unity; that is, that he stands alone in his personality, as God: Deut. xxii, 39, "See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no God with me; I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal." Isaiah xliv. 6, "I am the first, and I am the last; and besides me there is no God. . . . Is there a God besides me? yea, there is no God; I know not any." Isaiah xlvi. 9, "I am God and there is none else; I am God and there is none like me." These passages are instances of the use of the pronoun I, implying personal unity; and they are strong affirmations of that unity. The use of I, when God speaks, is the prevalent usage of the Scriptures. The other pronouns referring to God are used always in the singular number.

2. There are a few examples of exception to the usage, which are sometimes regarded as obscurely referring to the Trinity.

(1) There are four instances of the use of the plural pronoun when God speaks: Gen. i. 26, "And God said, Let *us* make man in our image, after our likeness;" but in the next verse we read, "And God created man in his own image." Gen. iii. 22, "And the Lord said, Behold the man has become as one of *us*, to know good and evil." Gen. xi. 7, "And the Lord said . . . Go to, let *us* go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech." Isa. vi. 8, "Whom shall I send and, who will go for *us?*" These examples are unique in the Scriptures; we find no others like them; they all represent God as speaking as in council, using pronouns referring to himself in the plural. It is natural to regard it as the representation of a king in the midst of his court or counsellors. It is like the language of David when called upon to choose what calamity should befall the people: 2 Sam. xxiv. 14, "And David said, . . . I am in a great strait; let us fall now into the hand of the Lord; for his mercies are great; and let me not fall into the hand of man." Also in 1 Kings xii. 9, "And he said unto them, what counsel give ye, that we may answer this people, who have spoken to me?" A similar example we find in Ezra iv. 18, "The letter which ye sent unto us hath been plainly read before me." It is difficult to regard these four passages as referring to the fact of a conscious plurality in the divine nature. We may accept them as representing the Lord as announcing his purpose in the midst of his angels, or as employing a mode of speech common to a ruler among men.

(2) The Hebrew word *Elohim*, God, a plural noun translated as a singular, is supposed by some to indicate a plurality in the divine nature. But whatever the explanation of this plural may be, it carries with it, in the Scriptures,

no idea of plurality, because the verb of which it is the subject is in almost every instance singular, as well as the connected adjective and pronoun; and that, too, in spite of the principle of attraction, which operates in all languages, and is familiar to the student. This plural noun is used in cases where no plural idea could possibly be intended: for example, 1 Kings xviii. 21, "How long halt ye between two opinions? If Jehovah be *Elohim*, follow him, and if Baal, follow him." Also verse 39, "And when all the people saw it they fell on their faces: and they said Jehovah, he is the *Elohim*." The same plural is used in the passages affirming the divine unity, as already quoted. The presentation of the divine unity in the Old Testament is such as to give the uniform impression that God is a single, indivisible, moral agent—a person.

(3) In the New Testament the only apparent exception to the usage is the language of Christ when speaking of himself and the Father. Here there is such separateness indicated as to imply two persons or moral agents. Christ addresses the Father, and says, "We," when speaking of himself and the Father: John xiv. 23, "We, (my father and I) will come unto him and make our abode with him." The incarnation gives a separateness of personality to the Lord Jesus Christ, which makes it appropriate and necessary for him to address the Father, and to use the plural pronoun when he speaks of himself and the Father.

3. The manner in which the Scriptures speak of the Spirit and the Word, and perhaps of the Angel of Jehovah, still gives a basis for the idea of the Trinity, or for recognizing some distinctions in the divine nature.

(1) The Spirit, as we have seen, is spoken of as sent forth from God: Psalms civ. 30, "Thou sendest forth thy Spirit." John xiv. 26, "The Holy Ghost whom the Father will send in my name." John xv. 26, "When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father."

(2) The Spirit, is a person. He can be blasphemed, grieved, lied to; and is classed as a person with the Father and the Son, in the baptismal formula and in the apostolic benediction.

(3) But his personality does not seem to be separated, in the Scriptures, from the personality of God: Acts v. 3, "Why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? . . Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God." John xiv. 23, "If a man love me he will keep my word: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." Verse 18, "I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you." But this coming of the Father and of himself appears, from verse 26, to be the coming of the Spirit: "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." 1 John iii. 24, "And hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us." A careful comparison of these passages makes it clear that the presence of the Holy Spirit is the presence of the Father and the Son, and that the personality of the Holy Spirit is the personality of God.

(4) Still again, in the New Testament, we have the Word, (John i. 1) by whom the worlds were made; who was with God and was God. This Word became incarnate in Jesus Christ, (verse 14) and thus becomes the Son of God and the Son of man. Frequent affirmations of the pre-existence of Christ are in harmony with this statement in reference to the Word. John viii. 58, "Before Abraham was, I am." John vi. 62, "What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?" John vi. 38, "For I am come down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me."

(5) In the Old Testament, again, we have the Angel of Jehovah, commonly supposed to be the same as the

Word of John. Gen. xvi. 7, the Angel of the Lord appeared to Hagar; he spoke as Jehovah, in his name and with his authority, and Hagar regarded it as a vision of God. Gen. xxi. 17, gives us a similar appearance of the Angel of Jehovah to Hagar. In Gen. xxii. 11, 12, the Angel of the Lord called to Abraham and said, "Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me." Ex. xiv. 19, "And the Angel of God which went before the camp of Israel, removed and went behind." This is called God's presence, Ex. xxxiii. 14: "My presence shall go with thee." Gen. xxxii. 24, Jacob wrestled with a man until the break of day. In verse 30, he says, "I have seen God face to face." Num. xxii. 31, the Angel of the Lord met Balaam, and, in verse 35, he says, "Only the word that I shall speak unto thee, that thou shalt speak." In the next chapter, verses 4 and 5, we read, "God met Balaam," "and the Lord put a word in Balaam's mouth." Judges ii. 1, the Angel of the Lord talks with the people as Jehovah: "I made you to go up out of Egypt, and have brought you unto the land which I sware unto your fathers." Thus the Angel of Jehovah in the Old Testament is a divine appearance, a manifestation of God. He always speaks as God—never as the messenger of God, or of God as separate or distinct from himself. There is no positive Scripture identifying absolutely the Angel of Jehovah with the Word of John. The two names, Angel (messenger), and Word (revealer), seem to suggest identity. A passage in 1 Cor. x. 4, has sometimes been interpreted as expressing the identity: "They drank of a spiritual rock that followed them; and the rock was Christ." The meaning might naturally be, the rock was a representation of Christ; and it would seem unreasonable to press the passage beyond such a meaning. A prophecy in Mal. iii. 1, bears more directly upon this question: "Behold I will send my messenger (Angel), and he shall prepare the way before me;

and the Lord whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple; even the messenger (Angel) of the covenant, whom ye delight in."

4. The revelation of God in the Old Testament involves, thus, the personality and unity of God; the personality of the Holy Spirit, and the personality of the Angel of Jehovah, or of the Word. But these facts do not necessarily involve a distinct, or separate, personality in these representations. All that seems to be required is that we recognize the personality of God. They do not, as separate personalities, address each other, nor speak in the plural, but each speaks as Jehovah himself. These distinctions, therefore, in the nature of God, whatever they may be, should not be regarded as dividing his personality. He is absolutely one.

5. In the New Testament we find no usage different from that of the Old, except as connected with the person and relations of the Lord Jesus Christ. It is a very frequent, I might almost say universal, habit, with theological writers, and interpreters of the Bible, to transfer the relations of Jesus Christ and the Father to the relations of the eternal Trinity; the elements or distinctions existing in the nature of God from eternity. Let us remember that Jesus Christ was "the Word made flesh," the Son of God; that he loved the Father, and was loved by the Father; that he was dependent upon the Father and addressed him in prayer; and we shall see that to transfer these facts to the eternal relations of the Trinity must be unwarranted. But such a transfer is very generally made. The error seems to begin with the assumption of the eternal Sonship, which the Scriptures do not require; then all the relations of the Son to the Father are transferred to the so-called persons of the Trinity. The misconception proceeds to a recognition of a covenant between the persons of the Trinity from eternity, and to the modern tritheistic view of a Trinity which would present

God as a society of persons,—a moral union; who would say We, rather than I. In support of this conception it is urged that such society must be necessary to God's blessedness. But these relationships, which belong to the Father and the Son, are not indicated in the Scriptures as predicable of the Word or the Spirit. They seem to grow out of the incarnation, and must not be taken as expressing eternal facts in the divine nature. It seems impossible to maintain such a conception in harmony with the idea of the divine unity. The two passages in the Savior's prayer (John xvii. 5, 24) which are sometimes supposed to warrant the idea of these eternal relationships are probably misinterpreted. Verse 4, "And now O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was," naturally refers to the pre-existence of the Messiah as the Word, in harmony with John i. 1, and should not carry with it the limitations and dependence of the Messiah in the incarnation. Verse 24, "Father I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory which thou hast given me; for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world," is interpreted as expressing a love which rested on the Word before the incarnation, that is from eternity. It is quite as reasonable to understand it as referring to the divine foreknowledge of the nature and character of Christ, and to God's eternal purpose to honor and exalt him. A similar fact is expressed in reference to the people of God: Eph. i. 4, "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world." Rev. xvii. 8, "And they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, whose names were not written in the book of life from the foundation of the world."

6. We have no Scripture speaking distinctly of the Trinity, as do the creeds. The passage which approaches such expression, John v. 7, 8, must be regarded as an interpolation. It is so treated in the revised version. The bap-

tismal formula gives us the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost; but this implies the incarnation, and relations which grow out of it. It calls attention to the great revelation of God in the history of redemption, rather than to the eternal Trinity.

7. That there is any society, or communion, or separate consciousness, or separate moral agency, between, or pertaining to, the constituents or subsistences of the God-head, except as involving the incarnation, the Scriptures seem to give no intimation. Neither of these addresses the other, or speaks of the other as separate from himself. God sends his Angel and his Spirit; but the Angel when he appears is God himself—God in his revealed and manifested nature. The Spirit, too, is God himself in his energizing, sanctifying, indwelling presence. The personality of each is the personality of God.

8. The term person, as applied to these constituents of the divine nature, is theological, not scriptural; and is an unfortunate term because it must be used in a sense wholly peculiar and technical, utterly distinct from any popular or even philosophical use of the term. Such a special use is in general admitted and claimed, for the word, by theological writers; but, in spite of all their care, they are apt to slip into expressions and conceptions, in their use of the word, which savor of tritheism; and the common conception of the church has drifted in the same direction, led away by the use of the term person, in the common statement; there are three persons in the God-head; Father, Son and Holy Ghost. It would seem safer to disuse the term.

9. It can scarcely be questioned that our modern Trinitarianism is more tritheistic than the ancient. The Apostolic and the Nicene creeds contain the Trinity only as it is contained in the Scriptures, without the affirmation of three persons in the Deity. Even the Athanasian creed,

which is more distinctly Trinitarian, labors to exclude the tritheistic conception.

10. Attempts to give a philosophical explanation of the three-fold nature of God are not uncommon, but, in general, they are unsatisfactory, and unsuccessful.

Sabellianism was an attempt made, in the third century, to render the doctrine comprehensible, or simple and reasonable. Sabellius regarded the distinctions in the God-head as not pertaining to the nature of God, but to the manner of his manifestation. God manifests himself as Father, Son and Spirit, he maintained, not by any necessity of his nature, but of his own will and purpose, chiefly in the work of redemption. These manifestations are temporary, not eternal; they belong to the history of revelation, not to the eternal nature of God. Many teachers and preachers of our own time express themselves much in the same way, in an attempt to make the doctrine of the Trinity intelligible. The doctrine of the Word, as found in John i., seems to set aside such explanation. The Word, from eternity, "was with God and was God."

11. The essential point in our popular Trinitarianism has been the maintenance of the Supreme divinity of Jesus Christ. This has given it its power, rather than the affirmation of the tri-personality of God. The weakness of Unitarianism has been the denial of this divinity. The names, Unitarian and Trinitarian, seem strangely to have missed the point at issue. The Trinitarian, in recognizing, as eternal facts, God, the Word, and the Spirit, does not cease to be a believer in the unity of God.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE ATONEMENT.

1. In close connection with the fact of sin stands the grander fact of salvation through Jesus Christ. This plan of salvation was obscurely revealed at the beginning, when sin first appeared; involving the fact that God's treatment of sinners was to be disciplinary and remedial, instead of penal and destructive. Of this great revelation of God's love we have foreshadowings throughout the Old Testament Scriptures, in the passover, in sacrifices, and in Messianic prophecy.

2. The historical facts are that the Word was made flesh and lived among men, in the brightness of the Father's glory, setting forth the purpose of his mission; that he "came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many;" that he wrought many mighty works, and uttered many gracious words; that he died at the hands of wicked men, and rose again the third day, and ascended into heaven before the eyes of his disciples; and that redemption through his name has been preached among all nations by divine command, and has proved the power of God unto salvation.

3. The Scriptures which refer to the work of Christ, his life and death, as a condition of pardon and redemption to men, are abundant and striking. The prophetic announcement of his work is scarcely less distinct than the statements of the later revelation. Isaiah liii. 5, 6, "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his

stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Matt. xx. 28, "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." Matt. xxvi. 28, "This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." John iii. 14, 15, "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." John vi. 51, 53, "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." Rom. v. 8, "While we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." Rom. iii. 25, 26, "Whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, by his blood, to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God. . . . that he might himself be just and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus." 1 Cor. v. 7, "Christ our passover is sacrificed for us." Gal. iii. 13, "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." 2 Cor. v. 21, "For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." Heb. ix. 14, "How much more shall the blood of Christ who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" 1 Peter vi. 18, 19, "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, . . . but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." 1 Peter ii. 24, "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead to

sins, should live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed." 1 John vii. 2, "And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Heb. xix. 28, "So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many."

4. These are examples of the manner in which salvation through Christ is presented in the Scriptures. The representation is not confined to single passages, but characterizes the Scriptures as the great gospel fact. It is that which distinguishes Christianity from every merely ethical, or theistic, system.

5. The power of the gospel for ordinary practical use in the world, seems to lie in this simple fact, "that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners;" that "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." This simple fact has power with men, however inadequate may be their comprehension of the theory which underlies the gospel system. False, and even monstrous, theories have sometimes been proposed; but the great fact has not thereby lost its power. The inherent vitality of the Atonement remains, and does its work. The practical result is that the doctrine of salvation through Christ proves the mightiest power to lift up men to a better life; we might almost say the only power; all other forces are derived from this, or are based upon it. It is found that the free and full offer of pardon to men, through Christ, does not encourage them to persevere in sin, but leads them to abhor and renounce it. The work of Christ was necessary to the salvation of sinful men. Wherein lay this necessity? The answer to the question involves a theory of the Atonement. There are different answers and therefore different theories.

Some have preferred to regard the subject as utterly mysterious, as if the reason for the Atonement were beyond our reach. They therefore discard, in advance, every theory

of the Atonement. But the Atonement is addressed to the human understanding; it was intended to operate on human souls, and the presumption is that some at least of the reasons for the transaction can be appreciated. It is certainly not out of place for us to search humbly for the reasons, and find them if we can.

In looking at these theories it will be convenient to use the term, *Atonement*, as expressing comprehensively the work of Christ in the salvation of men, without implying, in the use of the word, any theory whatever.

6. It must be granted to begin with, that the Scriptures do not give us a distinct theory. The general fact is presented that Christ died for men, and that there is no other salvation. But a variety of theories have been proposed and held by earnest and able men, all believed to be consistent with the Scriptures. It may well be that one theory is more in harmony with the Scriptures than another; but it can scarcely be claimed that any special theory is absolutely required by the Scriptures. Neither the apostles nor the early fathers seem to have undertaken the development, or announcement, of such a theory.

7. The earliest speculations on the subject seem to have been suggested by the words ransom, redemption, as in Matt. xx. 28, "Even as the Son of man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." 1 Tim. ii. 6. "Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time." 1 Pet. i. 18, 19, "For as much as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold: but with the precious blood of Christ." Rev. v. 9, "For thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation." These passages were interpreted as implying that men were captives, and were rescued by purchase,—bought with a price. Other passages represent men as captives or slaves of Satan: Rom. vi. 16,

"Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?" Thus the idea grew that the death of Christ was a price paid to Satan for the ransom of sinners. Some writers, like Gregory of Nyssa, held that Satan was a loser in the bargain; that he was really "taken in," "caught," as Gregory says, "by the hook of the incarnation." The Savior was too mighty for him to hold, and thus he led captivity captive. This idea of redemption was perhaps the most definite thought on the subject from the fourth to the eleventh century. The view has at least this element of truth, that men have yielded themselves to sin and Satan, and must be delivered—not by a price paid, but by the mighty motives which gather about the cross of Christ. We cannot accept the idea that Satan could possibly have any rights in the case, or a claim for any ransom.

8. Later views on the Atonement may be arranged under three general theories, depending upon the apprehended difficulty existing in the way of the sinner's salvation. The varying views have given rise to three leading theories: the Moral Influence theory, the Satisfaction or Penal theory, and the Governmental or Benevolence theory. Special views have been proposed which might not naturally be included under either of these designations, but they have obtained little or no currency.

9. The Moral Influence theory is based upon the idea, that the only difficulty in the salvation of sinners is, to secure their repentance; that nothing is required on God's part as a condition of forgiveness—nothing in the interests of the moral universe, except as provided for in the condition of repentance. All the difficulty, it is supposed, is in the attitude of sinners themselves, their impenitence. If they will repent, they can be forgiven. No antecedent provision is required to make this forgiveness safe and wise.

The work of Christ then, consists in inducing this repentance, in reconciling sinners to God. 2 Cor. v. 19, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation." The repentance of the sinner furnishes all the satisfaction to God and to the universe that is demanded. Repentance is secured, or the highest moral influence is brought to bear to produce it, by the manifestation of the love of God in Christ. The idea is not admitted that any danger to God's moral government can arise from the forgiveness of the penitent. This is the view held by Socinians generally, and by all who discard the divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. It is also the view of those who regard the penalty of the law as limited to the natural consequences of the transgression, not involving any positive penalty inflicted by God himself. This is essentially the view of the late Dr. Horace Bushnell in his "Vicarious Sacrifice." He was no Unitarian or Socinian, but a believer in the supreme divinity of the Savior. He however, discarded the idea of a positive infliction of evil; and limited the penalty of the law to a reaction of sin upon the sinner's soul, in accordance with the laws of his being. There could, of course, in this view, be no direct pardon or remission of the penalty. The action of the laws of the sinner's nature is not to be set aside. The sinner must put away his sin, and thus escape the evil of present sin; and the manifestation of the love of God in Christ will gradually lift him out of the evil of his past sin. He outgrows it under the grace of God; and this is forgiveness.

10. In a careful examination of this theory we shall find that the positive part of it is true, and of vast importance. One of the great difficulties in the way of the salvation of sinners is to secure their repentance. This is an absolute necessity: there can be no salvation without it. It is true, too, that sinners will not repent except under the ac-

tion of powerful motives, and it is also true that the mightiest motives to repentance gather about the cross of Christ. In this view, the work of Christ is absolutely essential. No writer, so far as I am aware, has given a more satisfactory presentation of these saving forces than the author of "Vicarious Sacrifice."

11. Still the theory seems to be incomplete, and inadequate. God has a government in the world; and one of the forces in this government is the penalty announced against the transgressor. To offer pardon simply on the ground of penitence, would tend to subvert the government. Human government would break down under such conditions; why not the divine government? It is a government over beings of the same nature; a moral government; a government of motives, not of power; and penalty is one of these essential motives. These motives must greatly fail, if nothing is required for the remission of sin but simple repentance. It is sometimes said that such an arrangement would be safe in human government, if there were certain knowledge on the part of the government that repentance were sincere. This is a misapprehension. The danger is that men would commit crime under the impression that they could repent at will. If the governor of the state had omniscience, we should not think it safe for him to pardon every penitent criminal. The danger arises, not chiefly from the one that is pardoned, but from the influence upon others who are propense to crime. This necessity of penalty to government is overlooked, or underestimated, in the Moral Influence theory. The doctrine that natural consequences constitute the entire penalty of the law does not seem to be well sustained. God's positive disapprobation of sin must in some way be expressed.

12. Bushnell's later view, presented in his "Forgiveness and Law," adds to the earlier view a new idea of propitiation, and affords a modification of the Moral Influence

theory, as originally presented. He apprehends that there is, in the mind of God, a natural difficulty in the way of the forgiveness of the sinner. He must have a keen sense of the sinner's ill-desert; of the wrong he has done. There can be no proper forgiveness, he maintains, that is, restoration to the favor of God, without an abatement, on God's part, of this hard, stern, condemnatory feeling. God lays himself out for the sinner's salvation; comes into the world in the incarnation, and suffers and dies in the work of the redemption of men. Thus his feelings soften toward them; his tenderness goes out with his effort; he propitiates himself in making cost for sinners; as we ourselves feel a tenderness toward the unworthy for whom we have toiled and suffered.

This idea of self-propitiation is too artificial and fanciful. We do not properly think of God as struggling with his own feelings, as having a difficulty to obtain his own consent to do what he judges best to do. Such a struggle belongs to human imperfection and limitation, not to the divine perfection. The Scriptures represent that the love of God for the world moved him to send his Son into the world for men. This love was the cause of the Atonement, not the result.

13. The Satisfaction or Penal theory is based upon a different conception of the difficulties in the way of the sinner's salvation. These difficulties are held to arise from the sinner's ill-desert, which arouses, as is sometimes claimed, in the mind of God himself, a just indignation, or wrath, against the sinner, requiring the sinner's punishment. If the sinner is not to be punished, then some other satisfaction, or propitiation, must be provided for God's just indignation. The indignation is not conceived as a selfish passion, or a vindictive spirit; but a righteous condemnation, and an impulse to inflict deserved punishment. Thus the Atonement is regarded as a satisfaction to the ethical nature of God.

A modification of this view, often maintained by Cal-

vinists of the old school, puts justice in the place of the wrath of God: justice as the abstract principle of righteousness, and justice as an attribute of the divine nature. They do not ordinarily seem to discriminate between these relations of justice, but they would generally maintain that there is such a distinction. When sin has been committed, it is just that the sinner should be punished—inherently just in the nature of things, and God's justice, too, requires it; he cannot, by reason of his justice, permit sin to go unpunished. He never does; he often spares the sinner, but he punishes sin. The justice of God requires that the ill-desert of the sinner should, in some way, be met or cancelled, if not by the punishment of the sinner, then by some substitution which will serve the same purpose: that is, cancel the ill-desert, and satisfy the justice of God. The Atonement provides for the emergency. Christ comes forward and takes the sinner's place, and receives the sinner's punishment in his own person. The guilt of the sinner is imputed to him; guilt, as some would say, not in the sense of unworthiness, blameworthiness, criminality, but in the sense of liability to punishment. The Savior takes the sinner's place in law, in the sense of becoming obnoxious to its penalty. God is pledged to punish sin by virtue of his justice; he is merciful as well as just, and thus accepts the punishment in his own person, or rather in the person of his Son, Jesus Christ, who voluntarily takes the sinner's place. Christ thus really suffers the penalty. He is punished, and law and justice have no further claim upon the sinner. Gal. iii. 13, "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."

But here necessarily comes in a limitation: if Christ thus bare the sins of all, and suffered the punishment due to all, then no sinner can be punished, and the universal salvation of the race naturally follows. The earlier form of the doctrine of universal salvation apparently sprung from this

view of the Atonement. But such a doctrine is not in accordance with the Scriptures, which represent that some human souls will, in the end, be lost: that the finally impenitent will suffer everlasting punishment. Hence, it is said, Christ endures the punishment only of the elect. In God's sovereign grace a certain portion of the race are chosen to salvation; the punishment of these Christ bears in his own person, and they cannot rightfully suffer the penalty of the law. They are regenerated, and saved, by the power of God; and the atonement is limited to these. Christ died for the elect. Such a limitation is an essential element of the system, a logical necessity. Some who hold to this limitation of the Atonement maintain that, in its inherent value, it is sufficient for all men; but it is restricted by God's sovereign and righteous will to the elect, and is effective only in their case. There is no salvation within the reach of others, or available for them. The broad statements of the Scriptures which represent that Christ, by the grace of God, tasted death for every man, are based, it is supposed, upon this inherent value of the Atonement which makes it, in itself, sufficient for the salvation of the world. "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." The limitation is in the restriction of the Atonement, by God's will, to a portion of mankind.

But again, the suffering of Christ only provides for the remission of the penalty; it does away with punishment, but in order to the enjoyment of the favor of God and the blessedness of heaven, sinners must have some merit; they must somehow be made worthy. Thus it is represented that the obedience of Christ is imputed to them, and they are accounted worthy of eternal life through the merits of Christ. A double imputation is thus involved; the guilt of sinners is imputed to Christ, and the worthiness of Christ is imputed to sinners, and thus redemption is complete.

14. The Satisfaction theory involves difficulties and objections such as the following:

(1) It is a misrepresentation of God's nature and character to say that his wrath stands in the way of the sinner's salvation, or requires his punishment. We must accept the fact of God's righteous indignation against sin and sinners. He is a moral being, and must look upon sin as it is; as unreasonable, inexcusable, ill-deserving and worthy of punishment; thus the Scriptures represent God. But this sentiment in view of sin, is not a reason for its punishment. The sinner is not punished to relieve or propitiate God's feeling or sense of his ill-desert. God has the sentiment of compassion and pity; the desire to save the sinner from the ruin he deserves. Why shall he not indulge the sentiment of mercy, and save the sinner? We are told that he delights in mercy, and judgment is his strange work. If it is a question of divine impulse or feeling, mercy will triumph, and the sinner will escape punishment. But here the principle of justice comes in, it is said. It is just that the sinner should be punished, because he deserves it, and God must be just. "We can say, God may be merciful or not, as he pleases: we cannot say, God may be just or not, as he pleases." This means that because the sinner deserves punishment he must be punished. Then the sinner can never be pardoned, for he can never be otherwise than ill-deserving. But this, as we have seen, is not the true idea of the necessity of the sinner's punishment; his ill-desert is not the reason of his punishment. It is a condition of his punishment—that without which he cannot be punished; but unless there be other reasons for the punishment, he will not be punished. God is under no obligation to punish sin because of its ill-desert. We will consider later what the true reason for the punishment of sin is, and what the necessity for its punishment. God's justice consists in fidelity to all interests, regard for all well-being. In punishment, as in

all other things, he is governed by this respect for all interests. Abstract justice is not an interest; it has no force apart from sentient being: it grows out of the interests and welfare of moral beings. Justice has no demand upon God, or men, but that which the good, the welfare of all, requires. This is the only justice which can be a principle of action.

Here it must be observed that our theory of the Atonement is dependent upon, and must grow out of, our conception of obligation. If there is an abstract righteousness, or justice, which constitutes an end in itself, apart from the well-being of the universe, a justice which must be respected, and conformed to, on its own account, then sin must be punished because it deserves it; and desert of punishment is obligation to punishment; an obligation resting on the being who holds the rightful authority.

But this is not properly the force and meaning of ill-desert. The desert of punishment does not make the punishment obligatory; it makes it permissible, provided there is a necessity in the welfare of the universe for the punishment.

(2) But again, granting all that the Satisfaction theory requires in respect to ill-desert as a demand for punishment, as a final reason for it, that which makes it necessary and just; the theory breaks down when we come to the provision made in the Atonement to meet this necessity. Neither the wrath of God, nor the justice of God, in the sense defined, nor abstract justice, nor the sinner's ill-desert, can be satisfied in the death of Christ. There is no provision in it for such satisfaction. God's wrath burns against the sinner, because of his sin and ill-desert, and Christ dies for him. But God's moral indignation is toward the sinner himself, not toward his well-beloved Son; and how can it be satisfied with the suffering of one perfect in goodness? / We must remember too, that sinners crucified the Savior; and is this to relieve or propitiate God's indignation against the sinner?

We have in some of our hymns intense expressions derived from this view:

> "Rich were the drops of Jesus' blood
> That calmed his frowning face:
> That sprinkled o'er the burning throne,
> And changed that wrath to grace."

Such things have been said and sung so long that the true idea escapes us. It is inconceivable that the Atonement should thus bring a satisfaction to God's moral indignation, or that the sinner's ill-desert should thus be cancelled. The sinner is still ill-deserving, and God pardons him at last in his ill-desert.

If we put God's justice, in the sense implied, in the place of his wrath, the difficulty is just as great. God's justice requires the punishment of the sinner. According to the theory it is his ill-desert that makes the punishment necessary; his punishment, and not the punishment of another, is required—least of all the punishment of an innocent being, absolutely perfect in goodness. The very thing that makes the punishment just is the sinner's ill-desert. The suffering of Christ is no punishment of the sinner; it is not a punishment of sin. The object of punishment, according to the Satisfaction view, is to meet the ill-desert of sin: a work which the Atonement can by no possibility accomplish. We may impute the guilt of the sinner to Christ; but the imputation does not make him a sinner, or afford God or man any satisfaction in his suffering as the punishment of sin. Some propose to meet the difficulty by separating the ill-desert of sin into two parts: first, its legal liability to punishment, and second its blameworthiness, its wickedness. The legal liability to punishment, it is said, is transferred by imputation to Christ, while the wickedness and unworthiness of the sin are left with the sinner. This is what is meant by the imputation of sin. Christ so identifies himself with the elect that he assumes their liability to punishment, while the

real wickedness is personal; it belongs to moral character, and cannot be thus imputed or transferred.

But we must not forget that this very wickedness, or unworthiness, or demerit, of sin is what makes the sinner ill-deserving and worthy of punishment. The attempt to separate the guilt from the unworthiness, and transfer it to another to whom it does not belong, must be a failure. Guilt, in the sense of liability to punishment, is just as personal as the sin; it is impossible to punish the guilt, in the person of another, and leave the sinner unpunished; he is a sinner still, with all the demerit of his sin upon him. But such a transfer, by imputation, is essential to the theory.

No more can abstract justice, or the principle of justice, as distinct from the justice of God, be satisfied by Christ's suffering. The language of justice, as of the law, is: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Justice requires the punishment of the sinner, because of his ill-desert, that is, because of his sin; there can be no transfer, no substitution. The Atonement cannot satisfy the sinner's ill-desert, or cancel it in any degree; it stands to the sinner's charge, after all that has been done in the Atonement; and the sinner must be saved at last, and taken to heaven, with all his ill-desert upon him. If this ill-desert stands in the way of salvation, the sinner can never be saved; no power can cancel it.

A recent popular lecturer on the Atonement represents that one of the difficulties in the sinner's salvation is that he "cannot face his record." A man has committed crime, like murder; he repents and puts away sin; but he cannot live with himself; he cannot look his crime in the face; it must somehow be overcome, or cancelled, or set aside. This is an impossible requirement. He can be pardoned, and saved in heaven; but that fact of sin can never be obliterated; the guilt can never be cancelled. The Atonement can do everything else for him, but this one thing it cannot do; his unworthiness remains, and must remain while the soul lives.

A pardoned sinner, with the favor of God restored to him, can be blest, but he can never deserve his blessedness, or be anything else than ill-deserving. Salvation for the sinner does not involve the cancelling of ill-desert.

(3) Again there is the same difficulty in transferring to sinners the merit of Christ, or his obedience, as in imputing to Christ the guilt of sinners. Obedience and merit are personal facts, and can never be separated from the person to whom they belong. Christ's obedience can never render the sinner worthy of heaven. The pardon of penitent sinners might be accorded to Christ as a reward of his zeal for righteousness, and his obedience unto death; but this would not imply the transfer of obedience. The sinner does not need to deserve heaven in order to share in its blessedness.

(4) Still again, the limitation of the Atonement to the elect, is not in accordance with the representation of the Scriptures, nor with our natural convictions. The Atonement is not exhausted in the salvation of sinners; when one sinner has been saved it is no less effective for the salvation of others. It is a great moral force, as available for all sinners as for one; and this is the Scripture representation.

15. The Satisfaction theory has its mechanical simplicity to commend it; it seems to be easily understood. It is as luminous as an arithmetical problem; so much ill-desert to be cancelled; so much penalty to be suffered; so much obedience to be rendered, and the problem of salvation is solved. This apparent simplicity gives a popular acceptance to the theory. It is easy to apprehend and state. When we say Christ paid the debt for every man, if we do not go beyond the figure of speech, it all seems plain. If we pause to consider, we must go beyond the figure; we need something more to satisfy us.

16. There are modified forms of the Satisfaction theory which have obtained a limited acceptance. There is the conception of a mystical union between Christ and humanity,

or of Christ and the elect, somewhat like the realistic conception of the relations of Adam to his posterity, by which the obedience and suffering of Christ are made to belong to the elect; not by imputation, but by an actual participation; and thus what he does is their act, and thus God is satisfied. Such a view must be regarded as a speculation, without any Scripture evidence, and as subversive of all ideas of personality. A modification of this view is that Christ entered into a *moral union* with sinners in such a way that he sympathizes with their sin and ruin; that he repents and confesses for them, on their behalf, and thus furnishes a repentance and confession which God can accept. The sinner who accepts Christ, and adopts his repentance as his own, is saved.

17. We have still to consider the Governmental theory of the Atonement, which appears with varying modifications. According to this theory there is a difficulty in the way of forgiving the sinner, aside from, or in addition to, the difficulty of bringing him to repentance. That difficulty is in the danger which arises to the government of God, as to any government, in the offer of pardon to every transgressor upon the mere condition of repentance. Penalty is a moral force to prevent transgression; a necessary motive against sin in the government of God. To offer a free pardon to the penitent, without some counteracting force, would break down this motive and encourage transgression. The Atonement is designed to bring such forces into the government of God, to supply such motives, that the penalty can be remitted, in the case of the penitent, without detriment to the government. As it is to furnish the ground upon which penalty can be remitted, it must bring equivalent forces to the support of the government; it must furnish such lessons and make such impressions in the government of God that the pardon of the penitent will do no harm. The claim of the advocates of the theory is that the Atonement accomplishes

just this work. Historically the theory appeared later than the Satisfaction theory. It is sometimes called the Grotian theory, because Hugo Grotius of Holland, in the early part of the seventeenth century, was among the earliest, if not the earliest, of its advocates. It is sometimes called the New England theory, because it has been thoroughly elaborated by theologians of New England, and has been more prevalent in New England than elsewhere.

The theory is essentially one, in that it maintains that the danger to be guarded against, in the forgiveness of sin, is danger to God's government. There are various forms of the theory, because the bearing of the Atonement upon God's government can be contemplated in so many different aspects. The bearings are in fact so various that no single statement will probably ever embrace them all. These different views, in so far as they present the truth, must be regarded as supplementary of one another, and not as antagonistic. Of course there may be misapprehensions and fancies that need to be set aside.

18. In considering the bearing of the Atonement to make forgiveness safe in the government of God, we need first to recall the relation of penalty to government, the purposes it serves, its natural bearing. The leading impressions of penalty are two: In the first place it exhibits the fidelity of the ruler to the interests which the government is designed to maintain. When the transgressor is punished the faithfulness and efficiency of the government are exhibited. The penalty in God's government shows that sin will not be passed by, or treated as a small matter. The evil-doer can not go on in his career, under the delusion that God will regard his course with indifference; under temptation to sin a wholesome fear takes possession of him. Penalty is a restraint upon sin, by the apprehension which it induces. It makes an impression of the danger of sin to the one who

commits it: an impression made upon all the subjects of the government.

In the second place penalty makes an impression of the sinfulness of sin, in that it is God's testimony to its ill-desert. In civil society crime ceases to be regarded as crime when it ceases to be punished; the public conscience becomes debauched, and the restraint upon crime which lies in the apprehension of its wickedness is set aside. Penalty in God's government is a constant reminder of the ill-desert of transgression, a constant enforcement of the obligations of righteousness, an ever-present motive to obedience. These are essentially the lessons which penalty in God's government is intended to impress. It is true that in this present life the actual penalty is not exhibited before the eyes of men; its power is in the announcement of a judgment to come. We apprehend God's government as existing over the future world as well as over the present; its appliances and forces will be necessary, and will continue, while God and his creatures exist.

19. Now the plan of redemption contemplates the recovery of sinners by turning them to righteousness, and by making such provision of governmental forces as shall render the pardon of these penitent sinners safe, in that it shall bring no detriment to God's government. And when we speak of detriment to God's government, we should mean harm to the great interests of his rational and dependent universe. We sometimes speak of the necessity of protecting God's honor as a ruler, or of magnifying the law of God, and of meeting the claims of justice. These terms have a limited significance; but all the essential facts implied are summed up in the comprehensive idea of securing the well-being of God's rational creatures, the subjects of his government. This is the sole end of government; and when this is secured the honor of God, and of the law, and of justice, will all be safe. The Atonement is adapted to secure these ends:

(1) In that it represents the highest moral force to bring sinners to repentance. This necessity must have place in any theory of the Atonement; but the Satisfaction theory has greatly overlooked the necessity; and very naturally, because regeneration is contemplated as the work of omnipotence, not of moral forces. The Governmental theory recognizes the need of these forces, and claims this adaptation of the Atonement.

(2) It claims farther that the Atonement provides essentially the same lessons, and makes the same impressions, that penalty affords; and thus enables God, in his wisdom, to dispense with penalty in the case of the penitent. It is a painful necessity of human government to punish the penitent. If the murderer on the gallows were as truly penitent as the thief on the cross, and known to be so, the awful exhibition must still be consummated; the risks of pardon would be too great. In the gospel system such a necessity is removed; the Atonement meets the case and sets aside the danger of pardon. Even more distinctly than penalty, it begets a sense of the danger of sin—danger to the sinner himself. At first thought we might say that the tendency of the Atonement, as it provides pardon, is to do away with fear. But this is a hasty view; it makes a profound impression, even beyond that of penalty, of God's fidelity to the interests of his kingdom. He gave his only begotten Son to secure those interests. At such expense to himself, at such a sacrifice, with such intense personal interest in the end to be attained, has the Atonement been wrought out, that God can never be suspected of carelessly passing by sin, or of regarding it with any easy-going indulgence. By this wonderful coming out before the eyes of men in the incarnation; by encountering sin in his own person, pressing on to the cross itself in the conflict with the powers of darkness, God has so secured to himself the confidence of the universe that he can exercise his mercy in the pardon of the penitent,

without danger of misunderstanding on the part of his creatures. No creature of his, in view of this marvelous personal interest and sacrifice on God's part, will imagine that he can go on in sin, and not be looked after and brought to account. The interests of the universe so manifestly rest upon the heart of God, that no sinner can flatter himself that his sin will be treated as a small matter.

The father in his family who should without hesitation pass over every offense on the part of his children, on their mere repentance and confession, would at length come to be regarded as too good-natured or careless to guard faithfully the interests of the household. But if, at great self-sacrifice, he walks among them in pain and suffering incurred in his faithful effort to correct his children, and recover them from their misdoing and its consequences, he secures such a moral position that he can exercise great freedom in passing over their faults. The family government is not weakened, but rather strengthened, by such clemency; his children will not mistake his gentleness for weakness. The parable of the prodigal son contains a suggestion of the danger. The prodigal himself was received by the father with overflowing affection and tenderness. The elder son resented the effusive display. If the father, at great self-sacrifice, had gone into the distant land and brought back the wanderer himself, exhausted and suffering from the toil and hardship, the elder son would have been ashamed to complain. Such advantage of position the Atonement secures to the heavenly Father. It brings him into such manifest and vital connection with the interests of the world, that the sinner cannot expect to continue in sin with impunity. It is the disposition of sinners to put God out of the world, or to conceive of him as indifferent to its concerns; this is their hope of security. "They say, how doth God know; and is there knowledge in the Most High?" In the light of the incarnation and the cross such a delusion can scarcely arise. It

is to be borne in mind that the penalty still stands against the impenitent sinner, and so far the lesson of penalty itself remains.

The second great impression of penalty we find to be, the exceeding sinfulness of sin. How does the work of Christ provide this lesson? In two ways: first, it is an exhibition of God's estimate of sin, in that no arrangement less significant than the coming of the Emmanuel, and his patience and obedience unto death, could be devised, to counteract the mischief of sin, and deliver men from its ruin. When the worlds were to be created, "God spake and it was done." The effort involved no cost or sacrifice to him. But when a remedy for sin was to be provided, "the eternal Word" "emptied himself, taking on the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and becoming obedient unto death;"—the cheapest remedy for sin that infinite wisdom could offer. In the presence of the cross there is little opportunity to underestimate sin.

Again, it is to be observed that in the death of Christ sin has made an exhibition of itself. The Savior hangs upon the cross, not by the act of God, but by the act of sinners themselves. We are not to forget that he was "delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God;" but he was taken by sinners, "and by their wicked hands was crucified and slain." The most exalted being that ever stood upon the earth, "the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," coming to his own to bring them deliverance and salvation, is despised and rejected and slain by the sinners that he came to save. Sin never so displayed its malignity and hatefulness, as in that infamous deed; and the sight of the cross from that day to this, has tended powerfully to make the world ashamed of sin. Thus we gather from the cross the second great lesson which penalty was intended to impress: the loathsomeness of sin.

20. But farther, there are mighty forces in the cross

that are not found in penalty. In the first place it exhibits the beauty of holiness, even more impressively than the odiousness of sin. The exalted character and consecration of the Savior is the highest exhibition of goodness and unselfish devotion that the world has seen. It has stood, and must always stand, as the loftiest ideal of excellence that human thought can reach; and there is power in that great lesson to beget in human souls a longing for some likeness to Christ himself. As Paul expresses it (2 Cor. iii. 18), "We all, with open face beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." Thus the Atonement works in human souls a love of holiness.

Again, the cross is an exhibition of the love of God, in the sense of sympathy and compassion for sinners. The sovereignty of God is illustrated in penalty; his fidelity in the maintenance of law. But the goodness of God which encourages to repentance, and which is the ground of our confidence in him as a father and a friend, needs to be set forth. If punishment should always, and instantly, follow sin, and repentance should not avail to turn it aside, a suspicion of God's sternness or vindictiveness might have possessed the hearts of men. That danger is forever set aside. The goodness and severity of God are united in the great lesson of the cross.

21. In the presence of these great moral forces which the Atonement brings into the government of God, the forgiveness of sin can occasion no detriment. The government is not weakened thereby, but immeasurably strengthened, because it increases our confidence in the Ruler. The pardon of the penitent is proper and just, when their punishment is no longer required to sustain the government. In the case of the unrepentant the penalty still remains, with all its moral force. It is presumption to suppose that all the bearings of the Atonement can be embodied in any theoret-

ical statement; it is too broad and deep and far-reaching. But these governmental bearings are real and significant and unquestionable. Undoubtedly the general bearings of the Atonement lie in this direction.

22. A few further considerations and suggestions as to the nature and relations of the Atonement will close the discussion.

(1) The theory presented does not represent that Christ suffered the penalty of the law. Penalty is impossible, except for guilt, and guilt is found only in the sinner. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Penalty is an expression of God's disapprobation of sin and of the sinner; there was no disapprobation for his well-beloved Son. The mysterious outcry on the cross, "Why hast thou forsaken me?" must not for a moment suggest the thought of God's disapprobation. In a very proper sense the death of Christ takes the place of the penitent sinner's punishment, as a moral force in the government of God; and thus it is that the Scriptures represent that Christ died for us; that "he bare our sins in his own body on the tree." The suffering of Christ made the punishment of the penitent unnecessary.

(2) Again, so far as there is a demand for punishment in the mind of God, the Atonement satisfies the demand. God never demands the punishment of sinners, except as a necessity of government. The Atonement meets this necesity, and thus "satisfies the ethical nature of God," in the only sense in which satisfaction is necessary or possible. It satisfies the wisdom of God, not his wrath.

(3) In the same way the Atonement satisfies the demand, in the minds of God's creatures, for the punishment of the penitent. It secures the interests of God's government against the danger arising from pardon; and in this is the only reasonable ground for a demand for punishment.

(4) In a similar sense the Atonement satisfies justice; it meets all the necessities and obligations of the case. The

only justice which has any claim upon God or man is, a due regard for every interest. Justice, in this sense, is satisfied when the well-being of the universe is provided for; it gives to God's government the highest attainable success, and places God in highest honor among his creatures. When these ends are secured, justice can have no other claim upon God or man.

It may be said, with entire propriety, that justice not only permits the Atonement; it even requires it. Justice is a due regard to all well-being. The salvation of men was possible to God, through the Atonement. He could not satisfy his own sense of what was fit and suitable in the case, without coming to the rescue at great self-sacrifice and cost. To fail to do this would have been injustice to himself and to the interests of his creatures.

There is a form of justice sometimes spoken of, called retributive justice, which consists in treating every being according to his deserts. The Atonement makes no provision for a justice of this kind. It provides for sinners a better treatment than they deserve, and for the Savior a worse treatment than he deserves. It made him "who knew no sin," "to be sin for us." Retributive justice is not a principle of righteousness; God does not act upon it, and he does not permit his creatures to do so. He does what he can to save the ill-deserving, and requires us to love our enemies, to be kind even to the unthankful and the evil. The term *desert* often confuses the minds of men. The superficial thought is that a man's desert is what ought to be rendered him. No, it is what it is right to render him, provided nothing better can be done. The whole gospel idea is an effort on God's part to treat men better than they deserve; not to set aside justice, but to fulfill that justice which is righteousness. God is just when he justifies the believing sinner. Righteousness requires it; it ought to be done. We sometimes hear the expression that it would be just in

God to send us all to perdition. No, we deserve to be sent to perdition; but God is able to do something better for us than that, and therefore it is not just or right for him to send us to perdition. Retributive justice is not justice; desert is not a guide to duty.

(5) It would be a mistake—a mistake which is sometimes made, to attempt to find in the death of Christ a *formal* substitution for the sinner's death; some more or less exact correspondence, in external form, with the penalty of the law. The Scripture facts scarcely sustain the idea. Christ dies that sinners may live; and the necessity was absolute; the substitution is real and effective, but it is not a case of immediate and definite exchange, as when a friend yields himself to suffer the penalty appointed to a friend; or like the case of the philanthropic teacher who receives the exact number of blows instead of the offending pupil; or of the king of the Locrians yielding one of his eyes to the executioner, to save an eye for his guilty son. The evil which came upon Christ was not inflicted by the government, any more than that which came upon Paul and other martyrs; hence Christ suffered no punishment. His death furnishes a moral equivalent, an equivalent in motive power, for the remitted penalty. It is scarcely helpful to attempt to demonstrate the formal elements of penalty in the death of Christ. It is not necessary to say, or to suppose, that he suffered under the wrath of God. There is nothing in the suffering of Christ that corresponds in form with penalty; the substitution is less direct than this.

(6) If it be asked what facts and particulars in the work of Christ go to make up the Atonement, the obvious reply must be, Everything which contributes to the necessary moral impression. The essential fact of the Atonement is the manifestation of God in his true character of a faithful ruler, a loving father, ready for any sacrifice to maintain the great interests of his universe. This manifestation is in-

volved in the incarnation, and in the whole life and work of Christ on earth, with his death as the crowning fact. The Governmental view affords room for every influence, involved in the work of Christ, which tends to honor the government of God, and give it power over the hearts of men.

(7) The Atonement brings salvation within the reach of every human sinner. It does not secure the salvation of any, but it is sufficient for all. "Whosoever will let him come and partake of the water of life, freely." This is the Atonement of the gospel. On God's part all obstacles are removed, all external or governmental conditions of salvation are supplied; and still further, all the motives to repentance and righteousness are furnished. The way is open. The sinner must respond to these offers of mercy and salvation. It remains to consider the subjective conditions, those which the sinner is called upon to supply. No salvation can come to him without his own co-operation.

CHAPTER XX.

SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF SALVATION: REGENERATION, CONVERSION, REPENTANCE.

1. The work of the sinner—the change which he must undergo to be made a partaker of the salvation provided through the Atonement, is expressed in the Scriptures by various terms; prominent among these are the terms Regeneration and Conversion. The first of these terms, Regeneration, is used but sparingly, and only in the New Testament: Matt xix. 28, "And Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Titus iii. 5, "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." We have a few examples of the verb from which the noun, Regeneration, is derived: 1 Peter i. 3, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead." 1 Peter i. 23, "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever." John iii. 3, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."

2. The word Conversion, with its derivatives, meaning turning, turning about, is used more abundantly, both in the New Testament and in the Old. The two terms, Regeneration and Conversion, evidently refer to the same essential change, because they are both used to express the condition

of acceptance with God, to be supplied on the part of the sinner. John iii. 3, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Matt. xviii. 3, "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven."

3. The necessity for this change is everywhere represented as lying in the fact that men are sinners: "Isa. lv. 7, "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts; and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon." Ezek. xviii. 21, "But if the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed, and keep all my statutes and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live." Acts x. 35, "In every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." Heb. xii. 14, "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord." These declarations indicate that turning from sin to righteousness is the change required for salvation; and this must be the essential significance of the words Regeneration and Conversion. The necessity lies in the nature of the case; sinners cannot become subjects of salvation, without turning from sin to righteousness. Rom. viii. 7, "The carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The necessity is two-fold, governmental and natural. God cannot pardon the sinner continuing in sin, without breaking down his authority and his law. Again, pardon, if it could be offered, would bring no salvation. Sin and salvation are incompatible. In the nature of the case, sin is ruin.

4. The necessity of Regeneration is as widespread as the fact of sin; and as all men are sinners, all must be converted, that their sins may be blotted out. This is the assumption of the Scriptures: "Except ye be converted and be-

come as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." This language is addressed to every man.

5. The nature of the change is shown in the fact that it is ceasing to sin—turning from sin to righteousness. Sin is what stands in the way of salvation. Ceasing to sin is the necessary condition of salvation. As it is a turning from sin to holiness, it is called Conversion, turning.

In this view and to this extent the change is wholly moral—a voluntary change. The man himself has power to make the change, and no other being can make it for him. Sin is man's free action; so also is obedience; and so the change from sin to obedience. Thus the Scriptures everywhere hold the sinner responsible for the change. Matt. xi. 28, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." Acts iii. 19, "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." James iv. 8, "Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts, ye double-minded." John v. 40, "Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life." These passages, and many others, indicate that the man himself must turn; that he alone is responsible for the failure, if there be a failure.

6. At the same time we have reason to suppose that no one ever turns of his own motion; that is, without antecedent inducement or persuasion. Sinners are so fascinated and possessed, as to require divine persuasion; and the Scriptures sometimes state very strongly this unwillingness and repugnance. John vi. 44, "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." This *can not* is still unwillingness. It stands in close connection with the Savior's words, "Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life." It expresses the difficulty, the reluctance and unwillingness—not the impossibility; as when Joseph says (Gen. xxxix. 9), "How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?" The drawing which precedes the coming,

is not physical, but moral; it carries with it no compulsion. Rev. iii. 20, "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." John xii. 32, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." This divine drawing, called by some of the older theologians "God's preventing grace," is necessary to the conversion of men, because they make it so.

The moral force of persuasion is often exerted through human agency; thus, Paul says (2 Cor. v. 11, 20), "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men." "As though God did beseech you by us; we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." Sometimes the drawing influence comes through providential outward circumstances; sometimes, probably, by the direct action of the Spirit upon the sensibilities, to soften and subdue and pre-dispose to a reception of the truth. But this direct action upon the soul does not produce conversion, in the sense of causing it; it is simply an arousing of the soul to understand and appreciate the truth; and the truth must operate as motive to induce conversion. The change is made by the sinner himself in view of the truth; the work of the Spirit becomes effective through the truth—that is, as motive. Psalms xix. 7, "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul." John xvii. 17, "Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth." Rom. i. 16, "I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ; for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." James i. 18, "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth." 1 Peter i. 23, "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever." The work is done by the truth; that is, by persuasion, motive. It is therefore a moral work.

7. In reference to the nature of this change, and the cause or force which produces it, there is confusion even in

the writings of theologians of the New School. One says, "The Spirit of God is the efficient cause of all holy affections." "And yet when these affections are excited in us, they are our own." "God has his appropriate work in this matter, and we have ours. We are not called upon efficiently to cause holy affections, either in our own hearts or the hearts of others." "God gives the new heart in Regeneration, or excites holy affections where only sinful ones had existed before." This must be wrong and impossible. God excites holy affections by motives, inducements, persuasions. The efficient cause of them is the man himself: there can be no other cause of responsible activity, in any form. There is a mistake as to the nature of holy affections. Some condition of the sensibility, or of the feeling, is in the writer's mind, which belongs to Christian experience, and which the sinner cannot originate; but such experience is not required of him—is not obligatory. What he can do is to yield his heart to God in a spirit of obedience; this is possible, and this is a holy exercise, and he is the cause of it. It is an utter removal of responsibility to say that God must give us a new heart before we can become obedient. We take to ourselves the new heart, in becoming obedient; and the Scriptures always place the responsibility upon the sinner himself. "Cease to do evil, learn to do well," is the uniform language.

The antecedent action of the Spirit, in inducing obedience, is often brought to light in the Scriptures. Eph. ii. 1, "And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins." This sounds, at first thought, like a work of divine power,—of omnipotence; but lest we should press this figure of death and making alive too far, we have, again, in the same epistle (Eph. v. 14,) "Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light." The death spoken of is not an irresponsible condition; and to arise from the dead, is a duty resting upon the sinner,

which he is exhorted to discharge. A similar passage we have in Acts xvi. 14, where it is said of Lydia "Whose heart the Lord opened that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul." Her heart was opened by the Spirit through the truth; not as a deaf ear is opened by an act of power. There is no propriety in waiting for the movement of the Spirit, and no excuse for waiting. Every sinner has motive sufficient, and there is not the slightest hindrance out of his own will; he will not turn.

8. But this persuasive action of the Spirit is not irresistible; it is doubtless often resisted. We have no reason to suppose that the influence of the Spirit before Conversion, is different in kind or degree, in the case of those who are converted, from that afforded in the case of others who are not converted. "Because I have called and ye refused," is the language which God addresses to the reprobate. Effectual calling, as distinguished from the common calling addressed to men, is an idea of theology, not of the Scriptures. It is the responsibility of the sinner to determine whether the call shall be effectual.

9. Thus far then we find two things: God's persuading, calling; and man's hearing, yielding. The last is the moral change required, the first is the universal antecedent. That men are distinctly conscious of the divine movement upon the soul, it is not necessary to maintain. So far as the movement falls within the range of consciousness, it seems, in general, to belong to the soul itself. There are cases in which the mind seems to be seized upon, and borne away with a tide of conviction, such as to indicate the presence of the Spirit. These are extraordinary cases. Oftener the work of the Spirit is more quiet, but no less real. The more remarkable instances appear in the case of those who have stubbornly pursued a life of sin, or who are brought suddenly face to face with some crisis. Such examples we find in the Scriptures, as that of Saul of Tarsus, of the mul-

titudes on the day of Pentecost, and of the jailer at Philippi; but in most instances the work seems to have been a more quiet one. The style and method of religious instruction, and the general expectation of the Christian community, doubtless have much to do with the forms of experience which shall attend.

10. The change in Conversion—the moral change, must be instantaneous, because it is a moral change—a change in moral character, in the attitude and purpose of the will. Any other change might be gradual—a change of experience in any other form, or even a change of nature, as that of the transformation of a caterpillar into a moth. But moral character, the moral attitude of the will, must be either right or wrong; no intermediate position is possible. There may be progressive experiences, and similar changes, leading to Conversion and following it; but the moral change itself admits of no such degrees.

11. The change must also be entire. There can be no partial turning. The sinner renounces sin wholly, or he does not renounce it at all. The sinful state is the unbenevolent attitude of the will, and that will cannot be divided in its controlling purpose. No withholding is possible in the surrender to God. Any reservation is total reservation. This view is generally maintained by theologians and religious teachers and preachers of whatever school.

12. Thus far, as we have seen, the change must be regarded as voluntary—*moral*, wholly within the responsibility of the sinner, except as respects the antecedent coming of the Spirit. As to that antecedent action, the sinner is receptive or passive; but in the response to that coming, his action is responsible, voluntary. Thus he renders the duty required, and becomes morally acceptable to God. This is the human side of the work, the *duty* of Conversion; and the word Conversion, as distinguished from Regeneration, expresses the duty.

There is still a want in the man which God alone can supply. He has the same nature as before Conversion; a weak human nature, weak before the fall, perhaps still weaker since. The converted man does not find, in his Conversion, any sufficient security for the future; there is no necessary permanence in it. The new attitude he has taken is a definite and settled purpose, a deliberate, benevolent, choice, not a temporary phase of feeling; but he is weak, and temptation will overcome him, and the tide of worldliness around will drift him away. He will fall under the pressure of his old impulses and faults and habits. These appetites and impulses must remain, as essential to his nature, and to his earthly life. Conversion does not eradicate them; it is not a change of nature. Some aggravations or perversions of appetite or passion may be, sooner or later, abated or corrected, sometimes suddenly, oftener gradually; but his nature must remain essentially as it was.

13. Here then comes in that divine operation which gives the change the name of Regeneration,—being born again, created anew in Christ Jesus. The Scripture doctrine seems to be, that God takes possession of the soul, and permeates it with his own Spirit, and sustains by his own presence the spiritual life, standing in closer relations to the soul because it is open to receive him. Before Conversion the Spirit, so to speak, acted from without, the heart being closed against him. In Conversion the heart is opened, and the Spirit enters; thus the man is said to be born of God, a new creature.

14. But we are still to understand that, while the presence of the Spirit is real and essential, the action is moral, through motive, persuasion. There is no constraint, no overruling of personality. The man is still free and responsible, and the new action in the direction of holiness is his own action. The movement of the Spirit is probably not

different in kind from that before Conversion; but more effective because the will is in harmony with the Spirit.

15. The Scriptures abound in references to the special relation of the Spirit to the regenerate soul. Rom. viii. 14–18, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." Gal. iv. 6, "Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." Eph. iv. 30, "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption." 2 Cor. i. 21, 22, "Now he which stablisheth us with you in Christ, and hath anointed us, is God; who hath also sealed us, and given the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts." Rom. viii. 1, 9, "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." "But ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." 1 Cor. iii. 16, "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" John i. 13, "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." John xiv. 23, "If a man love me he will keep my words: and my father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." 1 John iii. 9, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin: for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." Rev. iii. 20, "Behold I stand at the door, and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me."

This indwelling of the Spirit is not given as a special

experience of a few, but as belonging to all Christians. 2 Cor. xiii. 5, "Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?" There are special experiences of the baptism of the Spirit, as in the case of the Apostles, and other disciples, on the day of Pentecost, and of Christians in our day; but the Christian life in every degree and form, from its very beginning, involves the indwelling of the Spirit.

16. Thus the entire change has two aspects: first, that for which the man is directly responsible, involving his own act, which we call Conversion: and secondly the incoming of the Spirit, which is called Regeneration, and which, as distinguished from Conversion, is the work of God. The last follows the first, and is conditioned upon it, and together they constitute the change necessary, in the case of the sinner, to make him a subject of salvation. It is called, indiscriminately, Conversion or Regeneration; Conversion when viewed from the human side as a duty—something to be performed by the sinner; and Regeneration when viewed from the heavenward side as the incoming of the Spirit, the work of God. Either term may be used, and both are used to express the condition of acceptance with God. Thus we may speak of the beginning of the Christian life as a duty or as an experience; it is both, and religion may be performed or experienced. First comes the duty, then the experience.

17. As before remarked, it is, in general, probably true that there is no direct consciousness in the soul of the presence of the Spirit. He is shown to be present by the results. Gal. v. 22, 23, "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." By such fruit in ourselves and in others we determine the presence of the Spirit.

18. The mystery of Regeneration does not lie in the change, as a moral change, a change of moral character;

all this is open to consciousness and to our own understanding; it is a natural human exercise. Nor does it lie in the forces employed by the Spirit to induce the change—the force of motive or of truth operating upon the will. The mystery is in the coming and intervention of the Spirit; this is a supernatural fact, and lies outside the field of consciousness. John iii. 8, "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." In this view, and to this extent, Regeneration is a supernatural fact.

19. False views of Conversion and of Regeneration grow out of false views of human nature and of sin. If human nature is sinful, and its acts are sin by necessity, then human nature must be recovered, created anew. Such recreation or restoration by God's omnipotence is, according to some, Regeneration. The divine recreative action, it is supposed, is the first fact in the change; Conversion follows, which is the act of the sinner after he has a new heart, or is regenerated. Or if, as some suppose, the difficulty is, a taste for sin in human nature, and no taste for holiness, and hence no possible movement toward it, then this taste must be removed, and a new taste given. This is a work of divine power, and such a work would be Regeneration. If, as others claim, the difficulty is in a set of the will toward sin, by reason of the fall, a sinful attitude which the will assumed in Adam, so that it has ability to sin and no ability to holiness, then this set of the will must be removed before there can be any turning to righteousness. A prominent theological writer says, "Spiritual death is as real as corporeal death. The dead body is not more insensible and powerless in relation to the objects of sense, than the soul, when spiritually dead, is to the things of the Spirit. This insensibility and helplessness are precisely what the word dead in both cases is meant to express; it is as literal in the one

case as in the other. As the blind could not open their own eyes, or the deaf unstop their own ears, or the dead quicken themselves in their graves; as they could not prepare themselves for restoration, or co-operate in effecting it, so also the blind, the deaf, the dead in sin. . . . Effectual calling is the work of Omnipotence. No one is hardy enough to attempt to explain how the efficiency of God operates in creation, or how the mere volition of Christ healed the sick or raised the dead; neither will men attempt to explain how Christ raises the spiritually dead, did they believe it was a simple work of almighty power."

In every such view Regeneration is supposed to involve a change of nature or constitution, or the removal of some condition outside of the man's will, in order to make obedience possible to him. Such a view must remove from the sinner all responsibility for the change; he can do nothing right until regenerated by divine power. God must give the new heart, then obedience follows.

20. These views take away the significance and value of the offer of salvation on God's part, and the significance and importance of preaching the gospel on the part of men. Truth, it is said, has no power, until after Regeneration; it does not touch the sinner any more than it would a dead man. This is not Scriptural, and preachers of the gospel cannot practically believe it. The sinner apprehends the truth, and at length yields to it; it is adapted to move him, and nothing else is adapted to his case.

21. Such theories of Regeneration imply a change which does not take place. The regenerate man is not changed in nature, but in the purpose and aim of life; in this respect he is a new creature; in this sense old things have passed away, and all things have become new to him that is in Christ Jesus. In the place of worldliness and self-seeking, there is found a voluntary, willing obedience; and this must be continued by the same voluntary action,

and sustained by the same moral forces and motives that produce the change. The nature of the converted man is not different from that of the unconverted; they differ in their voluntary attitude, the aim of their lives. The Christian cannot say, "Now I have a new nature all things will go well with me;" but like Paul he must keep his body under, and bring it into subjection.

22. The idea of baptismal regeneration is sometimes maintained, on the ground that baptism, and other ordinances, are appointed by the Lord as the channels of his grace; that regenerating grace comes with the administration of the rite of baptism. Such a view of the grace of God is too mechanical. God's grace operates only through the responsible co-operation of the sinner; it is not operative until it is accepted, and there is no special outward observance that will convey the grace. Another view of baptismal regeneration is sometimes maintained; this is, that baptism is an act of obedience appointed as the entrance upon the Christian life; that the sinner has the definite command upon him to be baptized. He can do nothing acceptable but this, and in doing this he is accepted, and enters upon the Christian life. This is a misapprehension. The sinner may enter upon a life of obedience in the act of prayer or in any other duty, or in an inward act of consecration independent of any outward duty; and the act of baptism is just as liable to be performed without inward obedience as any other outward duty. The passage in Acts xxii. 16, might be made to signify baptismal regeneration: "And now why tarriest thou? arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins;" but such interpretation is not in harmony with the general tone of the Scriptures.

23. The evidence of Regeneration is in a character and life renewed. No degree of emotion, or special type of feeling or thinking, or fancied purpose, can be taken as a sure evidence; nor is any special form of experience necessarily in-

volved. The fact of Conversion is often unrecognized at the moment; often, probably, the point of time noted is not the real time. The attainment of spiritual light or joy is often fixed upon as indicating the precise instant of the change. The real moral change often precedes such emotional experience. Paul was probably converted when he cried out earnestly, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" He found little light or comfort until his eyes were opened, three days afterward.

24. It is possible to make the idea of a marked and violent experience too prominent. It is common to regard the experience of Paul as a model. Such teaching doubtless tends to produce the experience it calls for; especially, the prevailing idea on the subject of Conversion, in any religious community, tends to give form to the experience, and direct the emotions in connection with the change. The only essential element is a change from a life of self-pleasing to a life of obedience to God—a life of benevolent purpose and action. Possibly the idea of a violent conversion has been too prominent in the Puritan and Wesleyan churches. The view has had its power and utility, perhaps its drawbacks. It has been useful as arousing the attention to the fact that religion is a significant and important matter; that Conversion is a radical change; but it has doubtless tended to draw away the attention from the essential element in Conversion to emotional experiences which are not essential, and thus to confuse the minds of men. The Puritan idea that there must be days of conviction and darkness before the new life can begin; the Wesleyan idea that there must be a period of seeking and mourning before the way is found, are both examples of this misapprehension.

REPENTANCE.

1. The most obvious suggestion of our common word, Repentance, is sorrow for past misconduct—generally sinful

conduct; yet the word sometimes implies mere regret for mistakes in conduct. When used theologically, the word signifies, in general, a change of conduct, or of character, in connection with the sorrow; indeed, the popular use of the word commonly implies such change; but sorrow or regret is included in the idea.

2. In the New Testament the Greek words wich are translated repent and repentance seem to place foremost the idea of a change of mind, or purpose, rather than of sorrow. In 2 Cor. vii. 10, we have, "For godly sorrow worketh repentance unto salvation, but the sorrow of the world worketh death." Here the sorrow and the Repentance appear to be distinguished from each other.

In the Old Testament repent is used to translate a Hebrew word the primary meaning of which is to turn, or return. The same word is translated convert, or be converted; and Repentance and Conversion become the same thing. That this is the essential meaning of the word is shown in many passages of Scripture. Matt. iii. 2, 8, John the Baptist preached saying, "Repent ye; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." "Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance." Mark vi. 12, "They went out and preached that men should repent." Luke xiii. 3, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." Luke xvi. 30, "Nay, father Abraham but if one went unto them from the dead, they will repent." Acts xvii. 30, "And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men every where to repent." Luke xvii. 3, "If thy brother trespass against thee rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him." Acts iii. 19, "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." Acts xxvi. 20, Paul says that he showed "to the Gentiles, that they should repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance." These and similar passages prove that Repentance and Conversion are essentially one and the same thing, each expressing the moral

change required in the sinner in order to salvation. The term repentance or repent is often used, in a restricted sense, as referring to the abandonment of a particular sin, as in the case of a Christian who has fallen under temptation. Conversion is more commonly used in a generic sense, as referring to the first turning from sin to obedience; yet to this there are exceptions. Luke xxii. 32, the Savior said to Peter, "When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." Peter was already a believer, but was about to fall under temptation; and the conversion to which the Savior refers was a recovery from that fall.

3. Repentance is, of course, the duty—that which devolves upon the sinner himself; yet it is sometimes spoken of in the Scriptures as the gift of God. Acts xi. 18, "They . . glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life;" which means, doubtless, that the offer of salvation, on condition of Repentance, had been made to the Gentiles. 2 Tim. ii. 25, "If God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth." A passage in Heb. xii. 17, has sometimes been quoted as proving that Repentance is at times impossible because God will not give it. It is said of Esau that "he found no place of repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears." The Repentance spoken of was on his father's part; Esau made no effort at Repentance for himself.

4. The necessary antecedent of Repentance is a perception of the sinful course to be renounced, an apprehension of it as wrong. It is perhaps conceivable that one may see the right, and embrace it, without a distinct apprehension that he is in the wrong. It is doubtless possible that a Christian who has fallen into sin may turn from that sin and be restored, without a distinct recognition of the fact that he was in a state of sin. He may possibly always remain in doubt,

whether in that act he sinned or not; but the ordinary experience involves a perception of the sin.

5. The frequent antecedent of Repentance is a keen feeling of the sinfulness of the character and the life, commonly called conviction. This keen sense of sin often follows Conversion, and may appear afterward in the Christian life. Such vivid emotion is not a necessary antecedent, but it is wholesome and helpful for a soul to stand thus face to face with the sinfulness of sin; and this is a common element in Christian experience.

6. It is important to distinguish Repentance as a duty from all the experiences connected with or resulting from it. The obligatory part is the voluntary turning away from sin—always obligatory, and always possible. Whoever has light enough to sin, has light enough to renounce the sin. If other experiences be made prominent, in the presentation of the duty, there is danger of an abatement of the sense of immediate obligation; because these experiences are not immediately possible or attainable. One may become bewildered waiting for conviction or feeling. There is no more propriety in waiting for feeling when one is wronging God, than when he is wronging a fellow-man. His plain first duty is to stop, and there is no occasion to perplex this plain duty with other experiences. There is no question that the great moral change will be attended with emotional experiences, more or less speedy, more or less intense, according to the light and circumstances.

7. The fruits meet for Repentance will in due time appear, involving outward reformation, if the outward life has been wrong; reparation or restitution, if wrong has been done to others. "Can one be pardoned and retain the offense?" Then there must come the inward spiritual life, and all the graces of the Spirit in their time. Frequently change of view will follow, and difficulties of belief will be cleared away. Obstacles in the attitude of the will, to

the apprehension and acknowledgment of the truth, are removed by the change, and truth itself becomes more clear and luminous; thus the Savior says. (John vii. 17), "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." The best remedy for the doubts of the sceptic is to bring him to a state of obedience.

8. Repentance, like Conversion, is generic, comprehensive in its character; it covers sin as sin. It is impossible to repent of a particular sin without repenting of sin as such—of all sin. The repentance may begin with a particular sin, probably often does; but when the sin is abandoned it must be abandoned as sin; and this involves a renunciation of all sin; that is, of the carnal mind which is the essence of all sin. Other sins may not be in the thought at the time; but such is the unity of sin that if one is repudiated all must go. Old habits of sin may afterward come up as temptations, and occasion a new struggle; they may possibly gain sway and re-instate themselves, involving temporary apostasy; but this does not imply that they were reserved or cherished in the soul. We sometimes hear one say that when he was converted there was a particular sin that he did not repent of; it did not occur to him; it afterward came up, and he had a struggle with it, and put it away. The experience is doubtless real, but the philosophy of it is not correctly apprehended. The sin was not reserved in the soul; sin as such was renounced, the sinful attitude; but a sinful habit, not before the mind at the time, appeared afterward as a temptation. Hence in Repentance it cannot be necessary to recall every past sin; such Repentance would be impossible. The sinful mind, the self-indulgent will, is renounced, and thus all sin is repudiated, even if a particular act of sin be not at the moment recalled.

Nor is there any true Repentance where one sin is retained. Luke xvi. 10, "He that is faithful in that which is

least is faithful also in much: and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much." James ii. 10, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." Luke xiv. 33, "Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple."

9. Penitence as distinguished from Repentance is a permanent state—the state into which Repentance brings the soul. Penitence must be an attitude, or attribute, of every moral being who has been recovered from sin; it will have a place in heaven. We sometimes hear it said that when the sinner has repented and been forgiven, he has no occasion to recur to his past sins, or to recall them. This is probably not true; it must always be appropriate to look to the past, to remember the sin that has been forgiven, and perhaps to confess it anew.

10. Impenitence is the state opposed to penitence. It is persistence in sin—in an unbenevolent purpose and life; a state rather than an act; the state of the sinner under light and motives which should induce Repentance, and do not. Rom. ii. 4, 5, "Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But, after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God." Impenitence does not imply any special emotion or positive feeling of resistance or repugnance or opposition to God. Mere immobility, under motives which should turn the soul from sin, from worldliness, is all that is necessarily involved. Every sinner has motives before him which should lead to Repentance. Every persistent sinner is an impenitent sinner.

11. The question, which should precede, Repentance or Conversion, has no significance. They are one and the same thing.

CHAPTER XXI.

SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS: FAITH, OBEDIENCE.

1. A very common form in which the condition of salvation is presented is Faith; it is required of the sinner as a condition of God's favor, just as conversion, repentance and regeneration are required. John i. 12, "As many as received him, to them gave he the right to become the children of God, even to them that believe on his name." *Believe* is the verb, *Faith* the noun. John vi. 40, "This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life." Acts xvi. 31, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house." Heb. xi. 6, "But without Faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." The New Testament abounds in such passages.

2. We find further that Faith is required of men as a duty which they are to render. The disciples inquired (John vi. 28, 29), "What shall we do, that we might work the works of God? Jesus answered, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." Unbelief is reckoned as sin. John iii. 18, "He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God."

3. These facts, that Faith is a duty, that it is made a condition of salvation, and that unbelief is a sin, show that Faith is considered a voluntary, responsible, exercise, involving not thought or feeling alone, but the action of the will.

It must be a voluntary disposition or attitude of the soul, because it is required of all men.

4. The exercise of Faith is represented as directed toward God and toward the truth. Rom. iv. 3, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness." In 1 John v. 10, we are required to believe "the record that God hath given of his Son." These two things are not essentially different; in both cases there is a presentation of such facts as impose duty, and call for action. We believe God when we believe and accept his word as truth. We believe and accept him when we take him for what he claims to be.

We may define Faith as the voluntary acceptance of truth which calls for moral action: or as treating truth as true; respecting as truth what we have reason to believe to be true in regard to God and our relations to him, or to any moral duty. The truth must pertain to God, and to duty, because the acceptance of no other truth touches moral character, or can have any bearing on our acceptance with God. The acceptance of an abstract or scientific truth bears no proper analogy to the acceptance of truth pertaining to God: it cannot be treated as an adequate illustration of it.

5. The Scriptures harmonize with the idea that Faith is an acceptance of the truth—a voluntary act or attitude. John i. 12, "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." Heb. xi. 7, 8, 13, "By Faith Noah, being warned of God of things not seen as yet, moved with fear, prepared an ark to the saving of his house." He acted on God's word. "By Faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a place which he should after receive for an inheritance, obeyed; and he went out, not knowing whither he went." His Faith was a disposition to treat God's word with respect. "These all died in Faith, not having received the

promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them." James ii. 17, "Even so Faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone." Such passages show that Faith is acceptance of the truth, treating the truth of God as true.

6. A necessary antecedent of Faith is an intellectual apprehension of the truth,—of just so much truth as is necessary to obligation, or as brings moral responsibility. The first apprehension of the truth pertaining to duty puts one under the obligation of Faith. He is bound to act on that truth—to treat it as true.

Let us observe, too, that the moral attitude is the same, whether the light be greater or less. "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness." He was in a state of Faith; his light at the beginning of his obedience, was limited and feeble; but he walked in that light, and thus became the father of all those that believe, their great example and leader. Simeon and Anna, at the coming of the Savior, were in a state of Faith, waiting for the consolation of Israel; when the truth came to them that the Messiah was at hand, they embraced him. They stood ready before his coming; they were in the exercise of Faith. At his coming, when their eyes beheld him, they had new light, new truth, but no new Faith. Their Faith was in the disposition to receive and obey the truth. Cornelius was in the same state of Faith before he heard Peter preach Jesus Christ, as afterward. His range of truth was enlarged by the preaching, but no essential change was made in his Faith. He had more truth to believe, but the believing heart was the same as afterward; and he was morally just as pleasing to God.

7. Hence Faith in its subjective moral nature involves, not so much any particular form or amount of truth embraced, as the disposition to know and do the truth. The devils have more truth in their knowledge than many of the

saints; they "believe and tremble," but they have no Faith; they do not treat the truth as true, are not adjusted to the truth in their voluntary attitude; they resist and reject it. Pilate and Herod knew much about Jesus. Pilate knew him to be a righteous man; doubtless regarded him as a man or a person of no ordinary character; but he did not act according to his knowledge. Herod was glad to see Jesus because he hoped to see some miracle wrought by him; but he did not bring his own sick to be healed; he had no Faith. It is not a question of more or less light or knowledge, but of the disposition to obey the light. The feeblest light which is consistent with moral agency lays the foundation for Faith. It is not necessary to know the gospel, in its highest revelation, in order to the possibility and obligation of Faith.

8. Faith as a subjective exercise, a voluntary disposition, involves benevolence, and is not separable from it. Benevolence is voluntary regard for the well-being of all; treating the facts pertaining to being as facts, treating good as good. Faith is the same respect for the facts or truth pertaining to being, out of regard for the interests involved. No truth can be an object of Faith but truth pertaining to being; all other truth is abstract, and calls for no action, imposes no duty. Love to God and love to man are involved in Faith. Gal. v. 6, "Neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by love."

9. In a sinner Faith carries with it repentance and conversion; and each of these involves Faith, because the facts require repentance, the truth in the case calls for it; and acting according to that truth is repentance, and is Faith.

10. There are three elements which may be distinguished in the general exercise called Faith.

(1) The intellectual element; that is, an apprehension and conviction of the truth, of some truth which involves obligation.

(2) The moral acceptance of that truth, a voluntary treatment of it as true.

(3) The emotional results, the peace and assurance and confidence which follow a yielding of the heart to truth.

11. The exercise of Faith takes its name from the intellectual element; that is, from the reception of truth in the mind and thought. This is natural, because action in accordance with that apprehension properly and reasonably follows; it is the only honest action. Morally, however, the intellectual conviction becomes Faith, only when the will assents, and the man places himself in harmony with the truth. The name is sometimes applied to the emotional element, the peace and rest which come with the acceptance of the truth. Frequently it is applied to express the sense of the reality of the truth—a feeling that the truth is true. We sometimes know truth which does not seem to be true; even truth which we accept and cling to, which we morally believe, does not always seem to be true. We know, for example, that "all things work together for good to them that love God;" but in the midst of a great affliction it does not seem true. Our duty is to act on what we know, not on the seeming. The Faith which we are required to exercise—the duty of Faith, is this voluntary moral acceptance of the truth. Psalms xl. 1–3, "I waited patiently for the Lord; and he inclined unto me, and heard my cry. He brought me up also out of a horrible pit, out of the miry clay, and set my feet upon a rock, and established my goings. And he hath put a new song in my mouth, even praise unto our God." The Faith of the Psalmist was acceptable to God in the midst of his distress; it brought the pleasant result when his feet were established on the rock, and the new song was put in his mouth.

12. There can, of course, be no Faith beyond evidence of the truth, nor in opposition to it. The idea sometimes expressed that we can accept, and are bound to accept, things

of which we have no evidence, is preposterous. Somebody has set afloat in the world the maxim, "It is absurd, therefore I believe it," a monstrous idea! The true expression is, it is reasonable to believe it, therefore I believe. Faith is a disposition to accept truth; but it must be truth, or must have the evidence of truth, in order to be accepted. The honest disposition removes the obstacles to the acceptance of the truth. John vii. 17, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." Hence the truth held in the intelligence is some indication of the moral state. An orthodox head gives more or less presumption of an orthodox heart; hence the question of intellectual belief may reasonably be considered in estimating evidence of Christian character. The suitable emotions naturally and generally follow the apprehension and acceptance of the truth; hence these have their weight, greater or less, as evidence of moral Faith.

13. The opposing of Faith to reason, to which there is some tendency in the world, is entirely without justification. Faith depends on reason, and is only following reasonable evidence; any belief beyond this is arbitrary presumption, or prejudice, not Faith. The only foundation for the idea of such opposition is that in the exercise of Faith we receive divine revelation, and thus reach truth which lies beyond our reason. We accept God's word, and take as true what he teaches us, instead of relying on our own unaided reason. In doing this we do not abandon reason, or go in opposition to it; we follow it. Reason brings us to God; we accept his word as truth, because we have reason to do so in the evidence we have of its truth. A child who takes his father's wisdom as his guide, is following reason. He who rejects a higher wisdom, and claims to walk only by his own, is commonly called a rationalist; but he is not following reason. Absolute proof cannot properly be required for the acceptance of truth; probable evidence is sufficient.

14. The opposing of Faith to works is equally without

foundation. The works which Paul deprecates and discards are the formal observances which the law appoints, "dead works," works without Faith; and the dead faith which James condemns, the faith without works, is a belief without consecration of soul.

15. Unbelief is an indisposition to accept the truth of which there is reasonable evidence—a refusal to treat the truth as true. The motive to it is the same as the motive to sin in general—the impulses and desires. Truth is inconvenient and disagreeable to one living a life of impulse and self-indulgence. The truth requires that all these impulses and passions shall be held under control; hence there is a repugnance to the truth, a rejection of it; and this is unbelief. Failing to receive truth from want of evidence, is not unbelief.

16. In what sense can there be degrees of Faith? The disciples prayed (Luke xvii. 5), "Lord, Increase our faith." The Savior said to Peter, when he began to sink (Matt. xvi. 31), "O thou of little faith!" To the centurion he said (Matt. viii. 10), "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel."

(1) There can be degrees in the content of Faith; that is, in the amount of truth actually held in the mind, varying from the faintest apprehension of duty, to the fullest comprehension of the gospel of Christ; from Abraham's condition of knowledge, to that of Paul. Both Abraham and Paul were strong in Faith, as a subjective attitude, or state of the will, perhaps equally strong; but they differed greatly in degrees of knowledge. Rom. xiv. 1, 2, "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things: another, who is weak, eateth herbs." Such a man is comparatively ignorant of the system of truth called The Faith, yet he may have a very obedient spirit.

(2) Again there is such a thing as experience and inex-

perience in the faithfulness of God—all degrees of experience; and a corresponding sense of the reality of God's promises. One has tried the Lord in great tribulation, and has found him true; he has a feeling of assurance that all will be well. Another has had a very limited experience; and in the presence of trial there is a perturbation of feeling, which we sometimes call want of faith. Thus there are degrees of Faith in the experience and realization of the truth, and in the feeling of assurance or confidence which results; that is degrees of Faith as a condition of the sensibility. In this sense of Faith, the degree is not dependent on our will.

(3) From these varying conditions of apprehension of the truth, and of the feeling of assurance, it results that there are degrees of Faith in the sense that one is established and settled, not easily overcome by temptation to unbelief; while another lacks such establishment. A small trial frightens and may overset him. In the same sense there are degrees of establishment in the Christian character in general.

In this sense of establishment there is growth in Faith; one becomes strong in faith like Abraham Rom. xiv. 20: "He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in Faith, giving glory to God." In his earlier experience such difficulty would have proved a stumbling-block. The disciples, when they wished to have their faith increased, were in this state of inexperience and weakness; they had seen comparatively little of the power of Christ. The effect of this inexperience was shown when, in the absence of the Master, a child was brought to them having a dumb and deaf spirit, and they failed before it. An ordinary evil spirit they had learned to meet and cast out in the Savior's name; but this was an extraordinary one, and their Faith gave way; they staggered under the difficulty. When they asked, "Why could not we cast him out?" the Savior said, "Because of your unbelief." Their Faith failed in

the trial; it was a real, moral failure; but from this weakness experience recovered them. Faith is weak, then, in the sense in which Christian character is weak; it is liable to be overcome by temptation.

(4) But there cannot be degrees of Faith in regard to the responsible, moral, element, in the sense that one may partly accept the truth in his soul, and partly refuse or neglect to accept it, at the same time. This is the same as to be partly benevolent and partly not, partly honest and partly not; it would involve a dividing of the will in a dual, self-contradictory, action, which is impossible.

17. A careful consideration of the facts will probably show that that particular form of righteousness which is called Faith figures so largely in the New Testament because a new manifestation of God was made in Jesus Christ; a new revelation was set before men, and they determined their character by the manner in which they treated this new revelation. Those that accepted the Son of God were approved; those that believed not were condemned. The acceptance was Faith, the refusal was unbelief; yet this exercise of Faith was in essence the same as the trust and obedience and fear of God spoken of in the Old Testament. Abraham was the father of all them that believed; and all the old saints and worthies are brought forward in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews as examples of faith.

18. There seems no proper foundation for the idea that there can be no Faith without a knowledge of Christ and the Gospel. The Faith under the Gospel is not morally different from the Faith before the Gospel. When Christ is presented he must be accepted, or there is no Faith; and in a Christian land the failure to receive Christ as the Son of God affords strong presumption of moral unbelief. We cannot always know what darkness and perplexity may gather about an honest soul, one ready to know the truth; and it is not ours to judge.

A prominent religious writer defines Faith to be "An acceptance of the fact that God now pardons my sins for Jesus' sake." This is Faith in one who has the full Gospel light; it is not clear that it was the Faith of Abraham or of David. The mistake in every such definition is that it is an objective instead of subjective definition; that is, a definition from the content of faith in the mind, rather than from the responsible moral attitude, the disposition to accept truth. As a moral disposition, Faith is one and the same thing in all conditions and degrees of knowledge and ignorance.

19. But just here we must put ourselves on guard against the mistake that it is of small account what men believe, so that they have an honest and believing heart; or that error will answer the same purpose as truth, provided one is honest and right at heart. It is true that the right heart persistently maintained, in the greatest possible error of the head, will bring salvation at last. But the Faith once delivered to the saints—the Gospel of Christ, is the power of God unto salvation. The victory which overcometh the world is in a Faith which embraces this truth; and there will be an end of all honesty of belief, of all moral Faith, when the great doctrines and truths which call out Faith and sustain it, have dropped out of the knowledge and thought of men. A sound theology, in its essential features, is necessary to any permanent or established Faith among men. The way to promote Faith, the moral exercise, is to give men an object of Faith: a great truth to believe. "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." Rom. x. 14, "How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" Faith will not spring up or abide in the soul without an object which commands regard or acceptance. Human passion

and selfishness are too strong to be overcome, except by mighty truths.

20. Faith is made a condition of salvation, not arbitrarily, but for the same reason that repentance or conversion is. It is essentially the same thing; or rather, the beginning of Faith in a sinner brings repentance or conversion. Faith may exist in a being who never sinned; the angels have Faith. A sinner cannot have Faith without repentance, nor repentance without Faith. We should remember that it is no arbitrary intellectual belief which is required, but a voluntary acceptance of apprehended truth.

21. The Prayer of Faith is the prayer of a soul confiding in God's wisdom and faithfulness. It is sometimes supposed to involve the assurance that the thing asked will be granted. Such assurance is sometimes experienced, but it is properly no part of Faith, and is not essential to the Prayer of Faith; it is rather God's response to the prayer. The assurance, if genuine, comes from God; it is not a human responsibility. We cannot believe, at will, that our prayer will be granted; we can only believe that God will do what is best in the case. If we have not the assurance, it is not want of Faith, but want of evidence.

There are some strong expressions of the Scriptures in which this limitation is not expressed; but it must be implied. Mark xi. 22–24, "Have faith in God. For verily I say unto you, that whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass; he shall have whatsoever he saith. . . . What things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them and ye shall have them." Such a sweeping promise contemplates the guidance of the Spirit in prayer; it expresses the fullness of power and willingness on God's part, but omits the limitation on the human side. The needed limitation is implied in John xv.

7, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." Also in Rom. viii. 26, "Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities; for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered." 1 John v. 14, "And this is the confidence that we have in him, that, if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us."

The prayer of the Savior himself did not always exhibit this assurance. Matt. xxvi. 39, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." Paul's prayer in reference to the thorn in the flesh is another example. 2 Cor. xii. 7–9, "For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that it might depart from me. And he said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee. . . . Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me." In the Prayer of Faith we ask confidingly for what we think we need, and God gives us what we need. We cannot get anything we please by Faith, but only what is best.

22. Probably the chief value of prayer does not lie so much in special answers or gifts obtained by prayer, as in the general elevation of mind and heart and character which comes from communion with God in prayer. Prayer involves not simply petitions for good things, but confession, thanksgiving, adoration, communion; and thus the spiritual life is sustained.

23. Most writers speaking of Faith intimate that the subject has generally been made unnecessarily perplexing and mysterious. This complaint does not seem to be without foundation. There can be no clear apprehension of Faith, until the nature and limits of responsibility in regard to it are determined. When the duty of Faith is considered as a disposition of the will, a voluntary and responsible attitude, the darkness vanishes.

OBEDIENCE.

1. The subjective condition of salvation is often presented in the Scriptures as obedience. Thus (Matt. xix. 16, 17), to the man who asked, "What good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life?" The Savior replied, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." It is sometimes supposed that this answer of the Savior was not intended to guide the man in the way of life; that it was rather ironical, and intended to reveal to him his own self-righteous spirit. There seems to be no evidence of such a bearing; it is in harmony with the Savior's ordinary teaching. John xiv. 21, "He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him." The teaching of the apostles often took the same form: Acts x. 36, Peter says, "In every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." 1 Pet. iii. 10, 11, 13, "He that would love life and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil, and his lips that they speak no guile; and let him turn away from evil, and do good; let him seek peace and pursue it." "And who is he that will harm you if ye be partakers of that which is good?"

This, too, is the common doctrine of the Old Testament. Isa. lv. 7, "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts: let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon." Ezek. xxxiii. 14, 15, "Again, when I say unto the wicked, Thou shalt surely die; if he turn from his sin, and do that which is lawful and right, . . . he shall surely live." There is no conflict here with the conditions already considered. Obedience implies conversion, repentance, regeneration, faith; it embraces them all. The substance of all these provisions is that there is no salvation for the sinner but in the abandonment of sin. The gospel does

not save men in sin, but in their deliverance from sin; and the salvation of a sinner in his sins is beyond the power of the gospel. Rom. viii. 3, 4, "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." The gospel saves men by bringing them into harmony with the law of God. All the different instructions to the sinner are at one in this respect, and each of them may be presented as is found convenient.

CHAPTER XXII.

HUMAN ABILITY.—JUSTIFICATION.

1. Here we meet the question of the ability of the sinner to fulfill the conditions of salvation. Is the gospel offer made to those who can accept it; or are sinners powerless to meet the invitation? We have already considered the question of the freedom of the will as a fact of human nature; and that fact involves the answer to the question now presented. Can the sinner, in response to the call of the gospel, put away sin and turn to righteousness?

2. It is a self-evident principle that obligation is conditioned on ability. Whatever is, to any person, at any time, under any conditions, obligatory, is possible to that person, at that time, and under those conditions. I do not propose to prove this proposition. It does not admit of proof. It carries with it a rational necessity, like a mathematical axiom. All men assume it in their practical judgments, and God assumes it in his communications with men. Theological systems have often denied the principle; apparently because some element of their system requires the denial, rather than because it is the testimony of the general Christian thought. All the arrangements of society are based upon the principle that ability is the measure of obligation. All judicial proceedings involve it. The Scriptures present God as acting on the principle; he requires of men according to that they have, not according to that they have not. Light on the subject of duty is everywhere represented as a condition of obligation. John ix. 41, "Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth." John xv. 22,

24, "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin." "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father." Self-condemnation in view of failure is impossible to men, except in connection with the ability to have done better. In all our ethical reasonings we must assume the principle, and cannot safely move a step without it; also in all our interpretations of Scripture. The axioms of common sense are principles of interpretation.

3. The ability essential to obligation includes not only the natural faculties of moral agency, which Edwards calls "natural ability," but also the presence of whatever motive may be necessary to make possible the action of the will; that is, there must be a course of action open to the agent which he can freely pursue. The distinction made by Edwards, and by others after him, between natural and moral ability, does not commend itself to the understanding. According to Edwards, motives are just as necessary to moral action as any cause in the natural world to its result. It does not avail to call the absence of the motive, moral inability; the inability is just as natural and absolute as if there were no will or other faculties. Ability, as a condition of obligation, implies the presence of everything necessary to choice, outside of the action of the will itself.

4. The ability necessary to obligation implies power to good as well as to evil; one cannot exist without the other. It is common to represent that since the fall men have power to sin, but no power to obedience. The idea is self-contradictory and impossible,—it is a mechanical conception, involving a misapprehension of the nature of moral action. It is as if one should say water has power to run down hill, but none to run up hill. Water does not run down hill by any power in itself; it has no power of motion. Gravity draws it down, and the heat of the sun draws it up.

The conception of President Edwards is that men have both natural and moral ability to sin, but only natural ability to holiness; the motives are wanting. This is all impossible and self-contradictory. One cannot sin, unless there are present all motives necessary to holiness. Freedom of will is a natural attribute of man, as we have seen; and freedom of will involves power to do right as well as to do wrong.

5. But here the question comes, Can the sinner, fallen man, do right without divine help? This question is variously answered. The theologian of the Old School would say, "No; he has no more ability to do right than a dead man has to arise from his grave. God must perform some work of almighty power upon his heart before he can move in any way in righteousness." Many New School men would say, "No; but every sinner has this help, and therefore practically has the ability to repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance." This answer may not be harmful, but it involves confusion. The true answer is that, whatever is binding upon a man, as obligation, he has power to render. Ability is the condition of the obligation, and obligation pre-supposes the ability. If the sinner has no ability to be holy without God's help, he is under no obligation to be holy without that help; and there is no sin in not being holy. That help is a part of the ability necessary to obligation. If a man can sin without divine help, he can stop sinning without it; the same ability is necessary to the one as to the other. No one questions that the sinner is under obligation to repent and turn to righteousness; therefore he can. The sinner is required to exercise faith, to believe on the Son of God; therefore he can. He can treat the truth as true, which is the moral element of faith, the duty. These exercises are simply acts or attitudes of the will, and the will is free; therefore these attitudes are always possible.

If the sinner were required to have a certain opinion or

judgment, or to exercise a certain kind or degree of emotion, the case would be different. The requirement would transcend his ability. He could put himself right in will; could have a voluntary disposition to meet the requirement, but beyond this he has no direct power. Opinion and feeling are not directly at his control.

6. But here an important fact in human experience meets us. With this full ability to meet obligation, men do not turn from a sinful life without some divine persuasion; they do not, self-moved, set out on a life of obedience. They must be persuaded. But this persuasion pre-supposes ability, not inability. Persuasion is absurd except on this condition. The whole substance and manner of God's address to sinners imply this ability. He commands, admonishes, warns, entreats; if the sinner has no ability, all this is a show, a delusion. Thus there is demonstration of the sinner's ability on every page of the Scriptures. But if one denies the necessity of ability to obligation, if he questions or discards this ethical axiom, he reads the Scriptures altogether differently. Thus the prominent theologian already quoted writes, "It may indeed be said that the very command to repent and believe implies the possession of everything that is requisite to the obedience of the command. It does imply that those to whom it is addressed are rational creatures, capable of moral obligation, and that they are free moral agents. It implies nothing more. The command is nothing more than the authoritative declaration of what is obligatory upon those to whom it is addressed. We are required to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect. The obligation is imperative and constant; yet no sane man can assert his own ability to make himself thus perfect. Notwithstanding therefore the repeated commands given in the Bible to sinners, to love God with all the heart, to repent and believe the gospel, and live without sin, it remains true that the Scriptures nowhere assert or recog-

nize the ability of fallen man to fulfill these requisitions of duty." From such reasoning you will see that there can be no fair interpretation of the Scriptures without the acceptance of the first principles of reason.

7. There are many passages in the Scriptures which recognize the weakness of men in sin, and a certainty of persistence in sin, without divine intervention. The passage (John vi. 44), "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him," we have already considered. It expresses resistance, repugnance; not inability. The Savior still exhorts men to come, and rebukes them because they will not come. The drawing, when it is given, is persuasion, not compulsion. Matt. xi. 28, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." John vii. 37, "If any man thirst let him come unto me and drink." John xii. 32, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." Jer. xiii. 23, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." This is a strong, poetic, figurative expression of the power of sinful habit; and it is grievous misinterpretation to find in it a doctrinal statement of the inability of the sinner to turn away from sin. Josh. xxiv. 19, "Ye cannot serve the Lord, for he is a holy God; he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins." The purpose of Joshua was to impress the people strongly with what the service of God required: fidelity, constancy, consecration; and with their own liability to failure. So the people understood him, and they said, "Nay, but we will serve the Lord." They promised, and Joshua accepted the promise. Eph. ii. 1, "You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins," does not imply inability, but the moral stupidity and immobility of the sinner. It is a figurative expression, and must be reasonably interpreted. Place it by the side of another passage in the same epistle, Eph. v. 14, "Awake thou

that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light;" and with a little common sense the interpretation becomes easy.

8. What we call the weakness of human nature consists in the propenseness to self-indulgence, and the strong appeal of temptation to these propensities. This original inherent weakness is aggravated by the power of sinful habit contracted in a life of sin; and it is not unnatural to speak of this weakness in strong terms, as if it were absolute impotence. The drunkard feels the weakness, and speaks of it as inability, and as involving certainty of failure in the effort to reform. Every sinner has a similar consciousness, and speaks in the same way. We need support and help from above in our weakness, as a child needs parental guidance and aid. God comes to men with the Spirit to provide for this weakness, as a human friend helps one who is weak and temptable. It is a moral work, this succoring of human weakness; not a work of physical power. This fact of human weakness and dependence for spiritual life is quite as important as the fact of human ability. The true course of the sinner is to call upon God at once, and continually, for the Holy Spirit which he has promised to those who seek; to attach himself to Christ and abide in him as the branch abideth in the vine. Without this spirit of dependence there will be ignominious failure.

9. Another source of the feeling of inability lies in misapprehending the exact limits of obligation. We contemplate the glowing emotions of an advanced Christian experience; love, joy, peace, gratitude, devotion; and see that they are utterly beyond the reach of the human will. No man can produce these in himself, and the mistake is to assume that they are obligatory at once and directly, or that there is no satisfactory obedience until these experiences appear. Such emotions are desirable and appropriate; they belong to the Christian life, and sooner or later, in

this world or in another, they will be attained; but they are the gifts of the Spirit in response to the opening of the heart, or they are the natural fruits of a life of obedience. We have no power to produce them by any direct effort. The sinner, unregenerate, feels utterly incapable of producing them; he is incapable, and so is the Christian; he accepts them as they are given, and has no responsibility in regard to them except to live in obedience to the will of God. The mistake is to regard them as immediately obligatory, and required of God. The distinguished theologian already quoted has fallen into this mistake. He says, "The thing to be done is to turn from sin to holiness; to love God perfectly and our neighbor as ourselves; to perform every duty without defect or omission; to keep ourselves from all sin of thought, word or deed, of heart or life. Can any man do this? Does any man need an argument to convince him that he cannot do this? He knows two things as clearly and as surely as he knows his own existence: first, that he is bound to be morally perfect; to keep all God's commands; to have all right feelings in constant exercise as the occasion calls for them; and to avoid all sin in feeling as well as in act; and secondly, that he can no more do this than he can raise the dead."

In support of the idea that we are under obligation to have these experiences he reasons as follows: "We are responsible for external acts because they depend on our volitions. We are responsible for our volitions because they depend upon our principles and feelings. And we are responsible for our feelings and for those states of mind which constitute character because (within the sphere of morals and religion) they are right or wrong in their own nature. The fact that the affections and permanent and even immanent states of the mind are beyond the power of the will does not remove them out of the sphere of moral obligation. As this is attested by Scripture, and by the general judgment of

men, the assumed axiom that ability limits obligation in the sphere of morals cannot be admitted." With such an indiscriminate extension of obligation to all the movements and exercises of soul and body, it is of no use to reason upon the question of ability to meet the conditions of salvation. Yet with this view of his absolute impotence, the same author still maintains that the sinner can seek God. He speaks of "the express promise of God that those who seek shall find; that those who ask shall receive, and that to those who knock, it shall be opened." "Therefore," he says, "the doctrine of inability does not impair the force of any of the motives which should determine sinners to use all dilligence in seeking their own salvation in the way which God has appointed. When a man is convinced that the attainment of a desirable end is beyond the compass of his own powers, he instinctively seeks help out of himself. As it is a truth both of Scriptures and experience that the unrenewed sinner can do nothing of himself to secure his salvation, it is essential that he should be brought to a practical conviction of that truth. When thus convinced, and not before, he seeks help from the only source whence it can be obtained." There is sound doctrine here, although the statement as a whole is self-contradictory. The man has power to seek God. In thus seeking, is he doing nothing for himself? Is that seeking pleasing to God, or is it not? We will pass over the inconsistency and accept the truth it contains. If all that the man can do is to seek God, then this is all the obligation in the case. The man who calls on God, in the true spirit of obtaining help from him in order to obedience and righteousness, is already in a believing and obedient state. The mistake lies in considering the sphere of direct obligation as embracing something beyond these voluntary exercises, and extending immediately to the thoughts and feelings.

10. A doctrine of gracious ability, as distinct from

natural ability, has been generally held by Wesleyan theologians, and perhaps by others. Of this doctrine there are different forms or statements:

(1) The more common form, as held by Methodist writers, is that men lost in the fall the ability to righteousness; but, by the grace of God under the atonement, this ability is restored by bestowment of the Holy Spirit, and thus all become capable of obedience. To quote from a generally accepted authority of this school: "It is allowed, and all Scriptural advocates of the universal redemption of mankind will join with the Calvinists in maintaining the doctrine, that every disposition and inclination to good, which originally existed in the nature of man, is lost by the fall; that all men in their simply natural state are dead in trespasses and sins, and have neither the will nor the power to turn to God; and that no one is sufficient of himself to think or do anything of a saving tendency. But as all men are required to do those things which have a saving tendency, we contend that the grace to do them has been bestowed upon all." There seems to be here a recognition of the fact that men could not be required to turn to God without the ability to do it; but if this be so, how can the ability be called a gracious ability? It is merely the necessary condition of the obligation; and without it the requirement would be unreasonable and unjust; and there could be no sin under such conditions. If men had sinned in their own persons, and destroyed their own ability, or their own moral agency, which is the same thing, it would be grace, that is unmerited favor on God's part, to restore their moral agency, and give them another opportunity; but if they are to be held to the obligation of righteousness, the ability must be restored as a matter of justice and necessity. In this view it would not be grace.

But again, the whole conception is an impossibility. The ability to do wrong cannot remain from the fall, without the

ability to do right. The two are inseparable, and the proposed condition is inconceivable.

(2) Another view of the doctrine of gracious ability is presented by a later distinguished writer of the same connection. A condensed statement of his view is as follows: The law as revealed to men is the same as if Adam had not fallen, but the powers of men are depressed by the fall. Men cannot fulfill this perfect law. There is a coming short, a failure to fulfill the law, which is sin in a technical sense—not in the sense of blameworthiness. It would be monstrous to punish for such failure—but it must be provided for; and the righteousness of Christ is imputed to men to balance this deficiency. Thus the sinner is enabled to fulfill the perfect law; and this ability is a gracious ability. The writer says, "It may at first sight seem strange that the divine, like the human, law should deal in legal fiction; but it is no more strange than true. Pardon itself involves a legal fiction. Justification supposes its subject to be innocent, and free from the penalty, and treats him as such who is guilty, and justly liable to the penalty. Justification and imputation are antithetic fictions."

Is it not clear that all this mechanical view of a perfect law which is not a law of obligation, of sin which is not sin, and of righteousness imputed to balance this sin,—that all this is a fiction, utterly unsustained by Scripture or reason?

11. The true doctrine of grace in connection with human ability is this: that men are able to obey and will not. God comes with the Spirit, and the motives of the gospel, and persuades and induces repentance and obedience. Here is real grace, the only gracious ability that is possible.

12. It is possible to present the doctrine of human ability in such a way as to beget self-confidence, and turn the sinner away from the true source of help and strength. To

call upon the sinner to show his manliness, to become master of himself, is to delude him. He is to be taught that he has ability to come to Christ for help; and this is his only wisdom, and only hope. Any self-dependence, which diverts him from this dependence upon Christ, is a disappointment and a snare.

JUSTIFICATION.

1. The sinner having turned from sin becomes the recipient of God's favor: God accepts and forgives him. This act of God in relieving the sinner from the consequences of his sin, and from the penalty of the law, is called Justification. This is the theological term used to express the divine act. It is used also in the Scriptures, in both the Old Testament and the New. Isa. liii. 11, "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities." Acts xiii. 38, 39, "Through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins; and by him all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses."

2. It is clear from the Scripture presentation and from the nature of the case that this Justification, or pronouncing just, is simply an act of pardon, a remittance of the penalty of the law. The usual expression in the Old Testament is pardon, forgiveness. The same terms are used abundantly in the New Testament; but the term Justification is also used, especially by Paul. Indeed the term is almost confined to him, especially as referring to the forgiveness of sin.

There is a general sense of the word in which, not forgiveness, but present approval, is implied. Thus in Matt. xii. 37, "For by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." Luke xviii. 14, "This man went down to his house justified rather than the other." Matt. xi. 19, "Wisdom is justified of her children." Luke vii. 29, "All the people that heard him, and the publicans, justified God, being baptized with the baptism of John." Luke x. 29,

"But he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbor?" In these examples the word seems to have no reference to past sin, or to pardon.

3. Justification, then, as a fact under the gospel, is the pardon of sin that is past; and the doctrine of Justification is simply the doctrine of the pardon of sin.

Theologians who hold to the imputation of our sin to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, treat Justification as a judicial act, a pronouncing of the sinner just before the law. Christ has taken his law place, has borne his sins, and wrought out for him a righteousness. The law is satisfied; it has no further claim upon him. He is now legally acquitted. The simpler and more reasonable view is, that there can be no transfer, or imputation, either of guilt or of righteousness. The sinner must be forever guilty before the law; and Justification is an act of God's sovereign grace, setting aside the penalty on the conditions of the atonement and repentance, which make it safe and right. We sometimes loosely say that Justification is treating the sinner as if he had not sinned. No; there are two ways of treating a sinner as a sinner; one is to punish him, the other to pardon. An innocent man—one just before the law, can neither be punished nor pardoned.

4. The conditions of Justification are of two kinds: governmental on the part of God, and personal on the sinner's part. The governmental conditions are met in the atonement, which provides such moral forces in the government of God that it is safe to offer pardon to the penitent. The personal condition is repentance, a turning from sin to righteousness. This is a necessary condition, because salvation is impossible without it, and unsafe if it were possible.

The doctrine of Justification by faith is simply the doctrine of forgiveness under the atonement, on condition of repentance or turning from sin. Faith is often presented as the condition; it is but another form of expressing the sin-

ner's part in the work of salvation. Faith is another word for the righteousness which the law requires.

5. As repentance is the condition of Justification, so a continued repentance, or penitence, or continued obedience, is a condition of continued Justification. A lapse into sin must bring condemnation, and repentance of the sin alone can restore the pardon.

A different view is held by those who regard Justification as a judicial act, an acquittal of the sinner before the law. Such an acquittal, it is said, can never be revoked; the sinner can never come again under condemnation. He may fall into sin; indeed he is supposed to be continually in sin, to a greater or less extent; but the condemnation of the law cannot rest upon him. "Once in grace always in grace," is a maxim which grows out of this view. The regenerate sinner in sin is only a sinning child.

We may accept the fact that a sinning Christian is in a different condition subjectively, and in different relations to God's promises from one who has never believed. But he is a sinner, and it is just as necessary that he should repent and turn from sin as that any sinner should. This is the doctrine of the Scriptures. Ezek. xviii. 24, "When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned: in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." 1 Cor. xi. 30–32, "For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep. For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But when we are judged we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world." Justification is an essential fact, and not merely a technical or formal one. It depends upon the moral attitude of the sinner himself, and cannot exist while he is in a state of sin. The doctrine

that Justification is not invalidated by a lapse into sin is naturally connected with the idea of mixed action and mixed character—that there can be genuine righteousness in a Christian even in sin; that the sinner is justified without being free from sin; and a little more or less of sin can make no difference in the result. One who holds this view of character does not regard a full turning from sin as a condition of Justification.

6. The results of Justification are a remission of penalty, and a restoration to God's favor; not a remission of guilt, except in the low sense of the word guilt, as liability to punishment. A distinction has sometimes been made between Justification and redemption: the first involving the remission of the penalty, and the second the restoration to God's favor and the blessedness of heaven. The distinction is not necessary; pardon covers the ground.

7. We sometimes hear of the experience of Justification; implying a consciousness of pardon, and the consequent joy. Such experience is not necessarily an immediate attendant upon the fact. Justification is an objective fact depending upon subjective conditions. We are conscious of repentance and faith, the required subjective conditions. We have the promise that whoso confesseth and forsaketh his sins shall find mercy. We have a right to assume our Justification whenever we turn from sin; sooner or later the joy and the experience will come.

CHAPTER XXIII.

SANCTIFICATION.

1. The growth and establishment of the believer—the development in him of the graces of the gospel, is called Sanctification: a work beginning with, and following regeneration. In theological use the term does not, in general, include regeneration, covering rather the growth and establishment which follow it. In the Scriptures the term seems to embrace the whole work of saving the sinner, and especially includes regeneration. True believers are called saints, or sanctified ones, in the Scriptures, both in the Old Testament and in the New. But we may use the word in the theological sense, as a convenient term to designate Christian growth and progress and establishment. Our inquiry then is as to the nature and conditions of such growth and edification.

2. At the outset we need to inquire, What is the state or condition of the recently regenerated man? What has he attained, and what does he lack? What further needs to be done for him?

(1) He has consecrated himself to God without reserve, and is accepted. There is no partial consecration. His moral state, the attitude of his will, God entirely approves, except as from time to time he may lapse into sin under temptation.

(2) He is forgiven or justified, according to God's promise. The condemnation of the law is removed from him, while he continues in obedience.

(3) God has given to him his Holy Spirit; he dwells in him, and manifests himself to him. Of this divine manifestation there are various forms and degrees, adapted to his varying needs. He has opened his heart, and God has fulfilled his promise to come in and abide with him.

(4) The regenerate man is in the exercise of faith. Faith was the condition of his acceptance and regeneration; and continued faith is the condition of continued acceptance. Let us understand that it is moral faith which is implied, faith as a duty. He accounts and treats as true the truth which he apprehends. The actual truth embraced may be very limited; and thus he may be weak in the faith, in the objective sense; that is, in the apprehension of the truth.

3. But again, what are the deficiences of this regenerate man? What is there lacking by reason of his inexperience?

(1) There is a low degree of religious and spiritual knowledge, resulting from an imperfect apprehension of the gospel and its provisions. He has not comprehended its height and depth; he has only begun to appreciate its treasures. The knowledge that he lacks is not so much theoretical or scientific knowledge, as that which comes from a larger experience of the power of the gospel.

(2) He has, in other respects, a limited Christian experience. He is ignorant of his own weakness, of the snares of the devil, of the power of the world, and of the readiness and power of Christ to deliver and save.

(3) He possesses, to a greater or less extent, a depraved or perverted sensibility, resulting from a life of worldliness and sin; not yet wholly chastened and reduced to the standard of an obedient life. This uncorrected sensibility is, in itself, temptation, not sin.

(4) Ordinarily there are undesirable habits of thought and feeling and action—relics of a worldly life, a life of sin. They lie in the associations and connections of thought and

feeling in the mind. These are not sin, but tendencies and temptations.

(5) He has a limited and imperfect view of the applications of the law of love to his outward life; hence there is a want of symmetry, or fullness and completeness, of the Christian character. Every Christian is learning, more and more, how to adjust himself to the duties and relations of the Christian life.

(6) There is, again, a low state of spiritual power and efficiency—the difference between a child and a man. There is no strong grasp of the truth and promises of God, and of the work of the Christian life.

(7) From all these deficiencies combined, there comes a general spiritual weakness, a proneness to fall under temptation, to lapse into sin. There is a want of stability, of confirmed Christian character. His obedience suffers interruptions more or less frequent.

4. It is clearly desirable and important to have all these defects removed, these wants supplied. This work of renovation, of edification and establishment and enlargement, is comprehended in the work of Sanctification. It is essentially Christian growth and progress, as expressed in Eph. iv. 14–16, "That we may be no longer children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, in craftiness, after the wiles of error; but speaking truth in love, may grow up in all things into him, which is the head, even Christ; from whom all the body fitly framed and knit together through that which every joint supplieth, according to the working in due measure of each several part, maketh the increase of the body unto the building up of itself in love." This is the work, subjectively considered, of the Christian life; it begins with the beginning of the spiritual life, and ends, if it ever ends, in heaven. There is certainly no point this side of heaven where we can say, it is done.

5. Our responsibility in the work is met by "patient continuance in well doing;" in the exercise of faith and obedience. "To him that hath shall be given." The work involves the use of all available means of help; the gathering of light from every source; correcting every evil habit; giving to the outward life such form and direction as shall best honor God and bless men. Especially it involves a cultivation of personal acquaintance with God; walking with him in faith and prayer. Jude 20, 21, "But ye, beloved, building up yourselves on your most holy faith, praying in the Holy Ghost, keep yourselves in the love of God."

6. One who thus holds on his way shall grow stronger and stronger. The growth and advancement may appear to be constant and uniform; or in special cases there may be sudden and rapid enlargements,—baptisms of God's Spirit for a particular emergency, or for a special work, or a victory over some particular besetting sin,—not merely a single baptism, but often repeated. These enlargements seem to be sudden; but they are often the result of long-continued discipline and patience and prayer. It is a common mistake to suppose, in such cases, that the last step was the only important one; and those who have attained a sudden enlargement or elevation of soul often undertake to give instruction by which others may be saved the long conflicts which they endured, and be enabled to enter at once upon the blessedness of victory; as if there were some short cut for Pilgrim to the Delectable Mountains, without his passing through the Slough of Despond and the Valley of Humiliation. The Gospel opens the only royal road to such attainments, and it leads along the beaten path of faith and patience. It does not provide a spiritual elevator which one may enter, and be lifted at once to the heights of spiritual vision. "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled." But the hungering and thirsting must come before the filling.

7. Another frequent mistake is to call such a special experience Sanctification, as distinguished from ordinary and normal experiences; and to suppose the experience places one upon a rock from which his feet shall never slide. Persons thus blest are wont to express the conviction that their feet are established; that the struggle is over, and the work essentially complete; that all that remains of the Christian life is to walk on this highway of holiness, with the Celestial City always in view. Such persons are liable to be disappointed. There are new victories to be won. Paul was once caught up to the third heaven, where he heard unutterable words; but this was not the end of his conflicts. He described his own condition in later times as that of "fightings without and fears within." 1 Cor. ix. 27, "I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway." He was generally victorious, perhaps not always at the moment; but in the end he always triumphed in Christ.

8. There seems to be nothing in the Scriptures or in the nature of the case to support the idea which has to some extent prevailed, that by a present act of faith all necessary future faith, or future obedience, may be secured, so that we shall never fall or falter again. There is no promise in God's word which one can embrace, and have the assurance that he will never sin again. There is no faith that could secure such assurance, without a positive revelation from God, or without a conviction which is the result of special experiences and providential manifestations equivalent to a revelation. We have no indication that the apostles ever had such assurance in reference to themselves; or that any such assurance is necessary or helpful to wholesome Christian growth.

9. The idea that Sanctification is by faith in the same sense that regeneration is, and in the same way, involves

misapprehension and confusion. Sanctification includes, not simply change of moral character, as regeneration does; it is growth, experience, enlightenment, establishment. Faith does not confer these. It is one of the conditions of their attainment, but time and discipline must come in as factors. Every regenerate man already has faith. Why is he not permanently Sanctified? Because faith alone is not sufficient; and permanent Sanctification, as distinct from present faith and obedience, is not his immediate duty, or responsibility, or even privilege. Present consecration is the immediate duty.

10. There is no Scripture authority for dividing Christians into two classes, sanctified and unsanctified. All Christians are reckoned as sanctified, but there is no evidence that the work is complete in any. There is every degree of growth, development, establishment. Probably no two Christians are in exactly the same state of advancement.

11. There seems to be no ground in the Scriptures for the idea of a definite experience, like a second new birth, which marks the line between a sanctified and an unsanctified state. There are successive experiences marking various steps of progress in the Christian life; but there is no propriety in calling a particular experience Sanctification. It is only a step in the progress.

The idea of a definite experience as marking the instant of Sanctification, as in conversion, belongs to the doctrine of mixed moral action, and of partial obedience as characteristic of the early condition of the believer. To one in a state of partial obedience such a change would be possible. Coming into a state of entire obedience would be a second conversion, attained by repentance and faith; it would be a putting away of sin. This is the early Wesleyan doctrine of perfect love. It was essentially the earliest Oberlin doctrine of Sanctification; but with the doctrine of simplicity of action, no partial obedience is conceivable, and no such

second conversion is possible. The experience of perfect love, set forth in the biographies of early Methodists and others, is unquestionably a genuine experience. The philosophy or theory of the experience was at fault.

12. The idea has been set forth of receiving Christ as our Sanctification in a second experience, as we receive him as our justification in the experience of conversion. There is no proper basis for the idea. To receive Christ is to receive him for all that we apprehend him to be. The view of what he is to us will enlarge, but the moral attitude, the faith with which we receive him, is the same in the beginning as at the end. The theory rests upon the idea of a partial faith: that we can receive Christ in part, and in part not receive him; and thus have unbelief mingled with our faith. It is even maintained that we may have faith for the healing of the body without a faith for the healing of the soul. President Finney, although maintaining the doctrine of simplicity of action, has not kept perfectly clear of this error of a partial faith, although it was inconsistent with his general philosophy. He says, "This state" (entire Sanctification) "is to be attained by faith alone. Let it be forever remembered that without faith it is impossible to please God; and whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Both justification and Sanctification are by faith alone." If so, then the justified man must also be the permanently sanctified man, because he has the faith that is required of him, a faith that is pleasing to God. No one under gospel light ever obeys at all who does not receive Christ as his Sanctification; but his view of the power and grace of Christ will continually enlarge, and his character will thus become more established and confirmed. Hence knowledge, as well as faith, is the condition of establishment.

13. The duty of every man is to plan and purpose a life of perfect and constant obedience, and hold himself inexcusable for any interruption or failure. All needed help is

promised, and the result depends upon his fidelity. We may reasonably hope to become so established as not to slip; that is, so as to go on in continual obedience. This is a most desirable achievement, an object which we may pursue with all earnestness and hopefulness, and which every true Christian is pursuing with more or less success.

14. But this establishment or permanency, when attained, cannot reveal itself in consciousness. We cannot know it. It involves facts outside of consciousness; its existence is proved by the result, not by any present assurance or feeling. A feeling of strength or stability is no sufficient evidence of its existence. Peter felt strong when he said to the Master, "Though all men shall be offended because of thee, yet will I never be offended;" but he was very weak. We find in consciousness present obedience and consecration; not continued or future obedience. Some personal revelation might make the fact known, if it were necessary; it cannot be known in any other way. We seem to have no examples in the Scriptures of such assurance.

15. Nor can memory be relied upon as a ground of affirmation of past sinlessness. It is preposterous for one to rise and say that he has not sinned for so many past days, or weeks, or years. This is a question of observation, of judgment, and of memory, neither of which is infallible. There are doubtless sins which do not make a sufficient impression to be remembered, and the memory is fallible in other ways. One might properly say that, so far as he recollects, he has had peace with God, without interruption.

16. To seek for Sanctification as a special experience, is not likely to be profitable; it involves a wrong idea. The thing sought, in this view, is some particular mental or emotional experience, some phase or frame of the inner life which is supposed to characterize the experience of Sanctification. It is quite possible to cultivate such experiences; and where the current of religious sentiment requires them

they will be found; some of them genuine, others mere imitations, conscious or unconscious; none of them, perhaps, exactly what they are supposed to be. In general such experiences are estimated too highly both by those who receive them, and by those who seek for them. The Christian life, developed in connection with such experiences, is not likely to be any more symmetrical and reliable than that which comes with "patient continuance in well doing." It is our duty and privilege to accept such experiences as the Lord may lead us to; but, in general, seeking for special forms of feeling produces a life too self-conscious, introspective, and unwholesome. The constant inlooking upon our states and frames is anything but profitable. The wiser thought, and the natural method, is to seek Sanctification in a life of duty and consecration.

17. The way to preach Sanctification is to make no provision for sin as an essential part of the Christian life; to represent it as always unnecessary and inexcusable, to be at once repented of and renounced. Especially is it important to present Christ as able to save from temptation and sin, a personal present Savior, ready to help in every time of need.

The best safeguard against false and fanatical views in this direction is to present Christ as a sufficient Savior, and the gospel as the power of God unto salvation.

The church has suffered under the misapprehension that sin attaches necessarily to every thought and word and deed of the Christian; that this is to be assumed and expected of every Christian, and must be, throughout his life. Hence many have lived quietly in sin, under the delusion that a consciousness of sin, and unworthiness, is rather evidence of Christian character than otherwise. Many Christians have been discouraged in their efforts to live a holy life, because they have been taught that it is not God's plan to give us, in this life, complete deliverance from sin.

18. One of the mischievous implications and inferences

of the doctrine of instantaneous Sanctification, by a special experience, is that there is a form of religious life which is much below holiness, a justified, not a sanctified state; a very unsatisfactory life indeed, far below entire consecration, but still really a Christian life; and that the great mass of Christians are in this condition. Although indulging more or less in sin, still they are in the way to heaven, and will be saved at last "yet so as by fire." Such a representation is far removed from the gospel view of the holiness which is acceptable to God, and tends to give comfort to worldly people who are not ready to forsake all that they have, who ask indulgence to serve God and mammon. It does not seem possible to guard the doctrine of special Sanctification, whatever its form, from this false impression.

CHAPTER XXIV.

ELECTION.

The doctrine of Election presents the relations of the plan and purpose of God to man's salvation, and is a particular application of the doctrine of divine Sovereignty. There are certain obvious facts and principles gathering about the question to which we will first give attention.

1. The universe is God's work, the result of his wisdom and power and goodness. The natural and moral worlds are alike his work. He is responsible for their existence with all their results, in the sense that, in his wisdom and goodness, with all the liabilities in view, and all the actual results, he decided to bring into being the forces of nature and moral beings, and to establish the relations which we find existing.

2. As infinitely wise and good, God must have had a perfectly wise and benevolent design in this creation, and must have faithfully ordered all forces and movements for the accomplishment of his end. Every event in the universe must, in some form, enter into God's plan. Natural events, or those embraced in the system of cause and effect, the natural world, he must have purposed unconditionally, because the forces which produce them lie wholly within himself, and depend absolutely upon his own will. Moral action and character, as we have seen, sustain a peculiar relation to the divine purpose. God's plans contemplate these actions, and embrace them; he purposes all the conditions upon which they depend, outside of the voluntary moral action of the creature himself. The agent is directly responsible for

the existence and character of his own moral action. God must be responsible to the extent of providing all outside conditions, the existence and powers and circumstances of the agent. The act, as we have seen, is separated from God's immediate and effective purpose by the causative forces of the agent himself. Every moral agent takes his own moral attitude, and forms his own character.

3. The moral attitude and character of every one are foreknown to God, and his treatment of men is predetermined in view of that character. He will at the last save some and reject others, and what he will do at the last, already lies in his purpose, foreseen and pre-determined. Hence, from the necessity of God's infinite nature, the salvation of some and the reprobation of others are already settled in God's eternal purpose.

4. But again, these events are purposed, or pre-determined, as they will actually occur, with all their conditions and contingencies as dependent upon the free action of men. Men are not saved or lost independently of their own action. If they are saved, it is because they accept salvation; if lost, it is because they reject it. One factor in the result is, and always must be, their own free action. It is in the power of every man to make the result, in reference to his own salvation, different from what it will be; hence it is strictly true that each one determines his own election or reprobation, under the conditions in which he is placed. Since the voluntary acceptance of the gospel is a condition of his salvation, it is also a condition of his election to salvation. Each believer supplies for himself this condition, and so far secures his own election. 2 Pet. i. 10, "Wherefore the rather brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure." He who rejects salvation brings upon himself reprobation and destruction. Every human soul has it in his power to change the result, and, so far, to make the purpose of God, in reference to himself, different from what it is.

5. It is equally true that different moral arrangements on God's part would have led to different actual results; but not by necessity. With a different distribution of his saving forces, some now saved would have been lost, and some now lost would have been saved; and the determining of this distribution, the time and place and degree of the bestowment of his saving grace, belongs to God's sovereign wisdom. These things lie wholly in his hands. This distribution pertains not merely to nations and races, but to individuals. God's plans and purposes are as minute as human interests. "The very hairs of your head are all numbered."

6. The reasons in view of which God determines the distribution of his saving grace are wise and good. These reasons we can know only in general, as we know the great end of all his plans and purposes. Comprehensively they must be the highest good of the universe, probably involving the salvation of the greatest possible number. We have reason to believe that the foreknown action of his creatures, under the manifestation of his grace to them, their receptivity, is among the reasons in view of which his plan is determined. In the nature of the case this is reasonable, and it seems to be in harmony with the Scriptures. Gen. xviii. 18, 19, "Shall I hide from Abraham that which I do; seeing that Abraham shall surely become a great and mighty nation, and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him? For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment; to the end that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him." Here Abraham's foreseen fidelity seems to have determined the divine action; and this is the common representation of the Scriptures. In regard to the purpose of God as to final salvation, the foreseen action of the man must always enter in as a condi-

tion or factor. But this is by no means the only condition; the relations of the person, of the people, to the progress of God's kingdom in the world must come into account. Matt. xi. 21, "If the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sack-cloth and ashes." Capernaum and Bethsaida, favored with these mighty works, did not repent. Tyre and Sidon would have repented with the same exhibition of God's grace; but there were other reasons for the divine plan and purpose. In the days of Tyre and Sidon the fullness of time had not yet come for the manifestation of God in Christ. Even if the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon had been saved, it would not have been profitable to the progress of the kingdom of God, to anticipate the proper time of the Messiah's appearance. Such an exhibition could not have been made to them without subverting the whole course of God's providence.

7. The idea, sometimes supposed to be involved in the doctrine of Election, that God bestows special or greater grace, in all cases, upon the saved, than upon the lost, to induce repentance, seems to be set aside by this example presented by the Savior; and we find no statement in the Scriptures which proves the idea. It is true that no sinner is saved without God's foregoing grace; and no one self-moved attains to salvation. But the grace bestowed is not always effectual; it becomes effectual not simply by its inherent power, but by the acceptance and co-operation of the sinner himself; and if it fails it becomes inoperative by want of that co-operation.

8. As thus the recipient of God's saving grace, every converted sinner must recognize himself as sought out and brought to repentance and salvation by the sovereign grace of God; without this grace he would have been lost.

9. A practical view of the plan and purpose of God

in reference to our salvation may be gathered from what he actually does. He treats us as free and responsible beings; and by motives and persuasions secures our salvation. His Election and purpose must be in harmony with this action.

10. The divine plan and purpose must embrace all human action, and extend to all our activity, to all the results of our life, as well as to our salvation. The crop which the farmer is to harvest next year, is as really determined by the purpose and election of God as the fact of his final salvation. Both are conditioned upon his own responsible action; and no one dreams of any difficulty in the case, or perplexity, except as to the purpose of final salvation. Yet the relations of the two facts to the purpose of God are essentially the same. There is however this difference, that faithful effort will always secure salvation, but will not always secure the crop.

11. The doctrine of Election, as thus defined and limited, is a necessary inference from the nature and attributes of God, and from man's nature as a moral being. It is a rational truth, inseparable from the idea of God as a personal being, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, and of man as a free responsible agent.

12. It remains to inquire in what manner the doctrine is brought out in the Scriptures.

(1) We find it implied in the Savior's teaching: Matt. xxiv. 22, "Except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved: but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened." John xiii. 18, "I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen." John xv. 16, 19, "Ye did not choose me, but I chose you, and appointed you, that ye should go and bear fruit. . . . If ye were of the world, the world would love its own; but because ye are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you."

(2) Paul teaches the doctrine: "Rom. viii. 28, 29,

"And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God; to them who are called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." To foreknow is to look upon as proper subjects of salvation; it implies some reasons in the creature in view of which the election is made. Rom. ix. 11, 12, 15, 18, "For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger." "For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." Eph. i. 4, 5, "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will." 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14, "But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved in the Lord; because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth: whereunto he called you by our gospel, to the obtaining of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ." 2 Tim. i. 9, "Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."

(3) Peter presents similar views of the Election: 1 Pet. i. 1, 2, "Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the strangers . . . elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ."

(4) These and similar passages exhibit the divine sovereignty and purpose as involved in the salvation of men.

In some of these passages there is no allusion to human responsibility in the case; but that responsibility and co-operation are not excluded, and such co-operation is not denied. It is rather implied in the manner in which foreknowledge is made a condition of the Election.

(5) Other passages show more clearly that God's sovereign purpose in Election does not work by any necessity, nor take effect irrespective of the character and action of the creature. For example, in Matt. xxii. 2-14, the gospel is compared to a feast, and invitations are freely given. Those first invited excuse themselves, and others are called in, and come and are elected. "Many are called but few are chosen," because only these accepted the call. The eleventh of Romans teaches that the people of Israel had the birthright and the promises; that they, the natural branches, were broken off because of unbelief; that the Gentiles were grafted in, but were standing by faith. The plan of God was determined by the action of men. Phil. ii. 12, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." 2 Pet. i. 10, "Wherefore, the rather brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things ye shall never fall." Rev. xxii. 17, "The Spirit and the bride say, Come; and let him that heareth say, Come; and let him that is athirst come; and whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."

(6) The gospel invitations are such that we feel warranted in offering salvation to every man; nor is there any suggestion of any obstacle in the decree and purpose of God, or in his Election. We know, from the terms of the gospel, that every sinner determines for himself whether or not he will be saved, and thus determines his own Election.

The doctrine of sovereign, absolute, unconditional Election has grown out of a false application of passages which set forth the salvation of the sinner as springing from the

divine purpose. Passages which represent that salvation as turning upon his own acceptance or non-acceptance of the gospel are equally explicit and authoritative; and the two classes of passages must be combined to give us a symmetrical and truthful doctrine of Election.

(7) Besides these two classes of passages there is another class which disclose the fact that it is not from any indisposition on God's part that any are left unsaved. 1 Tim. ii. 3, 4, "For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior; who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth." John iii. 16, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." 2 Pet. iii. 9, "The Lord is not slack concerning his promises as some men count slackness; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." The Scriptures abound in such passages.

13. It is an interesting question, how or why this thought of God's sovereign Election became so prominent in the experiences and writings of the apostles, while it is so seldom brought out distinctly in modern Christian experience and instruction; and when it is presented it comes rather as a theoretical doctrine than a practical truth. Perhaps this is the explanation: The apostles and early Christians found themselves taken out from an apostate people, and from the midst of heathenism, by the grace of God, as the people of Israel had been chosen of old. This was a conspicuous fact, and greatly impressed them; they dwelt upon it, and magnified the sovereign grace which had called them and made them to differ. They used strong language to express their sense of God's sovereign intervention in their behalf, language that was natural, but liable to misinterpretation. Perhaps these are among the utterances in the epistles of Paul of which Peter speaks: 2 Pet. iii. 16, "In

which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction." These utterances have been perverted in the church, in connection with a false philosophy of human nature and human action; and a doctrine of arbitrary election has been built up, which attributes man's salvation, or his failure to be saved, to the arbitrary sovereignty of God, who saves some because he pleases to do so, and passes over others because he pleases, while there was no obligation upon him to save any. By such representations the very word *election* has been made repulsive to the common Christian thought,—suggestive of hard and arbitrary features in the divine character. The only relief which has been offered in explanation is that God has a right to do what he will with his own.

The essence of the doctrine of Election is still preserved in all Christian teaching which inculcates the fact of a divine providence, directed and controlled by infinite love, which pursues men and brings them to a knowledge of the truth. This is the essential element of the doctrine, and all Christian people agree in this view of God's sovereign love, and base all their hope of salvation upon it.

CHAPTER XXV.

PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS.

1. The Perseverance of the Saints is a phrase employed to express the doctrine of the final salvation of all believers. The essence of the doctrine is that all the regenerate are to be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation; not kept sinless, but preserved from utter apostasy and final ruin. The term *Perseverance*, seems scarcely a happy one, if respect be had to the natural meaning of the word. It seems to suggest that the primary ground of hope is in the believer himself; in the hope or assurance that he will hold on his way. The term *preservation* of the saints would be more fortunate, and more suggestive of the essential truth.

2. For the proof of the doctrine, if it be a true doctrine, we must depend wholly upon the Scriptures. No rational, or *a priori*, principle can be brought to bear upon the subject. It is essentially and necessarily a question of revelation.

(1) The doctrine cannot be inferred from the goodness of God; or from his willingness or power to save. Such an argument would apply to the salvation of all men, as well as to that of believers. He is good enough to save all, and has all power, therefore all will be saved.

(2) Nor can the doctrine be inferred from the nature of regeneration. If regeneration were a change of nature, instead of a change of character; if it were the introduction of a new faculty or taste or principle in the soul, instead of a new choice or attitude of the will, we might infer from its nature that it was abiding. Those who hold to such physical change infer its permanency from its nature.

(3) Nor can we infer the doctrine from the fact or nature of justification. The true conception of justification is, pardon on the condition of repentance, and continued pardon with continued penitence. Justification does not hold for those who lapse, and take up their sins anew. They fall again under condemnation. There can be no absolute *a priori* proof of the doctrine.

3. Still there may be a natural presumption in its favor:

(1) First as viewed from the human side. The soul that has been wrought upon by the motives to obedience, to the extent of renouncing sin and the worldly life, will probably hold on its way. The views and motives which were effective at the first, when the man was dead in trespasses and sins, can scarcely lose their power upon the regenerate soul, with some experience of salvation, and more susceptibility to spiritual considerations. It might be objected that such an argument would prove that the regenerate man would never fall into sin at all; the motives do actually fail when the man sins. It may be answered that permanent apostasy is different from impulsive and temporary sin. A lapse may come from sudden temptation, but when the pressure of temptation is past, a return to obedience is expected. Then, too, an experience of the blessedness of salvation becomes an additional motive for a return to righteousness,—additional to the original motives which induced repentance. The remembrance of his father's house was a strong motive to the prodigal to return; hence the presumption remains that one who has entered upon a Christian life will pursue it.

(2) There is again a presumption in favor of Perseverance, when we view the case from the heavenward side, from the bearing of God's plan and purpose. It cannot be the will of God that one of these little ones should perish—that a soul that has committed himself to God should be left to drift away and be lost. There is a presumption that God can retain and keep the soul that he has won from a life of

sin, and if he can he will. Psalms xci. 14, "Because he hath set his love upon me, therefore will I deliver him." The presumption then is that the soul that trusts him, God can and will keep,—a presumption which contrary evidence would overrule. There is a presumption, antecedent to all direct evidence, that God will save all men,—a presumption which the evidence sets aside. There is a stronger presumption in favor of the salvation of the regenerate; and there does not seem to be conclusive evidence against the idea.

4. The spontaneous expectation or judgment of men accords with this presumption. In a case of fatal apostasy they look for evidence of previous want of genuineness, of hypocrisy and deception; and in general such evidence will be found. The fall which seems sudden is generally but the last step in a downward course; and this men expect to find, according to the representation of the parable of the sower: those who suddenly fail "had no root in themselves."

5. We will now look to the Scriptures for the light they afford on the question.

(1) The Bible speaks of a class of persons appointed to salvation—a class to be finally saved. Matt. xxiv. 22, 24, "Exeept those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved; but for the Elect's sake those days shall be shortened." "For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very Elect." Mark xiii. 27, "Then shall he send his angels, and shall gather together his Elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven." Rom. ii. 5, "Even so then at this present time also, there is a remnant according to the Election of grace." "What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the Election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded." Thus the term Elect seems always to designate a class of persons who will finally be saved; over whom the Lord ex-

ercises a special care to secure this result. The Elect will be saved.

(2) But again, this class is presented in the Scriptures as embracing all believers: 1 Thess. i. 4, Paul, addressing a representative body of believers, says, "Knowing brethren beloved, your Election of God." 1 Pet. xi. 2, Peter addressing the Christians scattered throughout a wide region calls them "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God." In Luke xviii. 7, the Savior speaks in a similar way: "Shall not God avenge his own Elect, which cry day and night unto him?" He manifestly speaks of those who sincerely pray, all his children. Rom. viii. 33, "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's Elect?" That is, all who are forgiven through Christ. Col. iii. 12, "Put on therefore, as the Elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies." All these passages imply that believers and the Elect are identical, and there is not an intimation to the contrary. There are not two classes of believers, elect and non-elect. These representations of the Scriptures would give us the syllogism: All the Elect are finally to be saved; all believers are of the Elect, therefore all believers will be finally saved. If the Scriptures used language with mathematical exactness, it is difficult to see how the conclusion could be avoided. But it is not reasonable to look for such exactness; and there must remain a possibility that the term, Elect, as applied to the children of God, has a general application, not absolutely universal. Still the argument must hold, unless we find contrary evidence.

(3) There are many passages of the Scriptures that seem to be in harmony with this view, and others that are often thought to inculcate the doctrine positively and directly. Especially, there are numerous passages that represent the preservation of the saints as depending upon God's faithfulness and love. Matt. xviii. 12–14, the parable of the lost sheep, represents the shepherd as pursuing the wanderer and

bringing him back, and concludes with the words: "Even so it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish." The faithful love of God is their dependence. John v. 24, "He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life." The Savior speaks as if the question of his salvation were already settled. Such language is common in the Scriptures. John iii. 16, 36, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life." "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life." John x. 27-29, "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life: and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. My Father which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand." The sheep are all that obey and all that shall obey: verse 16, "And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd." The certainty of their salvation is contemplated from the view of the faithfulness, and power, and purpose, of God. John xvii. 11, 12, in the Savior's last prayer with his disciples, we read, "Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one as we are. While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name; those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition." "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word." Rom. viii. 28–31, "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first born among many

brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." "If God be for us, who can be against us. He that spared not his own Son but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things." "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" that is, his love for us. "In all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us." Paul's hope of final salvation was in the faithful love of God; not merely that he should be saved if he persevered, but that God would uphold and keep him. Phil. i. 3–6, "I thank my God upon every remembrance of you, always in every prayer of mine for you all making request with joy, for your fellowship in the gospel from the first day until now; being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ." 1 Thess. v. 23, 24, "And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth you, who will also do it." Eph. i. 4–7, "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the beloved: in whom we have redemption through his blood." 1 John ii. 19, 27, "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us." The apostasy was not from a genuine, but from a false, position. "But the anointing which ye have received of him abideth in you, and ye need not that any man teach you: but as the same anointing teacheth you of

all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him." 1 John iii. 9, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." Sin is probably here used in an emphatic sense: to sin finally, or apostatize. 1 John v. 13, "These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life." These and similar passages contemplate the final salvation of believers from the divine standpoint—that of God's grace and purpose. Some of them seem to indicate not merely the divine wish or desire, but the settled purpose and foretold result.

(4) We have another class of passages which contemplate the relation of salvation to human agency and responsibility, presenting admonitions and warnings. Heb. iii. 12–14, "Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God. But exhort one another daily, while it is called to-day; lest any of you be hardened through the deceitfulness of sin. For we are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end." This is a warning addressed to believers. 1 Cor. x. 12, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." The phrase, "thinketh he standeth," does not imply delusion, but an obvious and real standing. 2 Pet. i. 10, "Give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall." Matt. x. 22, "He that endureth to the end shall be saved." Rev. iii. 11, "Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." These and similar passages imply the fact that final salvation is conditioned upon the fidelity and perseverance of the believer himself. They are perfectly natural and appropriate, even if the final result be assured. The case is well illustrated by Paul's shipwreck, in the twenty-eighth chapter of

the Acts. The certainty of the final salvation of all was foretold, and Paul believed it; but when the sailors were about to escape, he said to the centurion, "Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved." The result, although assured and revealed, depended on human agency. Perseverance and final salvation are secured only by an appeal to the believer himself, and the use of motives to induce the perseverance. The necessity of watchfulness, and the danger of remissness, must be urged.

(5) There are other passages which speak of the consequences of apostasy, and are sometimes supposed to imply the fact of apostasy. Ezek. xviii. 24, "When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." This might be only a hypothetical statement of the case, expressing the principle upon which God deals with men: a truth important to be understood, and necessary to restrain men from apostasy. It is like Paul's announcement in the case of the shipwreck: "Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved." He knew they would abide; but they must be kept, and this announcement secured that result. Probably the most marked passage of this kind is found in Heb. vi. 4–6, "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame." In reference to this passage it is obvious, in the first place, that it refers to the unpardonable sin: the sin against such light that there is no repentance and no forgiveness. An interest-

ing inquiry is, does the passage describe those who have been born again—the truly regenerate, or simply those who have received great spiritual enlightenment? The terms are very strong; but they might apply to those who are greatly enlightened, but do not yield their hearts; and this, I think, is the true application. Verses 7, 8, 9, suggest this idea: "For the earth which drinketh in the rain that cometh oft upon it," the good ground, the converted soul, "and bringeth forth herbs meet for them by whom it is dressed, receiveth blessing from God. But that which beareth thorns and briers is rejected, and is nigh unto cursing; whose end is to be burned." These are reprobates; they receive rain and sunlight, but yield no fruit; they do not seem to have been believers at all. The apostasy then, would be an apostasy from great light, not from obedience. But whatever class is referred to, it seems to be a hypothetical statement, like that in Ezekiel: a principle rather than a statement of fact. The writer does not anticipate such a result in the case of any whom he addresses: "But, beloved, we are persuaded better things of you, and things that accompany salvation, though we thus speak."

Another strong passage, often quoted as expressing the fact of apostasy, is 2 Pet. ii. 20–22, "For if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, they are again entangled therein, and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the beginning. For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. But it is happened unto them according to the true proverb: the dog is turned to his own vomit again; and, the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire." This passage gives a similar condition of enlightenment with that in Hebrews. The whole chapter describes a class of false teachers who had appeared among

them, corrupt and mischievous, given up to their own lusts; who had joined themselves to the people of God, but who were teaching and practicing falsehood. The reformation which they had experienced was superficial, an outward improvement, under the influence of the light, like that described by the Savior in Matt. xii. 41, 45, "When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, but findeth none. Then he saith, I will return into my house from whence I came out. . . . Then goeth he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man is worse than the first." The application of the proverb shows Peter's view of the case. The dog and sow had the same filthy character after the superficial purification as before. It does not seem to be set forth as a case of apostasy from a genuine faith.

6. On the whole it seems probable that the apostles held the doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints, and that the general drift of the Scriptures sustains it. There is nothing in the Scriptures which necessitates a different view; yet the language is not so conclusive as to settle the case beyond all doubt. The argument from actual observation in life is not conclusive. Such observation does not give us any certainty, in cases of apparent apostasy, as to the real character at the beginning, nor does it give the final result.

7. The objections commonly urged against the doctrine, that it removes the sense and motive of responsibility, and induces ease and indulgence, have force against the hyper-Calvinistic view, which makes the salvation of the sinner depend solely upon the divine purpose, or upon some physical or constitutional change supposed to be wrought in regeneration. When the faith and fidelity and endurance of the believer himself become factors in the result, all the objections disappear.

The doctrine properly balanced is a needed encourage-

ment and stimulus in the Christian life. One of the temptations and dangers is that the believer will become discouraged, cast down, overcome with apprehension; and fail at the last. The promise of success counteracts this besetment. Such was the intent and the effect of the assurance of safety in the case of Paul's shipwreck. Without such assurance the sailors and the soldiers would have been hopeless, and it would have been impossible for Paul to secure the attention required. It is possible that a worldly, self-indulgent, man should pervert the doctrine, and take to himself unwarranted comfort, as he may pervert the gospel generally. But he has no right to the doctrine; it belongs to those who are in the faith, in earnest to overcome. The promise of success to such a man is a most helpful and wholesome force.

8. The doctrine in its essential, if not its absolute, form, is a necessary element of the gospel. The gospel proposes to save men; not simply to open the gate of heaven and let them get in if they can. Paul's view we gather from Rom. viii. 28–39. We have a right to the encouragement and hope which these promises afford, even if we cannot find in the Scriptures the doctrine of absolute, final, Perseverance, in its definite form.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FUTURE LIFE: THE RESURRECTION.

The argument for Immortality from nature and reason, we have already considered. We now go to the Scriptures for the light of revelation which has been given us.

1. It has been sometimes asserted that the doctrine of the Future Life is not found in the Old Testament; that the Jews did not have the idea until after the captivity of Babylon; that they obtained it in the East, and brought it back to Palestine. And it is urged that this is the origin of the belief which prevailed among them at the time of the Savior's appearing.

2. This extreme view cannot be sustained. It is set aside, as we shall see, by the Old Testament Scriptures; but there is a contrast between the Old Testament and the New in the degree of prominence that is given to the doctrine of a Future Life. In the New Testament there are constant and emphatic references to the Future Life, and motives are continually drawn from it to encourage the righteous and restrain the wicked; while in the Old Testament such references and motives are quite obscure.

3. There is a natural reason for this difference. It seems to have been the plan of the old dispensation to bring out the divine government before the eyes of men—to make it obvious, as a present fact. God's personal presence and intervention were so distinctly revealed to the people of Israel, the expressions of his favor and of his displeasure, in the treatment of them in the present world, were so distinct, that they needed little reference to the Future Life. They found themselves already in the hands of God, in this life, and did

not need to wait for a future to realize the fact. The distinction between the present and the future, in this respect, was almost obliterated. We are accustomed to think that the present is a period of probation; not a period of rewards and punishments. It was not so in Old Testament times. Judgments came upon the wicked before the eyes of men. The flood was not far back in the history of man; the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was before them—the plagues of Egypt, and the deliverance of Israel; the discipline and hardships of the wilderness; the destruction of the inhabitants of Canaan for their wickedness, and the chastisements of the people through all their history,—all these events were intended to impress them that, living or dying, they were in the presence and under the power of God. They did not need to be referred to another life to find God's government.

4. But it is antecedently improbable that the prominent good men of the Old Testament, and that the Hebrews generally, were without a knowledge of a Future Life. The nations around them were not without such ideas. The inscriptions on the tombs of Egypt, and the papyrus leaves found in the mummy cases show, that a future existence was an accepted doctrine of the Egyptians. The lofty character of the patriarchs, of Moses, and the good men of later times, requires this explanation. Such is the reasoning in the eleventh chapter of the Hebrews: "By faith Moses, when he was come to years, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter; choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season; esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt; for he had respect unto the recompense of the reward. By faith he forsook Egypt, not fearing the wrath of the king; for he endured, as seeing him who is invisible." "These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and

were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth. For they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country. And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned. But now they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God: for he hath prepared for them a city." This is the only reasonable explanation of their lofty character. The presumption that they lived in view of a Future Life is irresistible.

5. Positive indications of a belief in a Future Life are not wanting in the Old Testament. In Gen. v. 24, we have an account of the translation of Enoch. Its significance must have been known to the men of that time. He walked with God, and God took him, as a token of his favor—a testimony that he pleased God. The event is so explained in Heb. xi. 5. Gen. xxxvii. 35, Jacob says, "I will go down to the grave to my son mourning." The common version reads, "into the grave;" it means Hades, the world of spirits. Joseph, as his father supposed, had no burial, but was devoured by wild beasts. So, in general, the expressions so often used in the Old Testament: "went to his fathers;" "slept with his fathers;" "gathered to his people," do not refer to the burial, but to the fact of joining the spirits of the departed. Numbers xxiii. 10, Balaam says, "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end (my hereafter, my final destiny) be like his." Job xiii. 15, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." 2 Sam. xii. 23, David says, "But now he is dead, wherefore should I fast? Can I bring him back again? I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me." The reference of Job xix. 25–27, "I know that my redeemer liveth, etc.," to a future life is called in question by many commentators; but such a reference seems most probable. Psalms lxxiii. 26, "My flesh and my heart

faileth, but God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever." The whole of this psalm seems to be written in view of the Future Life: "Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee? And there is none upon the earth that I desire beside thee."

The popular belief in familiar spirits, the tendency to consult them by necromancy, is demonstration of the belief in a Future Life. In 1 Sam. xxviii. 7, we have the account of Saul seeking the witch of Endor to bring up Samuel. He believed in the existence of Samuel, whatever may have been his thought of the power of the woman; and Samuel appeared, according to Saul's belief.

6. At the coming of Christ a belief in a Future Life was the prevalent orthodox belief among the Jews. The Pharisees represented this traditional belief; it was the belief of the common people. John xi. 24, Martha said, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection, at the last day." The evidence is that this was the inherited, traditional belief; they had received it from the fathers.

7. The doctrine of the New Testament on the question of the Future Life is unequivocal and unquestioned; it was the doctrine of Christ and of the apostles. Quotations are unnecessary; the references are too numerous to require mention. Yet Jesus does not bring forward the doctrine as new, but as contained in the Old Testament. He thus refutes the Sadducees (Luke xx. 37, 38): "Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he called the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him." That is, none who make him their God will be left to perish, or to cease to be. This was the implication of the announcement to Moses, according to the Savior's own interpretation. In 2 Tim. i. 10, it is said of the Savior, "Who hath abolished death, and hath

brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." Not that he first revealed the truth of a future life; but he has made immortality, blessedness, accessible to men; has given it reality, or brought it within their reach. The New Testament makes very distinct and pronounced the doctrine of the Resurrection, and thus gives new force and reality to the fact of the Future Life.

THE RESURRECTION.

1. The Resurrection of the dead is a doctrine of revelation. I am not aware that any ancient religion has any distinct trace of it, unless it be that of Zoroaster. The ancient Persians, it is said, received such a doctrine from him. It has been claimed, at times, that the embalming of the dead among the Egyptians had reference to a return of the spirit to the body; but it is quite probable that such care of the body was supposed to have some bearing upon the comfort and repose of the soul in the spirit world; as, among the Greeks and Romans, a decent burial was supposed to be necessary; otherwise the spirit was believed to wander on this side of the river, for a hundred years. The doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls, so prevalent in the religions of the East, is not the doctrine of a Resurrection.

2. The Resurrection is a doctrine of the later revelation. Revelation is progressive; all important truths are not presented at once. Gen. l. 25, where Joseph charged the people to carry his bones with them out of Egypt, has sometimes been supposed to indicate a belief in a Resurrection. The passage is not conclusive of such a belief. The passage in Job (xix. 25–27), already quoted, is unquestionably mistranslated in the accepted version; it probably has no reference to a Resurrection, but to a future life: "After they have destroyed my skin this shall be;" that is, the redeemer shall stand upon the earth, "and out of (apart from) my flesh, shall I see God." Psalms xvii. 15, "As for me, I

will behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness," is often interpreted as referring to the Resurrection. If used by a modern psalmist, that would be its natural meaning, but as it stands there must be doubt. Isaiah (xxvi. 19) uses the figure of the Resurrection to set forth the history of Israel. Ezekiel does the same in the thirty-seventh chapter. A single verse in Daniel recognizes the Resurrection (Dan. xii. 2), "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." This does not seem to be an announcement of a universal Resurrection, but of martyrs and their persecutors, who shall receive according to their deeds. In the Apocryphal books references to the Resurrection are found, showing that the people had embraced the doctrine and comforted themselves with it in their martyrdom: 2 Mac. vii. 14, 23, 29.

3. The doctrine of the Resurrection is distinctly set forth in the New Testament. The Savior taught the doctrine. In Luke xx. 37, 38, we have his argument with the Sadducees. That the dead are raised up is proved by God's calling himself the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob. The point directly proved is the existence of spirits after death; the Resurrection easily follows. The Sadducees were radical in their unbelief; they admitted no Resurrection, nor angel, nor spirit. To them death was the end of all things. A spiritual existence hereafter was the essential point in their case. John v. 28, 29, "The hour is coming in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation."

The Resurrection of Christ became the model and standard and proof of a general Resurrection to the apostles and the early church. He was "the first fruits of them that slept;" not the first person actually brought to life from the

dead, but the first raised to die no more. When they spoke of the Resurrection they had Jesus in view. In Matt. xxvii. 52, 53, we have another example of a resurrection: "And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city and appeared unto many." These cases show what the apostles must have meant by the Resurrection.

4. Paul teaches the doctrine elaborately and circumstantially. In 1 Cor. xv, he connects his hope of the Resurrection with that of Christ: "If the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised." "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept." The same thought is elsewhere expressed by Paul: Rom. viii. 11, "But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies, by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." 1 Thess. iv. 14, "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." Still further, and very particularly, we gather from 1 Cor. xv., that in the resurrection there will be a body—a spiritual body. "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body;" that is, a body adapted to the wants and uses of the soul or spirit; as here it is adapted to our natural, earthly, animal life. The limitations of sleep and rest, and similar conditions, are removed, and the body becomes the servant of the mind. Again, this body will sustain some relation to the present body; such as renders it proper to speak of a Resurrection: "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" The analogy of the seed and the plant which springs from it is given. Paul nowhere intimates that the gross material of which our bodies here are composed, will constitute the body of the Resurrection; the contrary is implied: "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the

kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." Thus Paul sets aside the physiological objection often urged against the Resurrection: that the material of our bodies is dispersed; and that the same material may have entered into the composition of various bodies at the time of death. What the connection between the present body and the future may be, we have no further light, and no Scriptural basis for a theory; and every theory on the subject is a mere human fancy. Paul seems to find no difficulty in conceiving that a body may be very exalted and satisfactory: "All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory." "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." Phil. iii. 21, "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." That glory was perhaps shown in the transfiguration.

5. We learn that the Resurrection is general, both of the just and the unjust. John v. 28, 29, "The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." In Acts xxiv. 15, Paul announces his hope toward God, "that there shall be a Resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust." Rev. xx. 12, 13, "And I saw the dead, small and great,

stand before God; and the books were opened; and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them." In Phil. iii. 11, Paul speaks of putting forth every effort, that he might "attain unto the Resurrection of the dead." He probably uses the word in an emphatic sense, as immortality, eternal life; that which deserves to be called a Resurrection, as in Rom. ii. 7, "To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life."

6. Two resurrections are spoken of in Rev. xx. 4, 5, first, of the martyrs: "them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God;" "and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years;" then of all the rest. Those are pronounced "blessed and holy," who have part in the first resurrection. It is not said of others that they are not blessed and holy, but a special blessing for the martyrs is probably indicated. This passage is the chief reliance for the view, that the righteous are to be raised and reign, during the millennium, with Christ; and that afterward the wicked shall be raised to final judgment. It is not represented in this passage that all the righteous shall be raised in this first resurrection, or that they are to reign with Christ on the earth, or that the transaction takes place in the sight of men. All the conditions would be fulfilled if the martyred dead were quietly raised, and taken up into the presence of the Lord, as in the case of the saints spoken of in Matt. xxvii. 52, 53, as already quoted. The passage in 1 Thess. iv. 16, is sometimes interpreted as referring to two resurrections: "The dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air." "First," probably refers to the statement

which precedes: "We which are alive and remain, unto the coming of the Lord, shall not precede them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first;" not before the other dead, but before "we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air."

7. Some interpreters discard entirely the idea of a bodily resurrection, and of any connection of the soul with a body, in the future life. The Resurrection, in their view, is simply the elevation of the soul to a higher spiritual life; an elevation which takes place, in the case of each one, immediately after death. The idea does not meet the requirements of the Scripture. Paul's argument in 1 Cor. xv., in such a view, is without meaning; and what propriety can there be in speaking of the resurrection of the wicked? Their course at death is downward, not upward; it ends in shame and everlasting contempt.

8. The Swedenborgian idea of the spiritual body has become somewhat prevalent in later years. It maintains that every person has, besides the body and the soul, a spiritual enswathement or organism of the soul, in form like the body, with all its parts, of a very ethereal and attenuated substance, which at death is separated with the soul from this gross material body, and remains as the permanent habitation and organism of the soul. It is supposed that, in general, this spiritual body is invisible to mortal eyes, yet it has form, and becomes visible under certain conditions, as ghosts have appeared from time to time. The conception is a mere human fancy, incapable of proof, and scarcely in harmony with the Scripture representation of the Resurrection.

9. Isaac Taylor, in his "Physical Theory of Another Life," suggests that there is a certain germinative or forma-

tive substance or principle in every human being, probably some attenuated form of matter, which is not dissolved or dissipated in death, which constitutes the germ or organizing force of the body of the Resurrection, and forms the connecting link between the old body and the new. Identity does not necessarily imply the same constituent substance, or material particles. We claim the same bodies that we had twenty years ago; but physiology teaches us that the substance of these same bodies is entirely changed. The fact that our bodies continue under the same formative forces is sufficient ground for accounting them the same. Whether that force belongs to the body or to the spirit, or to somewhat between the two, we cannot determine.

10. The chief practical value and force of the doctrine of the Resurrection is to give definiteness and reality to the conception of the future life. A mere spiritual existence is shadowy and difficult of comprehension to human thought. Christianity has a great advantage over other religions in this respect. Paul, in 1 Thess. iv. 13, 14, makes the Resurrection the basis of consolation to believers: "I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." The doctrine of a Resurrection answers the most pressing questions which we can ask in reference to the future life. Any tendency to low or gross ideas is checked with the Savior's words in Matt. xxii. 30, "In the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." In 1 John iii, 2, 3, we have indicated the proper influence of the Resurrection: "It doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him: for we shall see him as he is. And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself even as he is pure."

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.—CONTINUED PROBATION.—THE JUDGMENT.

1. The doctrine of the resurrection involving the reunion of the soul with a glorified body in the case of the saints, and an immortal or imperishable body in the case of all, leads to the conception of a state between death and the resurrection: a disembodied state in which the soul is looking forward to the resurrection. This condition is designated under the term, the intermediate state. Our knowledge of this condition, or state, is mostly inferential; it lies almost wholly beyond the range of rational thought, and the Scriptures throw little light upon it. No one has ever returned to bring us tidings of the experiences there. The veil which separates present experience and that of the moment after death is, absolutely impenetrable. One of the most impressive facts connected with death, is our almost absolute ignorance of the experience upon which the soul enters. What is the condition of the disembodied spirit? All that revelation gives us on the subject is but here and there an incidental suggestion.

2. One of the few things that we know is that there must be continued existence; death is not the dissolution of the soul. The spirit is an essence distinct from matter, and lives on after the death of the body. The idea which has prevailed more or less in later times, that the soul has no existence apart from the body, and that in the resurrection the soul revives with the body, and meanwhile has no existence, cannot be accepted. It involves a crude, materialistic, conception of the nature of spirit. If the soul is dissolved

with the body, and is restored to existence in the resurrection, all continuity of being is set aside, and there can be no responsible connection between this present life and the life hereafter. The same person does not appear. It is a new creation. There can be no transfer of the character, and history, of the person dying, to the new person that appears in the resurrection. It is not a resurrection, but a new creation. Even if the identical gross matter of the dissolved body be reorganized into the body of the resurrection, it can not carry with it the reality and responsibility of the original person; nothing can do this but continuity of spiritual existence. A future life necessitates the continued existence of the soul; in no other way can personal identity be continued.

3. It is reasonable to suppose, and there is a presumption in favor of the idea, that some purpose must be served in this intermediate condition. We cannot well suppose that the intermediate state is an accident in the divine economy; as men are ushered into an ante-room to await their time to be called into the presence of the sovereign. It must be a step in natural development, in some form.

4. Hence there is a strong presumption against its being an unconscious state, as some have maintained. The argument for unconsciousness, as it has been presented, is almost wholly of a negative character; to the effect that the Scriptures do not prove consciousness. The principal positive argument brought from the Scriptures is, that the dead are said to be asleep. Such a figure can scarcely warrant the inference of unconsciousness; it indicates the repose of the body, a cessation of all bodily activity. Death is called sleep by a sort of euphemism: John ii. 11, "Our friend Lazarus sleepeth." Matt. ix. 24, "The maid is not dead but sleepeth." 1 Thess. iv. 14, "Even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." That the word has any reference to the question of consciousness, does not seem to

be implied. As to the positive indications in the Scriptures in reference to the point in question, we have the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, in which the departed spirits are represented in conscious activity, enjoyment, and suffering. True, this Scripture is a parable; but it is reasonable to assume that the Savior would construct the parable, in all essential points, even in its costume, in accordance with the facts. Luke xxiii. 43, to the penitent thief the Savior says, "To-day thou shalt be with me in paradise;" and paradise must be a state of conscious enjoyment. In 2 Cor. v. 6, Paul speaks of being at home in the body, and absent from the Lord, and absent from the body and present with the Lord; of having a desire to depart and be with Christ, which is far better. Matt. xvii. 3, the appearance of Moses and Elias at the transfiguration, favors the idea of consciousness and activity in the disembodied state. Archbishop Whately, in his treatise on the subject, meets all such cases by saying, that the interval of unconsciousness is of no account; and that though Paul might sleep thus thousands of years, yet to his own experience he would pass immediately from earth to heaven. It is difficult to believe that Paul had any such conception of the facts.

As an improvement upon the conception of a state of unconsciousness, the view has been presented that disembodied spirits are conscious, but dispossessed of all means of outward expression. They cannot communicate with others, or make any show of activity. They can only occupy themselves with their own thought, and can be approached only by the divine Spirit. They can enjoy and suffer, but exist utterly apart from association or communication, except as God approaches them. This, too, is wholly a speculation, unsustained by any word of Scripture.

CONTINUED PROBATION.

1. The question of a possible continuation of Proba-

tion after death is perhaps the only practical inquiry connected with the intermediate state. The general impresssion gathered from the Scriptures is that Probation ends with this life; yet no such direct and definite statement is found. Several passages seem to imply the fact: Heb. ix. 27, "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment." 2 Cor. v. 10, "That every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." 1 Cor. xi. 30–32, "For this cause many are weak and sickly among you and many sleep. For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But when we are judged, we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world." The apostle is speaking of sickness and death brought upon wayward believers, to save them from the final ruin with the worldly. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke xvi.), represents the condition entered upon at death as irretrievable. "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot;" "Son, remember that thou in thy life-time receivedst thy good things." The question of the future was settled then. The desire of the rich man to warn his brethren while they lived, because there would be no help after death, and the answer, "They have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them;" "If they hear not Moses and the prophets neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead"—all this implies that nothing more can be done in their case. There does not seem to be any intimation here, or in other Scriptures, of any opportunity hereafter for retrieving the loss or failure. Prov. xiv. 32, "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness: but the righteous hath hope in his death."

2. The view has been held by a few in the church at various times in the past, and has been revived of late, that for those who have not heard the Gospel, the heathen, and perhaps infants, there will be a probation hereafter. This

view must be regarded chiefly as a speculation, with little Scripture to support it. There are two passages in the first epistle of Peter, sometimes supposed to bear on the subject. 1 Pet. iii. 18–20, "Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God; being put to death in the flesh; but quickened in the spirit, in which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which aforetime were disobedient, when the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing." The passage must be regarded as obscure. One of the points of interest in it is, When was this preaching done? A very common interpretation has been that the preaching was in the days of Noah to the spirits then alive upon the earth, who are now in prison; preaching done perhaps by Noah himself, called a preacher of righteousness (2 Pet. ii. 5). The other view is that Christ, in the interval between his death and resurrection, descended into the spirit world and preached the Gospel to the disembodied antediluvians. The other passage we find in 1 Pet. iv. 6, "For this cause was the gospel preached also to them that are dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit." The same question arises in reference to this passage, When was the preaching done? to those who were dead, or to the living before their death? It may refer to the martyrs who, as the result of receiving the Gospel, perished by the judgment of man, but live by the power of God in the spirit. The passages are too obscure, and of too doubtful interpretation, to furnish a satisfactory foundation for the doctrine of continued probation, without other decisive Scripture support. The silence of the Scriptures is significant. Paul in 1 Thess. iv. 13, 14, comforts those whose friends are asleep in Jesus, but utters not a word of comfort to those whose friends have died without hope.

2. As to a further probation for the heathen, Paul

seems to set it aside in Rom. ii. 6–16: "Who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil; of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile. But glory, honor, and peace, to every man that worketh good; to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile; For there is no respect of persons with God. For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness." Rom. i. 20, "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Paul's reasoning implies that there is no necessity for continued probation for the heathen; they know their duty and do it not.

4. In reference to a probation for infants hereafter, the Scriptures are utterly silent; they afford not even a hint. Infants are moral beings, and must somewhere form moral character, and to that extent must have a probation. That such a probation will be attended with risk and loss, as in this life, we do not know. It is conceivable that they may be received into the society of the redeemed, and made to enjoy their influence and to share their experience to such an extent that they shall be carried safely through to established character without failure. This is conceivable, and we may be permitted to hope it. Infants thus surrounded will be in a different case from that of our first parents in

Eden. They will be under the influence and guidance of those who have experienced sin and salvation.

5. The necessity of what we call probation, lies in the fact that moral beings must form their own character. They cannot be made at once, by creative power, what God wishes them to become; but must grow to this in the exercise of their own responsibility. We have reason to think that a degree of hardship, trial, temptation, is favorable to the development of moral beings; and that the blessedness of heaven will be safe to men after such discipline. The experience of Eden proves that it would not be safe without the discipline. Thus probation is not an arbitrary appointment, but the necessary requirement of a moral nature. The conditions of our probation are in part determined by God's sovereign wisdom, and in part by our connections with the race to which we belong, our ancestors and our contemporaries. The conditions of the probation of the Chinaman have been greatly made by his predecessors; so of every race and family. This is the result of human freedom and responsibility, and cannot be set aside without overruling the results of human action. Hence we cannot ask that all shall be placed in equally desirable conditions of probation. This could not be without giving to each one an independent existence, and separating him from all influences from others, past and present; an arrangement which would annul all relationships, and essentially destroy the moral system.

6. Every finite moral being, then, necessarily has a probation, and in a very important sense it must be called a fair probation. Character is not formed by accident, or determined by outward conditions. No man becomes confirmed in sin, without a struggle with his own moral nature, his conscience. That is sin which he sees to be such; which, with the light he has, he himself condemns; he does not fall into it by mistake. It is required of a man "according to that he hath, not according to that he hath not;" hence

there is no call for a *new* probation; no place for such probation, in the case of those who have formed their character. There can be no new or second probation without breaking down the character already formed, and reconstructing the man. A man thus reconstructed would be another person, and must have his own probation.

7. There are natural reasons for the termination of probation, in the tendency to fixedness of character. The work of probation is at length accomplished. The man becomes settled in virtuous or in sinful character. The limit is reached beyond which nothing in the nature of change is to be expected; indeed there are indications that that limit is sometimes reached in the present life. The good man of established character we do not expect to change, and in the case of the man confirmed in wickedness there is little hope.

A providential termination of probation is conceivable, and seems to be indicated in the order of events. It would involve a change of conditions, a withdrawing of God's grace and the influence of the Spirit, the motives by which men are led to repentance; a leaving of men to their own chosen way of sin. It is possible, and probable too, that such a termination of probation may be needed among the moral forces of God's kingdom. If every one could look forward to assured opportunity of reaching the natural limit of probation, there would be danger of procrastination. There is divine wisdom in the uncertainty of life. Life is less likely to be wasted, than if every man could calculate with assurance upon his four-score years; and so the termination of probation may be wisely made uncertain. If probation terminates with this life, it is as uncertain as life itself; and this seems to be the drift of the Scriptures. We can only demand that God should deal justly with every man, according to his works; in the way of a justification of the ways of God, we can ask no more.

8. The Roman Catholic Church has connected with

the idea of the intermediate state the doctrine of purgatory, which involves a certain degree of punishment for imperfect believers, as they pass into the other world. Repentance and forgiveness, as experienced here, are not supposed to set aside all punishment. There is in most cases a remnant of guilt which is not remitted, and which the fires of purgatory purge away. This is not properly a second or a continued probation. It is not a provision for those who die impenitent, but applies only to those who die as believers, with some defilement of sin upon them. The only support of the doctrine seems to be in traditional, but unnatural, interpretation of a few passages of Scripture.

THE JUDGMENT.

1. A Judgment after the resurrection is a frequent representation of the Scriptures. It is presented in many forms, often under the figure of a day of judgment: Matt. xi. 24, "I say unto you that it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee." Matt. xii. 41, 42, "The men of Nineveh shall stand up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: because they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and, behold, a greater than Jonah is here. The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation and shall condemn it." Matt. xiii. 30, "Let both grow together until the harvest: and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn." Then follows the explanation of the parable: "So shall it be at the end of the world. The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire." Matt. xxv. 31, "When the Son of man shall come in his glory; and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: and be-

fore him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats." Acts xvii. 31, "He hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained." Rom. xiv. 10, "Why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost thou set at naught thy brother? for we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ." Heb. ix. 27, "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment." Rev. xx. 12, "I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works." These are examples of the manner in which the Judgment is presented in the Scriptures. The language is doubtless greatly figurative; but the fact of a final Judgment, a general Judgment, is unquestionably presented. Those who discard a general resurrection, account the Judgment as taking place for each person immediately upon his death; and, in the sense that each person is made aware of his destiny at that time, the idea is probably true.

2. The Scriptures say little of the purpose served by the Judgment, except that men may be dealt with according to their deeds. It cannot be that the Judgment is for the purpose of any information to God, in reference to the character of his creatures; it must be the creatures of God that are enlightened by the Judgment. The influence and value, in the government of God, of the final awards to men, will depend upon their manifest justice and appropriateness. This will require an exhibition of the character of men to all who are to be impressed with the righteous Judgment of God. All deceptions and false appearances must be swept away, and the true character must be made to appear. When we read that men are to be judged according to their deeds, we understand, not simply their outward acts, but their per-

sonal character. According to Jude 6, angels are to be concerned in the Judgment: "The angels which kept not their first estate he hath reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day."

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CONDITION OF THE SAVED—OF THE LOST.

1. In reference to the final condition of the redeemed, or the righteous, we have definite and explicit teaching in the Scriptures; and little essential difference of opinion has appeared in the church. The promise and expectation of blessedness are wholly desirable, and no one is tempted to offer any objection. The following passages may be taken as examples of Scripture teaching upon the subject: John xiv. 2, 3, "In my Father's house are many mansions: if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also." 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17, "The Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first; then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord." Rev. xxi. 3, 4, "I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain." 1 John iii. 2, "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is."

2. Heaven must be a place. The Savior's resurrection and the resurrection of the saints imply this; and the general language of the Scriptures is in harmony with the idea. The thought has been quite prevalent that this earth, after it has been purged by fire, will be renovated and fitted up as the abode of the blest. The Scriptures do not seem to be conclusive on the point. 2 Pet. iii. 10, 13, "The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up." "Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." Rev. xxi. 1–3, "And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea. And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God." These passages give us what we have as to the place of heaven, but they scarcely include the idea that this earth is to be our final abode.

A question closely connected with this is, whether the heaven of our race is to be the heaven of the universe. Only the inhabitants of this world, and the angelic hosts, are brought to view; but is there to be some grand gathering place of the universe, a grand center where all of the children of God, from all worlds, shall gather? Some Christian astronomer has suggested that the central star round which our system seems to revolve, must be the heaven of the universe. The answer to the question is utterly beyond our reach.

3. Heaven must imply an active and social state. The

Scriptures seem to harmonize with this idea. The parable of the talents may fairly be taken as implying that we are to have increased responsibilities there. Matt. xxv. 21, "Thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things." To such a result the experience and discipline of this life would necessarily look. Our training would almost seem to be without purpose, unless heaven is to be a state of responsibility and activity; not simply a state of reward, but of service.

Heaven must be a social state, because this is our nature. Our character and our history have been wrought out in connection with our relations to our fellow-men. This makes our life; we must lose ourselves, our identity, before we can find satisfaction in a solitary, subjective life. The friends we have known we must still know; the Savior's negative statement does not set aside this expectation: Matt. xxii. 30, "For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven."

The rest of heaven, then, is not cessation from activity, but relief from toil and hardship and the burdens of life; a difference like that between Eden, and the world cursed and bringing forth thorns, so that in the sweat of our face we eat our bread. We must have activity and responsibility in heaven, because our nature requires these as conditions of blessedness.

4. Heaven must be a progressive state, because growth, progress, is the law of our nature; and with an endless life before us, and a wide field of action opened to us, no limit can be set to progress in knowledge, in power, and in blessedness.

5. That conception of heaven must be most true which is most wholesome, most effective, in its reaction, to beget a heavenly mind in those who cherish it. 1 John iii. 2, 3, "We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him;

for we shall see him as he is. And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure."

THE CONDITION OF THE LOST.

1. As the doctrine of the Christian church has been, "The endless happiness of the righteous," so, with comparatively limited exceptions, it has been "The endless misery of the wicked." The traditional belief of the world, is not essentially different from the doctrine of the church. The doctrine of endless happiness for the righteous has been received without question; it is not repugnant to our natural feeling, it is acceptable. The idea of endless misery for the wicked has been earnestly questioned, and sometimes rejected, not by large portions of the church but by individuals, and by sects that have made the rejection of the doctrine their organizing principle. The fact of everlasting suffering is painful to contemplate; hence there has always been motive for calling it in question, or rejecting it.

2. Objection to the doctrine of endless misery is often urged on rational grounds, on reasons derived from our necessary convictions and intuitions.

The doctrine, it is said, is opposed to the divine character and attributes. The existence of everlasting evil under his government—of sin and consequent misery, is repugnant to God's nature and character. It is opposed to the benevolence of God. The evil contemplated is a calamity beyond all finite comprehension, and God's goodness must be arrayed against it with unchanging and infinite purpose. He cannot tolerate it in his universe. The existence of such an evil is also opposed to his holiness—his moral purity, which is intolerant of sin. Sin is hateful and loathsome to him; and how can he endure it forever in his sight, and under his power? If sin and misery are to exist forever in his universe, it implies a failure of his goodness and holi-

ness, or of his power. Either he cannot, or he will not, prevent it.

This argument is purely speculative—an appeal to our instinctive judgment, in utter neglect of facts. The same *a priori* argument could be brought, in full force, against the existence of sin and misery in the universe at all, for any length of time. Untold evil has existed in the world through all its history; and this fact as really impugns the attributes of God, as the existence of everlasting misery or evil. God cannot, or will not, prevent it. Everlasting evil is only a continuance of what has been, and what is. As matters stand, the presumption is in favor of the continuance of evil. In advance of experience there would have been, in the human understanding, a presumption against the existence of any evil. Our experience has changed the presumption.

3. Another form of the rational objection is, that sin in man can never call for endless misery, as a proper expression of God's sense of the evil. It is unreasonable to suppose that a finite being can contract such guilt. Answer: If the experience of finite beings, as we find them in the world, in their sin and misery, is not repugnant to reason, a continuance of this condition cannot be, or even an increase of the misery, if it be necessary. The difficulty, in its essential force, is involved in the facts which we know to exist; and these we must accept because they are facts. Endless guilt and misery are but a continuance of what is. The existence of misery without the guilt, is not the question, but the existence of the two in combination. If the sin continues the misery must follow it.

Again, guilt, that is unworthiness or ill-desert, is naturally everlasting. It is never done away and cannot be. Once incurred, it attaches to the soul like its own personality. He who has sinned is forever after ill-deserving. If God shall find it necessary, in the economy of his government, to

give some everlasting expression of his sense of that ill-desert, it will not be unreasonable. There is a presumption for the necessity of such an expression. The world needs evidence of God's disapproval of sin; and the same necessity which exists now, will probably continue. If the evidence of such disapproval should be taken away, or set aside, one great source of motive fails. Motives derived from the consequences of sin, are needed now in the world; why not forever? If the lesson should pass from view, and nothing be heard of it for ages, there would be a loss of restraining motive; and how could we be sure that God's creatures would not lapse again into sin. We cannot, then, by any exercise of our own reason, reach the conclusion that punishment may not be endless.

4. A rational argument to sustain the doctrine of endless punishment, is sometimes stated in this form: "Sin is an infinite evil, involving infinite guilt; it deserves endless punishment, and a just God must therefore inflict it. This statement is vague, of uncertain significance; and the conconclusion does not follow from the premises.

(1) Infinite guilt, as predicated of a finite being, is incomprehensible. We may properly say that guilt is endless, that it can never be done away; and it is true that it deserves endless punishment.

(2) But what sin deserves is one thing, and what it is right to inflict is quite a different thing. Punishment is inflicted, not on the ground of desert, but on the ground of its necessity to the good of the moral universe. Of that necessity reason cannot positively speak. We are not competent judges of the future necessities of God's kingdom.

5. Again, reason can affirm that if sin continues in the future life and becomes permanent, punishment, or consequent evil, must accompany it. But this judgment is hypothetical. As to the fact of the permanence of sin in the

future, reason can make no positive assertion. At the most it can only give us a presumption.

6. Reason then, can neither set aside the doctrine of endless punishment, nor establish it. It leaves the question in doubt, giving us a probability in its favor, as the great majority of the world have decided. The question belongs strictly to revelation. God alone can know the necessities of his government in the future, and what can wisely be done for sinners.

7. Of those who look to revelation for a settlement of the question, there are three classes that deny endless punishment.

(1) Those who deny any punishment hereafter, and affirm that men receive the consequences of sin in this life; and that sin and its results end with death. These have called themselves Universalists.

(2) Those who admit a degree of punishment, or rather of disciplinary suffering, hereafter. This suffering, it is supposed proves a corrective, and brings the sinner back, sooner or later, to God. These are commonly known as Restorationists.

(3) Those who maintain that persistent sinners will finally be blotted from existence. These are Annihilationists.

Each of these views would call for a volume, if we should undertake the consideration of every argument and text and interpretation. Only a few suggestions can be offered.

8. To the first and second of these views it may reasonably be said that the Scriptures do not sustain them, but seem to stand in direct opposition to them. The advocates of these views, in general, do not derive their positive arguments from the Scriptures, but from *a priori* or rational considerations, from the goodness of God, and from the natural repugnance of human feeling to the doctrine. The Scriptures are commonly treated, by writers that hold these

views, in a negative way; that is, there is an attempt to show that those passages commonly supposed to teach endless punishment do not necessarily convey the doctrine. The claim is that the doctrine itself is so repugnant to human feeling, that it is reasonable to give to such passages some limitation, if it can possibly be done. This must be an unsafe principle of interpretation. We have seen that there is no such rational presumptiom against the doctrine, but rather the reverse. The Scriptures then must have their natural meaning. No violent interpretation is called for, or is admissible.

Let us recur to some of the passages which bear upon the question. Matt. xxv. 41, 46, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal." Much discussion has been given to the word translated *everlasting*. It must suffice here to observe that the same word marks the characteristic of the punishment of the wicked and the blessedness of the righteous. Mark iii. 29, "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation;" or, according to the better text, "is obnoxious, or doomed to, eternal sin." Mark ix. 43, 44, "It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell—*gehenna*—into the fire, that never shall be quenched, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." This is not a fire that purifies and fits for heaven; it is a final destruction. Luke iii. 17, "Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and will gather the wheat into his garner; but the chaff he will burn with fire unquenchable." We find here no restoration, no fitting for heaven. John iii. 36, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." 2 Thess. i. 7–10, "To

you who are troubled rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power; when he shall come to be glorified in his saints." Matt. xii. 32, "But whosever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." Luke xii. 4, 5, "Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do, but I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, Fear him." Matt. xiii. 40–42, "So shall it be in the end of this world. The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." In our study of these passages it is appropriate to remember that they are the words of Jesus himself, who is the embodiment of all divine compassion. Passages like these abound, and represent the general drift of the Scriptures. They are fairly conclusive against the doctrine of no future punishment, and of a punishment that is terminable, resulting in reformation and restoration.

9. The advocates of the doctrine of the ultimate annihilation of persistent sinners seem to themselves to meet the requirements of these passages, as to a punishment that is final. Annihilation is certainly final, everlasting, in the sense that there is no recovery or restoration; not everlasting, in the ordinary sense of everlasting punishment. The difficulty which the doctrine does encounter is, that annihilation is not necessarily, or even naturally, implied in any expressions of Scripture; and these expressions, with rare exceptions, have not been interpreted to imply annihilation.

Such a suggestion now and then appeared among the early fathers; but the doctrine has not obtained any considerable acceptance until recent times.

There are expressions in the Scriptures that might mean annihilation if taken by themselves, unexplained by other language of the Scriptures. For example, 2 Thess. i. 9, "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." Yet even here the word *everlasting* seems out of place. If destruction be annihilation, why add everlasting? But destruction applied to moral beings, means ruin, not annihilation. Hos. xiii. 9, "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help." We say of a man who has ruined all his hopes and prospects, that he has destroyed himself. We say the same of a suicide. Matt. x. 28, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." The contrast here is not between killing the body and killing the soul, as we might naturally expect, but destroying it in *gehenna:* or as in Luke xii. 5, "Fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into *gehenna*." Mal. iv. 1, "Behold, the day cometh, that shall burn as an oven; and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly shall be stubble; and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the Lord of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch." This strong expression is often quoted to prove annihilation. It is a highly poetical expression of entire destruction; and doubtless refers primarily to the cutting off of the wicked in this life. These and similar passages might possibly mean annihilation, but it is not their probable, or natural, meaning. There are other passages which are not consistent with annihilation. Matt. xxv. 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." The word translated punishment is the same as that in 1 John iv. 18, "Fear hath torment." Rev. xx. 10, 14, 15, "And the devil

that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever." "And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book, was cast into the lake of fire." The declaration suggests the words of the Judge (Matt. xxv. 41), "Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels."

The advocates of annihilation give an unnatural force to the words, life and death, in the Scriptures. They assume that the words signify existence and non-existence. Careful study will show that they express, instead, happiness and misery. Luke xii. 15, "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth;" not his existence but his blessedness. Rom. ii. 7–9, "To them who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish." These last terms contrast with eternal life. Paul, in Phil. iii. 11, speaks of attaining unto the resurrection of the dead—not to mere continuance of life, but to blessedness. 1 Thess. iii. 8, "For now we live if ye stand fast in the Lord." Death and destruction are used to represent misery; see Rev. xx. 10, 14, 15.

If God has revealed annihilation in the Scriptures as the final portion of the lost, he has done it in language almost uniformly misunderstood.

10. A view tending somewhat in the direction of annihilation, but stopping short of it, and avoiding some of its difficulties, has been presented, of late, by different writers. This view represents that the condition of the lost will not favor growth, but will tend to produce or beget a wasting of the powers; that while advancement, progress, growth, is

the law of our being, the realization of this result requires favorable conditions, motives and forces which shall stimulate activity. In the case of the lost, shut out from the favor of God, all these forces will be wanting, and the soul will be left to shrivel, and wither, and decay. The wicked shall arise "to shame and everlasting contempt." This dwindling of a soul never goes to the extent of annihilation. Dr. Bushnell illustrates the condition by the asymptote of a curve—a straight line which continually approaches a curve, but never reaches it. The lost soul will never cease to be, but his powers and susceptibilities will become more and more insignificant. He becomes a mere shell, emptied of all that makes being valuable; hence the positive, conscious wretchedness of such a being will diminish, but never end. He must exist forever, the skeleton of what he was; an example of the righteous judgment of God.

The view which lies over against this, the prevalent view, has been that the law of progress and expansion belongs to human nature; that the unredeemed sinner will continue under this law of growth; that his powers and susceptibilities will expand, and thus the positive conscious misery of the lost soul will increase and accumulate forever. Both these views are mainly speculative. The truth in the case, lies utterly beyond our reach. There seems no reason why we should assume the law of growth to operate in the case of the soul cast out into outer darkness.

11. Finally, nothing appears, in reason or in the Scriptures, which warrants a departure from the commonly received doctrine of the church; that those who go on in sin and pass into the other world as sinners, unreconciled to God, will continue in sin, and abide forever under God's displeasure.

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